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
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Hermes

James Harris

XL 45, 35 [He
E!)



See Herm. p. 324, 325.

Engraved by Bauer.

HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQVIRY
CONCERNING
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BY JAMES HARRIS ESQ.

ΙΧΙΕΝΑΙ ΘΑΡΡΟΤΑΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΤΑΤΩΑ ΘΕΩΤΩ

THE SECOND EDITION
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M DCC LXV

To the Right Honourable
PHILIP Lord HARDWICKE,
 Lord High Chancellor of *Great Britain**.

My Lord,

AS no one has exercised the Powers of Speech with juster and more universal applause, than yourself; I have presumed to inscribe the following Treatise to your Lordship, its End being to investigate the Principles of those Powers. It has a farther claim to your Lordship's Patronage, by being connected in some degree with that politer Literature, which, in the most important scenes

A 2 of

* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.

of Busines, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

*Your Lordship's most obliged,
and most obedient humble Servant,*

*Cloſe of Salilbury,
Oc. 1, 1751.*

James Harris.

P R E F A C E.

TH E chief End, proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curioſity and inquiry; not to teach them himſelf by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if poſſible, to become Teachers to themſelves, by an impartial uſe of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Inſtruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that paſſively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowlege he rather thinks to reſemble the growth of Fruit; however external cauſes may in ſome degree co-operate, 'tis the internal vigour, and virtue of

A 3 the

the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est. —

For

*For tho' he hopes, he cannot be charged
with the foolish love of vain Praise,
he has no desire to be thought indif-
ferent, or insensible to honest Fame.*

*From the influence of these senti-
ments, he has endeavoured to treat his
subject with as much order, correct-
ness, and perspicuity as in his power ;
and if he has failed, he can safely
say (according to the vulgar phrase)
that the failure has been his misfor-
tune, and not his fault. He scorns
those trite and contemptible methods
of anticipating pardon for a bad per-
formance, that " it was the hasty
fruits of a few idle hours ; written
merely for private amusement ;
never revised ; published against
consent, at the importunity of
friends, copies (God knows how)
having by stealth gotten abroad ;"
with other stale jargon of equal fal-
shood and inanity. May we not ask
such Prefacers, If what they allege*

be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities?

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now a-days are but little studied; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name, just

just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes,

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Nemonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, shoud venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that no body knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect?—Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and 'tis to be feared he has) what method had be best take in a circumstance so critical?—Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows—

He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of ancient sentiments, as the view of ancient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the SAME REASON has at all times prevailed; how there is ONE TRUTH, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

Nothing

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge ; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

'Tis perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we BRITONS by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen ; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think

2 per-

perfection with ourselves, and that 'tis superfluous to search farther.

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something pecu-

peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. 'Tis hard indeed to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of LOGIC, or UNIVERSAL REASONING. 'Tis thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the MIND, during its proceſs in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since MIND, like other Powers, can be

be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every

every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service

service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confess already, 'twould be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably depart to those destined regions, where the productions of modern Wit are every day departing,

—*in vicum vendentem tus et
odores.*

T H E

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H E R-

HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BOOK. I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

IF Men by nature had been framed Ch. I.
for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse
to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they
had been by nature irrational, they could
not have recognized the proper Subjects
of Discourse. Since SPEECH then is the
joint Energie of our best and noblest Fa-
culties (*a*), (that is to say, of our *Rea-*
B*son*

(*a*) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv.
p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296. of the same Volume.

Ch. I. son and our *social Affection*) being withal
 our peculiar Ornament and Distinction, as
Men; those Inquiries may surely be deemed
 interesting as well as liberal, which either
 search how SPEECH may be naturally *re-*
solved; or how, when resolved, it may
 be again *combined*.

HERE a large field for speculating opens
 before us. We may either behold SPEECH,
 as divided into its *constituent Parts*, as a
 Statue may be divided into its several
 Limbs; or else, as resolved into its *Matter*
 and *Form*, as the same Statue may be re-
 solved into its Marble and Figure.

THESE different *Analyzings* or *Reso-*
lutions constitute what we call * PHILO-
 SOPHICAL, OR UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

WHEN

(b) Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia
 sit literaria; alia philosophica &c. Bacon. de Augm.
 Scient. VI. 1. And soon after he adds—Verumtamen
 hāc ipsā re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammati-
 cam quandam, quae non analogiam verborum ad invicem,
 sed analogiam inter verba et res frē rationem sedulō in-
 quirat.

WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus Ch. I. analyzed, we may then consider it, as compounded. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (*c*) *Synthesis*, which by combining simple Terms produces a *Truth*; then by combining two *Truths* produces a *third*; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of SCIENCE.

Now this is that *superior* and most excellent *Synthesis*, which alone applies itself to our *Intellect* or *Reason*, and which to

B 2 conduct

(c) Aristotle says — τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν ἔτε ἀληθὲς ἔτε ψευδές ἐστιν οἷον ἀνθρωπός, λεῦκός, τρέχει, νικᾷ — Of those words which are spoken without Connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, *Man*, *white*, *runneth*, *conquereth*. Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise *De Interpretatione*, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διάρεσιν ἐστι τὸ ψευδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. *True and False are seen in Composition and Division.* Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical.

Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, constitutes the Art of LOGIC.

AFTER this we may turn to those
(d) *inferior Compositions*, which are productive

(d) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatise Περὶ Ερμηνείας, p. 53. gives the following Extract from *Theophrastus*, which is here inserted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant

Διτῆς γὰρ ἔστι τὸ λόγιον σχέσεως, (καθὰ διάβιστον ὁ Φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος) τῆς τε ΠΡΟ`Σ ΤΟΤ`Σ ἈΚΡΟΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἵς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς ΠΡΟ`Σ ΤΑ` ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ᾧ ὁ λέγων τεῖσται προσθῆται τὰς ἀκροωμένας, τερὶ μὲν ἐν τὴν σχέσιν ἀυτῇ τὴν ΠΡΟ`Σ ΤΟΤ`Σ ἈΚΡΟΑΤΑ`Σ καταγίνουσι τοιησὶ καὶ ρήτορικὴ, διδτεὶ ἔργον ἀμιλαῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὄνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίας συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὡς εἰ διὰ τέτων καὶ τῶν τέτοις ἐπομένων, οἷον στρατηγίας, γλυκύτητος, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἴδεων, ἔτι τε μακρολογίας καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν τάσσετων παραλαμβανομένων, οἵσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ ἐκπληξᾶσι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν· τῆς δέ γε ΠΡΟ`Σ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τὸ λόγιον σχέσεως ὁ Φιλόσοφος προπονημένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τε ψεῦδος μελέγχων,

ductive of the *Pathetic*, and the *Plea-* Ch. I.
sant in all their kinds. These latter Com-
 positions

καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύει. The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains something, and one to the THINGS, concerning which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the busines of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.

*Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same Subject. Creavit Deus hominem rationis partipem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhucuit. Prima est Grammatica, quae ab oratione solētismos & barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quae in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, quae ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirit, Min. l. i.
 §. 2.*

Ch. I, positions aspire not to the Intellect, but being addressed to the *Imagination*, the *Affections*, and the *Sense*, become from their different heightnings either RHETORIC or POETRY.

NOR need we necessarily view these Arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requisite to every one of the rest. And though LOGIC may indeed subsist without RHETORIC or POETRY, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles,

Now all these Inquiries (as we have said already) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be possibly not a few) may with justice be deem'd Inquiries both interesting and liberal.

At

AT present we shall postpone the whole ^{Ch. I.} synthetical Part, (that is to say, *Logic* and *Rhetoric*) and confine ourselves to the analytical, that is to say UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. In this we shall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, first dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE into its CONSTITUENT PARTS; then resolving it, as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and FORM; two Methods of Analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations.

SHOULD any one object, that in the course of our Inquiry we sometimes descend to things, which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which those things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Consequences, let him honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not improperly be here inserted. " When the Fame

Ch. I, " of *Heraclitus* was celebrated through-
 —— " out *Greece*, there were certain persons,
 " that had a curiosity to see so great a
 " Man. They came, and, as it happened,
 " found him warming himself in a
 " Kitchen. The Meanness of the place
 " occasioned them to stop; upon which
 " the Philosopher thus accosted them—
 " ENTER (says he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE
 " TOO THERE ARE GODS (d)."

We shall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Presence; so there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philosophical Inquiry.

(e) See *Aristot. de Part. Animal.* l. 1. c. 5.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the Analyzing of Speech into its smallest Parts.

THOSE things, which are *first to Nature*, are not *first to Man*. *Nature* begins from *Causes*, and thence descends to *Effects*: *Human Perceptions* first open upon *Effects*, and thence by slow degrees ascend to *Causes*. Often had Mankind seen the sun in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition; much oftner had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a).

Even

(a) This Distinction of *prior to Man* and *prior to Nature*, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. See *Arist. Phys. Auscult.* l. 1. c. 1. *Themistius's Comment* on the same, *Poëter. Analyt.* l. 1. c. 2. *De Anima*, l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between

Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and *human Creation*, if we except a few Artists and critical

tween Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. GOD may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views *Effects* thro' *Causes* in their *natural Order*. MAN views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views *Causes* thro' *Effects*, in an *inverse Order*. And hence the Meaning of that Passage in Aristotle: ὅτιπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν οὐκείδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τὰ δὲ τῆς νηστέρας ψυχῆς οὐ Νᾶς πρὸς τὰ ἡτοῖ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντα. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all Things,* Metaph. l. 2. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—Αγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλάστερα καὶ τελεότερα προΐεναι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα. “Οὐτω γέν καὶ οὐ παῖς εἶραι μὲν λόγου, καὶ ἐιπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, οἴδε· τέτοι δέ αναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ρῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβάς, κακεῖνα εἰς σοιχεῖα ὑκέτι. *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh;*

tical Observers, the rest look no higher Ch. II.
than to the *Practice* and mere *Work*,
knowing nothing of those *Principles*, on
which the whole depends.

THUS in SPEECH for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own Language? How few then must be those, who know GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL; *that Grammar*, which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages; *only respects those Principles, that are essential to them all?*

'Tis our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall follow

walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Cóm. de Prædic, p. 28.

Ch. II. follow the Order consonant to *human Perception*, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

We shall begin therefore first from a *Period* or *Sentence*, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence pass, if possible, to those its *primary Parts*, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

WITH respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as, if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *assert*, and when we *question*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wish*?

FOR example, when we read in *Shakespeare**,

*The Man, that bath no music in himself.
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for Treasons—*

Or

* Merchant of Venice.

Or in *Milton**,

Ch. II.

*O Friends, I bear the tread of nimble
feet,*

Hasting this way—

'tis obvious that these are *assertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* says to her Companions,

*When shall we three meet again
In thunder, lightning and in rain?*

this 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* says to the Ghost of Banquo,

*—Hence, horrible Shadow,
Unreal Mock'ry hence! —*

he speaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the passion of hatred.

WHEN

* P. L. IV. 866.

Ch. II. WHEN Milton says in the character of
 his *Allegro*,

*Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
 Jest and youthful Jollity,*

he too speaks an *imperative Sentence*, tho'
 founded on the passion, not of hatred but
 of love.

WHEN in the beginning of the *Para-*
dise Lost we read the following address,

*And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
 Before all temples th' upright heart, and
 pure,
 Instruct me, for thou know'st—*

this is not to be called an *imperative Sentence*, tho' perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word)
 'tis a Sentence *precative* or *optative*.

WHAT then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in their

their stamp and character? Are they no Ch. II. way reducible to certain definite Classes? If not, they can be no objects of *rational* comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often apply'd to a man, when speaking, that *he speaks his MIND*; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is *a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his Soul*. So it indeed is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the Dissembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over and above the meer † nutritive) may be included all of them in those of PERCEPTION, and those of VOLITION. By the Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the *Senses* and the *Intellect*; by the Powers of VOLITION, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the *Will*, but the several *Passions* and *Appetites*; in short, *all that moves to Action, whether rational or irrational*.

IE

† Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

Ch. II. If then the leading Powers of the Soul
 be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech
 or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul,
 must of course respect one or other of
 these.

If we *assert*, then is it a Sentence which
 respects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For
 what indeed is to *assert*, if we consider the
 examples above alleged, but *to publish*
some Perception either of the Senses or
the Intellect?

AGEN, if we *interrogate*, if we *com-mand*, if we *pray*, or if we *wish*, (which
 in terms of Art is to speak Sentences *in-terrogative*, *imperative*, *precative*, or *op-
 tative*) what do we but publish so many
 different VOLITIONS?—For who is it that
questions? He that has a *Desire* to be in-
 formed.—Who is it that *commands*? He
 that has a *Will*, which he would have
 obey'd.—What are those Beings, who
 either *wish* or *pray*? Those, who feel
 certain

certain wants either for themselves, or Ch. II.
others.

If then the Soul's leading Powers be the two above mentioned, and it be true that all Speech is a publication of these Powers, it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (b).

THE

(b) Ρητέου τὸν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διτὰς ἔχοντος δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὀρεκτικὰς λεζομένας (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν, καθ' αὐτὸς γνωσκομενούς ἐκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νῦν, διανοιαν, ἀδέξαν, Φαντασίαν καὶ αἰσθησιν· ὀρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' αὐτὸς ὀρεγόμενα τὰν ἀλαζῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δοκεύοντων, οἷον βέλησταλόγω, προαιρεσιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ ΜΕΝ τέτταρα εἴδη τῷ λόγῳ (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, εὐκαὶ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργεύστης, ἀλλὰ ὡφεὶς ἔτερου ἀποτελούμενης (τὸν συμβάλλεσθαι δοκεύεται ὡφεῖς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) καὶ ἡτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτῇ

C

Ζητάσας,

Ch. II. The Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare the

ζητάσης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΠΤΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καὶ
ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ καλυμένῳ λόγῳ, πᾶς προσύρας,
καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, πάσας ἀλλήλαις ταχεῖς ἀφεμέντις, πρὸς δὲ
δὲ λόγῳ, ὥρπερ ἐπὶ τῷ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, πᾶς πρὸς πρᾶξιν
ἀλλήλαις πράξεις· καὶ τάυτης, πᾶς πρᾶξις κρείτιονθε, μηδὲ εἰς
τῆς ΕΤΧΗΣ, πᾶς πρᾶξις χείρος, πᾶς ἐπὶ τῷ κυρίως
καλυμένης ΙΘΘΩΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ μόνον ΔΕ τὸ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωστικῶν, καὶ εἴς τοῦ
ἔχυγγελτικὸν τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθῶς, πᾶς Φαινομένως, διὸ καὶ μόνον τοῦτο δεκτίκον εἴς την ἀληθείας πᾶσαν φεύδης, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν. The Meaning of the above passage being implied in the Text, we take its translation from the Latin Interpreter. Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra duplēm potestatē habeat, cognitionis, & vita, quæ etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellatur; quæ vero cognitionis est, vis est, quā res singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantasia, sensus: appetitus vero faciles est, quæ bona, vel quæ sunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiscimus, ut sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis species, præter emunciantem, a partibus animi proficiuntur, quæ concupiscunt; non cum animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui ei ad consequendum id, quod cupit, conducere posse videatur; atque etiam vel rationem ab eo exquirit, ut in oratione, quam Percundantem,

the Eneid to an Epigram of *Martial*. But Ch. II. the *longest Extension*, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here consider'd, that is to say a SENTENCE. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated.

Now a SENTENCE (*c*) may be sketch'd in the following description—a compound

C 2 Quantity

tem, aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in optante oratione, vel aliquam ejus actionem: atque in hac, vel ut a praefantio, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprio Jussus nominatur. Sola autem Enunciatio a cognoscendi facultate proficiuntur: haec nunciat rerum cognitionem, quae in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Haec sola verum falsumque capit: præterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

(c) Λόγῳ δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, ἵνα τὸ μέρη καθ' αὐτὰ σημαίνει τι. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.

Ch. II. Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.

Thus when I say [*the Sun shineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of Sound has a meaning, but *certain Parts* also, such as [*Sun*] and [*shineth*.]

BUT what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all meaning, like Body to be divisible, and to include within itself other Meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as *a Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant*. And this is what we call the proper character of a (*d*) WORD. For thus, though the Words

(d) Φωνὴ σημαντικὴ,—ἥς μέρος ἐδέν εἰς· καθ' αὐτὸς σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2. & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows

Words [*Sun*] and [*shineth*] have each a Ch. II. Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other.

IF therefore ALL SPEECH whether in prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain *Meaning*, divisible into other Meanings, but WORDS imply a *Meaning*, which is not so divisible: it follows that WORDS will be the smallest parts of speech, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all.

C 3

To

follows.—*Dicitio est pars minima orationis constructæ, id est, in ordine compositæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum est, ne quis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc sit divisio.* To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza.—Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστου κατὰ σύναξιν λόγου. Introd. Gram. l. 4. Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word—See Cratylus, p. 385. Edit. Serr.

Ch. II. *To know therefore the species of Words*
must needs contribute to the knowledge of
Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its
minutest Parts.

This therefore must become our next
Inquiry.

C H A P.

CHAP. III.

*Concerning the species of Words, the smallest
Parts of Speech.*

LET us first search for the Species of Ch.III.
Words among those Parts of Speech,
commonly received by Grammarians, For
example, in one of the passages above
cited.—

*The Man, that bath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet
sounds,
Is fit for treasons—*

Here the Word [*The*] is an ARTICLE;—
[*Man*] [*No*] [*Music*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*]
[*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treasons*] are all NOUNS,
some Substantive, and some Adjective—
[*That*] and [*Himself*] are PRONOUNS—
[*Hath*] and [*is*] are VERBS—[*moved*] a
PARTICIPLE—[*Not*] an ADVERB—[*And*]
a CONJUNCTION—[*In*] [*with*] and [*For*]

Ch.III. are PREPOSITIONS. In one sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the Greek Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latins* only differ in having no Article, and in separating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itself, which the Greeks include among the Species of *Adverbs*,

WHAT then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above,

The Man that hath no music, &c.

ONE Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Has*,
2 *Had*,

*Had, &c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweetest; Ch.III.
Fit into Fitter and Fittest.* On the con-
trary the Words, *The, In, And*, and some
others, remain as they are, and cannot be
altered.

AND yet it may be questioned, how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual Variation*, which is unknown both to the Moderns and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case, and Number ; whereas the *English* never vary them in any of those ways, but thro' all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods ; some by *Auxiliars*, as when for *Bruti*, or *Bruto* we say of *Brutus*, to *Brütus*; some
by

Ch.III. by meer Position, as when for Brutum am-
 ~~~~~ vit Cassius, we say, *Cassius lov'd Brutus.*  
 For here the Accasative, which in Latin  
 is known any where from its Variation, is  
 in English only known from its *Position* or  
 place.

If then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

SUPPOSE then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several Parts as they stand *separate* and detached. Some 'tis plain *still preserve a Meaning*, (such as *Man, Music, Sweet, &c.*) others on the contrary *immediately lose it* (such as, *And, The, With, &c.*) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when *in company*, or *associated*.

Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For if all Words

Words are significant, or else they wou'd Ch III.  
not be Words; and if every thing not ~~absolute~~  
~~relative~~, is of course *relative*; then will all  
Words be significant either *absolutely* or  
*relatively*.

WITH respect therefore to this Distinc-  
tion, the first sort of Words may be call'd  
*significant by themselves*; the latter may be  
call'd *significant by relation*; or if we like  
it better, the first sort may be call'd *Prin-  
cipals*, the latter *Accessories*. The first are  
like those stones in the basis of an Arch,  
which are able to support themselves, even  
when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are  
like those stones in its Summit or Curve,  
which can no longer stand, than while the  
whole subsists. (e.)

### § THIS

(e) *Apollonius of Alexandria* (one of the acutest Au-  
thors that ever wrote on the subject of Grammar) il-  
lustrates the different power of Words, by the differ-  
ent power of Letters. "Ετι ἐν τρόποις τῶν σούχεων  
τὸ μὲν τὸ φανέσθαι, οὐ καθ' ἕκατα φανήν αἴτοις εἰ.  
τὰ

Ch.III. § This Distinction being admitted, we thus pursue our Speculations. All things what-

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τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ὡπέρ ἄνευ τῶν Φωνήσιων οὐχ ἔχει ρητὴν πὴν ἐκφώνησιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ πὶ τῶν λέξεων, αἱ μὲν γάρ αὐλῆι, τρόπου τινὰ τῷ φωνητικῷ, ρηταὶ εἰσὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ρημάτων, ὀνομάτων, ἀγωνυμιῶν, ἐπιρρημάτων——αἱ δὲ, ὡσπερεὶ σύμφωνα, ἀναμένεσθαι τὰ φωνήστα, οὐ δινάμενα κατ' ίδίων ρητὰ εῖναι——καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἀρθρῶν, τῶν συνδεσμῶν τὰ γάρ τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ τῶν μορίων συσημαίνειν.  
*In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters some are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no express Vocality, so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for those parts of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when associated to something else.* Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. I. c. 3. *Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit NOMEN & VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; cetera vero, ADMENICULA vel JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae & trabes, cetera autem (id est, cera, stuppa, &c. clavi & similia), quinqua & conglutinationes*

whatever either exist as the Energies, or Ch.III.  
*Affections of some other thing, or without*  
*being the Energies or Affections of some*  
*other thing.* If they exist as the Energies  
or *Affections of something else,* then are  
they called ATTRIBUTES. Thus *to think* is the attribute of a Man; *to be white*, of a Swan; *to fly*, of an Eagle; *to be four-footed*, of a Horse. If they exist not after this manner, then are they call'd SUBSTANCES\*. Thus *Man*, *Swan*, *Eagle* and *Horse* are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else do they exist as Energies or Affections.

## AND.

*tiones partium navis, (hoc est, tabularum & trabium) non partes navis dicuntur.* Prisc. L. IX. 913.

\* SUBSTANCES] Thus Aristotle. Νῦν μὲν ἐν τύπῳ ἔργαται, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ κίσια, δῆτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑπόκειμένης, αὐλαὶ καθ' ἐτὰ αὐλαῖς. Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb.

Ch. III. AND thus all things whatsoever being either (f) *Substances* or *Attributes*, it follows of course that all Words, which are significant as *Principals*, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are significant of *Substances*, they are call'd *Substantives*; if of *Attributes*, they are call'd *Attributives*. So that ALL WORDS whatever, significant as *Principals*, are either *SUBSTANTIVES* or *ATTRIBUTIVES*.

AGAIN, as to Words, which are only significant as *Accessories*, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner define or determine, they may justly for that reason be called

DE-

(f) This division of things into *Substance* and *Accident* seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and Ages. See *Categor.* c. 2. *Metaphys.* L. VII. c. 1. *De Cœlo*, L. III. c. 1.

DEFINITIVES. If *so many Words* at Ch.III. once, then as they serve to no other purpose than *to connect*, they are call'd for that reason by the name of CONNECTIVES.

AND thus it is that all WORDS whatever are either *Principals* or *Accessories*; or under other Names, either *significant from themselves*, or *significant by relation*. —If *significant from themselves*, they are either *Substantives* or *Attributives*; if *significant by relation*, they are either *Definitives* or *Connectives*. So that under one of these four Species, SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES and CONNECTIVES, are ALL WORDS, however different, in a manner included.

If any of these Names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the *Substantives*, NOUNS; the *Attributives*, VERBS; the *Definitives*,

Ch.III. ARTICLES, and the *Connectives, Con-*  
*junctions.*

SHOU'D it be ask'd, what then becomes of *Pronouns, Adverbs, Prepositions,* and *Interjections;* the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient days, as to the *number* of these Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his \* Sophist mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb.* Aristotle mentions no more, where he treats of † Propositions. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to *Logic* or *Dia-*

\* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3.

*Dialectic (g), considering the Essence of Ch.III.*  
 Speech as contain'd in these two, because these alone combin'd make a perfect *affirmative Sentence*, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore Aristotle in his \* *treatise of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements  
 of

(g) *Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialeticos duæ, NOMEN & VERBUM; quia hæ solæ etiam per se conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes οὐκαληγόρηται, hoc est, consignificantia appellabant.* Priscian. l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putschii. *Existit hic quædam quæstio, cur duo tantum, NOMEN & VERBUM, sè (Aristoteles sc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur.* Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, suffecit. *Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis & Nominibus componatur.* — *Quare superfluum est querere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis orationis instituit elementa partiri.* Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. *Apollonius from the above principles elegantly calls the NOUN and VERB, τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη, τὰ λόγια, the most animated parts of Speech.* De Syntaxi l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quæst. Platon. p. 1009.

\* Poet. Cap. 20.

## D

Ch.III. of a more variegated speech) adds the Article and Conjunction to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To Aristotle's authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder Stoicks (*b*).

THE latter Stoicks instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative*, and *Proper*. Others increas'd the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Preposition* from the Conjunction. The *Latin Grammarians* went farther, and detach'd the *Interjection* from the Adverb, within which by the Greeks it was always included, as a Species.

WE

(*b*) For this we have the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Struct. Orat. Sect. 2.* whom Quintilian follows, *Inst. l. i. c. 4.* Diogenes Laertius and Priscian make them always to have admitted five Parts. See Priscian, as before, and Laertius, *Lib. VII. Segm. 57.*

WE are told indeed by (*i*) *Dionyphus* of Ch. III. *Halicarnassus* and *Quintilian*, that *Aristotle*, with *Theodectes*, and the more early writers, held but three Parts of speech, the *Noun*, the *Verb*, and the *Conjunction*. This, it must be own'd, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are (*k*) told) admit no other. But as to *Aristotle*, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the four Species which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper Definition \*.

## D 2                          To

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(*i*) See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

(*k*) *Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Estque hec Arabum quoque sententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem eam demum scribere cœperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam hac in re secuti sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum aliae etiam Orientis linguae retinent. Dubium, utrum eâ in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Græcorum, an bipotius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnoverisse, non solum autor est Dionyphus, &c. Voss. de Analog. l. i. c. i. See also Sanctii Miner. l. i. c. 2.*

\* Sup. p. 34.

Ch.III. To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the NOUN, the VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNCTION; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES and CONNECTIVES.

C H A P.

## C H A P. IV.

*Concerning Substantives, properly so called.*

**S**UBSTANTIVES are all those principal Ch.IV. Words, which are significant of Substances, considered as Substances.

THE first sort of *Substances* are the NATURAL, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

THERE are other Substances of our own making. Thus by giving a Figure not natural to natural Materials we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

AGAIN, by a more refin'd operation of our Mind alone, we abstract any Attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, devoid of its dependence. For example, from Body we abstract to Fly; from Sur-

D 3 face,

Ch.IV. face, the being White; from Soul, the being temperate.

AND thus 'tis we convert even *Attributes* into *Substances*, denoting them on this occasion by proper *Substantives*, such as *Flight*, *Whiteness*, *Temperance*; or else by others more general, such as *Motion*, *Colour*, *Virtue*. These we call **ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES**; the second sort we call **ARTIFICIAL**.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example in *natural Substances*, *Animal* is a Genus; *Man*, a Species; *Alexander*, an Individual. In *artificial Substances*, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican*, an Individual. In *abstract Substances*, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight or that Flight* are Individuals.

As

As therefore every (*a*) GENUS may be Ch. IV.  
 found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog are each of them distinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals*; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon are each of them completely and distinctly *a Man*) hence it is, that every Genus, tho' ONE, is multiply'd into MANY; and every Species, tho' ONE, is also multiply'd into MANY, by reference to those beings, which are their proper subordinates. Since then no Individual has any such Subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as MANY, and so is truly an INDIVIDUAL as well in Nature as in Name.

D 4

FROM

(*a*) This is what *Plato* seems to have express'd in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of μίαν ιδέαν διὰ τολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἑκάτευ κειμένη χωρὶς, τάντη διατεταμένη—καὶ τολλᾶς, ἐπέρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔχωντες περιεχομένας. *Sophist.* p. 253. Edit. *Serrani*. For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the *Isagoge* or Introduction of *Porphyry* to *Aristotle's Logic*.

Ch.IV. FROM these Principles it is, that *Words*  
 following the nature and genius of *Things*,  
*such Substantives* admit of NUMBER as de-  
 note *Genera* or *Species*, while those, which  
 denote (*b*) Individuals, in strictness admit  
 it not.

BESIDES

(*b*) Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or Number, from the causes following. In the first place the Individuals of the human race are so large a multitude even in the smallest nation, that 'twould be difficult to invent a new Name for every new born Individual. Hence then instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and many call'd *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the *Romans* had their Plurals, *Marci*, and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthonies*. Now the Plurals of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because 'tis merely by chance that the Names coincide.

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catos*, or (to instance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelbams*, and *Montagues*; because a *Race* or Family is like a *smaller sort of Species*; so that the *family Name* extends to the *Kindred*, as the specific Name extends to the Individuals.

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names become Plural, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one Individual, whose Name became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all

BESIDES Number, another character- Ch IV.  
istic, visible in Substances, is that of SEX. Every Substance is either *Male* or *Female*; or both *Male and Female*; or neither one nor the other. So that with respect to Sexes and their Negation, all Substances conceivable are comprehended under this fourfold consideration,

Now the existence of *Hermaphrodites* being rare, if not doubtful; hence Language, only regarding those distinctions which

those, who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus every great Critic was call'd an *Aristarchus*; every great Warrior, an *Alexander*; every great Beauty, a *Helen*, &c.

*A Daniel come to Judgment! yea a Daniel,*  
cries *Skylock* in the Play, when he would express the wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So *Martial* in that well known verse,  
*Sint Mæcenates, non decrunt, Flacce, Marones.*

So *Lucilius*,  
*Αἰγιλίποι montes, Ἀθνæ omnes, αἱperi Athones.*  
*πόσοι Φαέθοντες, ή Δευκαλίωνες,* Lucian in *Timon*.  
T. I. p. 108.

Ch.IV. which are more obvious, considers *Words*  
 denoting *Substances* to be either **MASCULINE**, **FEMININE**, or **NEUTER** \*.

As to our own Species and all those animal Species, which *have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are *eminently distinguished*, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to those animal Species, which either *less frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *less apparently distinguished* from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

IN

\* After this manner they are distinguished by *Aristotle*. Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ θῆλεα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ. Poet. cap. 21. *Protagoras* before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενα, θῆλεα, καὶ σκέυη. Aristot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where mark what were afterwards called ὑδέτερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μεταξύ καὶ σκέυη.

+ IN the English Tongue it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is *Masculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Substance*; none *Feminine*, but what denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and that where the Substance has no Sex, the Substantive is always *Neuter*. Ch.IV.

BUT 'tis not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many of the *modern Tongues*. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes) which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. MIND is surely neither male, nor female; yet is ΝΟΥΣ, in *Greek*, masculine, and MENS, in *Latin*, feminine.

## IN

† *Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, neutrum haberi oportet, sed id Ars &c. Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.*

The whole Passage from *Genera Hominum, quæ naturalia sunt &c.* is worth perusing.

**Ch.IV.** IN some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the meer casual structure of the Word itself: 'Tis of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns even *in things without Sex* a distant analogy to that great NATURAL DISTINCTION, *which* (according to Milton) *animates the World* ‡.

IN this view we may conceive such SUBSTANTIVES to have been considered, as MASCULINE, which were “conspicuous “for the Attributes of imparting or communicating; or which were by nature active, strong, and efficacious, and that indiscriminately whether to good or to ill; or which had claim to Eminence, either laudable or otherwise.”

## THE

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‡ Mr. Linnæus, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the *Distinction of Sexes* throughout the whole *Vegetable World*, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method,

THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch.IV.  
“ such, as were conspicuous for the At-  
“ tributes either of receiving, of contain-  
“ ing, or of producing and bringing forth;  
“ or which had more of the passive in  
“ their nature, than of the active; or  
“ which were peculiarly beautiful and  
“ amiable; or which had respect to such  
“ Excesses, as were rather Feminine, than  
“ Masculine.”

UPON these Principles the two greater Luminaries were considered, one as Masculine, the other as Feminine; the SUN (*Hλ.ο., Sol*) as *Masculine*, from communicating Light, which was native and original, as well as from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his Rays; the MOON (*Σελήνη, Luna*) as *Feminine*, from being the Receptacle only of another's Light, and from shining with Rays more delicate and soft.

THUS

Ch.IV. Thus Milton,

*First in his East the glorious Lamp was seen,  
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round  
Invested with bright rays; jocund to run  
His longitude thro' Heav'n's high road:  
the gray*

*Dawn, and the Pleiades before him danc'd,  
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the  
Moon*

*But opposite, in levell'd West was set,  
His mirrour, with full face borrowing her  
Light*

*From him; for other light she needed none.*

P. L. VII. 370.

By Virgil they were considered as *Brother* and *Sister*, which still preserves the same distinction.

*Nec FRATRIS radius obnoxia surgere LUNA.*

G. I. 396.

THE SKY or ETHER is in Greek and Latin *Masculine*, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth.

The

\* The EARTH on the contrary is universally Feminine, from being the grand Receiver, the grand Container, but above all from being the Mother (either mediately or immediately) of every sublunary Substance, whether animal or vegetable.

Thus Virgil,

*Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS fæcundis im-  
bribus ÆTHER*

*CONJUGIS in gremium LÆTÆ descendit,  
& omnes*

*Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fætus.*

G. II. 325.

Thus Shakespeare,

— ♀ COMMON MOTHER, Thou  
Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite  
Breast

Teems and feeds all — Tim. of Athens.

So Milton,

Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER,  
yields.

P. L. V.

So

\* Senecæ Nat. Quæst. III. 14.

‡ Παμπῆτορ γῆ χαῖρε — Græc. Anth. p. 281.

Ch.IV. So *Virgil*,

*Non jam MATER alit TELLUS, viresque  
ministrat (c).*      Æn. XI. 71.

AMONG artificial Substances the SHIP (*Naūs, Navis*) is feminine, as being so eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their Vessel, say always, “ SHE rides at “ anchor,” “ SHE is under sail.”

A CITY (*Πόλις, Civitas*) and a COUNTRY (*Πάτρις, Patria*) are feminine also, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurses* of their respective Inhabitants.

THUS

(c) —διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ δλῳ τὴν ΓῆΣ φύσιν, ὡς ΘΗΛΑΤ  
καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζεσσιν. ΟΤΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ΉΛΙΟΝ,  
καὶ ἐν τῶν ἀλλων τῶν τοιέτων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ  
ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύεσσι. Arist. de Gener. Anim.  
I. 1. c. 2.

Thus *Virgil*,  
*Salve, MAGNA PAREN'S FRUGUM, Satur-*  
*nia Tellus,*  
*MAGNA VIRUM—*      Geor. II. 173.

Ch.IV.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those  
 brave Greeks, who fell at *Chæronea*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλεῖστα κα-

μόντων

Σώματα —

Their PARENT COUNTRY in HER bosom  
 holds

Their wearied bodies.—\*

So *Milton*,  
*The City, which Thou seeft, no other deem*  
*Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN of*  
*the Earth.*      Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being  
 the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the  
 Container

\* Demosth. in Orat. de Coronâ.

Ch. IV. *Container and Productress of so many Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) Feminine; yet its deep Voice and boisterous Nature have, in spight of these reasons, prevailed to make it Male.* Indeed the very Sound of Homer's

μέγα σθένος Ωκεανοῖο,

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female* delicacy and softness.

TIME (*Xρόνος*) from his mighty Efficacy upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as *Masculine*. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

\* Ὡ γὰρ Χρόνος μὲν ἔκαμψε, τέκλων καὶ σοφὸς,  
Ἄπαιδα δὲ ἐργαζόμενος αὐτενέπερα τό.

*Me TIME hath bent, that sorry Artist, HE  
That surely makes, whate'er be handles,  
worse.*

So

---

\* Ο Χρόνε, παντοίων θυηῶν πανεπίσκοπε Δαιμον.  
Græc. Anth. p. 290.

† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

So too *Shakespear*, speaking likewise of Ch. IV.  
TIME,

Orl. *Whom doth he gallop withal?*

Ros. *With a thief to the gallows.—*

As you like it.

THE Greek Θάνατος or "Ἄθηνες, and the English DEATH, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as *Masculine*. Even the Vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a FEMALE DEATH they would treat as ridiculous (*d*).

TAKE a few Examples of the masculine Death.

E 2

*Calli-*

(*d*) Well therefore did *Milton* in his *Paradise Lost* not only adopt DEATH as a Person; but consider him as *Masculine*: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not supported by Custom; that perhaps he had as much the Sanction of national Opinion for his *Masculine Death*, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.

Ch.IV. *Callimachus upon the Elegies of his Friend Heraclitus—*

Ἄς δὲ τεῖλι ζύσιν ἀηδονες, ἥσιν ὁ πάντων  
Ἀρπάκηηρ Ἀΐδης εἰς ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

—yet thy sweet warbling strains  
Still live immortal, nor on them shall DEATH  
His band e're lay, tho' Ravager of all.

IN the *Alcestis* of Euripides, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo*; and towards its end, there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and rescues *Alcestis* from his hands.

'Tis well known too, that SLEEP and DEATH are made Brothers by Homer. 'Twas to this old *Gorgias* elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, "How be did?" —

"SLEEP

“ SLEEP (replied the old Man) is just upon Ch.IV.  
 “ delivering me over to the care of his  
 “ BROTHER (e).”

Thus Shakespear, speaking of Life,  
 —merely Thou art Death's Fool;  
 For him Thou labour'st by thy flight to  
 shun,  
 And yet run'st tow'rds him still.  
 Meas. for Meas.

So Milton,  
 Dire was the tossing, deep the groans;  
 Despair  
 Tended the sick, busieſt from couch to couch:  
 And over them triumphant DEATH HIS  
 dart  
 Shook; but delay'd to strike—  
 P. L. XI. 489 (f).

## THE

(e) Ἡδη με 'Ο "ΤΠΝΟΣ ἀρχεται ταρανατατιθεδαι ΤΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

(f) Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce a female Death; suppose we read,

Ch.IV. THE supreme Being (God, Θεός, *Deus*, *Dieu*, &c.) is in all languages *Masculine*, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as Τὸς Πρῶτος, Τὸς Θεῖος, *Numen*, *Deity* (which last we *English* join to a neuter, saying *Deity itself*) sometimes I say we meet with these *Neuters*. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as GOD is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and exprest by a *Negation*, than by any of those Distinctions which are *co-ordinate with some Opposite*, as Male  
for

*And over them triumphant Death HER dart  
Sboak, &c.*

What a falling off? How are the nerves and strength of the whole Sentiment weakened?

for example is co-ordinate with Female, Ch. IV.  
Right with Left, &c. &c. (g),

VIRTUE (*Ἀρετὴ, Virtus*) as well as most of its Species are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

E 4

—*abaſb'd*

(g) Thus *Ammonius*, speaking on the same Subject —ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν, εἰφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν σιὰ μυθολογίας παραδόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησε τις οὐ αρρενωπὸν, οὐ θυληπρεπῆ (lege θηλυπρεπῆ) διαμόρφωσιν Φέρειν· καὶ τύτο ἐικότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρρένι τὸ θῆλυ σύνοιχον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΤΗΙ ΑΠΛΩΣ 'ΑΙΤΙΩΙ σύνοιχον οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ ονομάζομεν, [πρὸς] τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τὰ ὑψεμένα προτιμῶντες, γάτως αὐτὸν προσαγορέουμεν. PRIMUM dicimus, quod nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fæminæ specie fingere ausus est: idque merito: conjugatum enim mari fæmininum est. CAUSÆ autem omnino ABSOLUTÆ AC SIMPLICI nihil est conjugatum. Immo vero cum DEUM masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus præstantius submissò atque humili præferentes. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 30 b.—ἢ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Πρώτῳ φένε, Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 210. Sylb.

Ch.IV.

—*abash'd the Devil stood,  
And felt, how awful Goodness is, and saw  
VIRTUE in her shape how lovely; saw,  
and pin'd  
His loss —*

P. L. IV. 846.

THIS being allowed, VICE (*Kaxia*) becomes *Feminine* of course, as being, in the *συστοιχία* or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite (*b*).

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character, that was Male; but taken together they make a very

(b) They are both represented as *Females* by *Xenophon*, in the celebrated Story of *Hercules*, taken from *Prodicus*. See *Memorab.* L. II. C. I. As to the *συστοιχία* here mentioned, thus *Varro*.—*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem.* *De Ling. Lat.* L. IV. See also *Arist. Metaph.* L. I. c. 5. and *Ecclesiasticus*, Chap. lxii. ¶ 24.

very natural *Female*, which has no small Ch.IV.  
resemblance to the Coquette of a modern  
Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and  
shifting her favours, as different Beaus  
succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,  
Nunc mibi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*,  
is not so easy to explain, unless it be that  
female Passions of all kinds were consi-  
dered as susceptible of greater excess, than  
male Passions; and that the *Furies* were  
to be represented, as Things superlatively  
outrageous.

*Talibus Alecto dictis exarbit in iras.  
At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat  
artus :  
Diriguere oculi : tot Erinnys sibilat Hy-  
dris,  
Tantaque se facies aperit : tum flammca  
torquens*

Ch.IV. *Lumina cunctantem & quærentem dicere  
plura*  
*Reppulit, & geminos erexit crinibus an-*  
*gues,*  
*Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque bæc ad-*  
*didit ore :*  
*En ! Ego victa situ, &c.*

Æn. VII. 445 (i).

He,

(i) The Words above mentioned, *Time*, *Death*, *Fortune*, *Virtue*, &c. in *Greek*, *Latin*, *French*, and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender, which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say *ἡ ἀρετὴ* or *ὁ ἀρετὴ*, *bæc Virtus* or *bic Virtus*, *la Vertu* or *le Vertu*, and so of the rest. But 'tis otherwise in *English*. We in our own language say, Virtue is *its* own Reward, or Virtue is *her* own Reward ; Time maintains *its* wonted Pace, or Time maintains *his* wonted Pace.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinc-  
tion between the severe or *Logical* Stile, and the orna-  
mental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we speak of the  
above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex,

He, that would see more on this Sub- Ch.IV.  
ject, may consult *Ammonius the Peripatetic*.

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as Neuters, we speak of them *as they are*, and as becomes a *logical Inquiry*. When we give them *Sex*, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth *personified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus Milton,

—*The Thunder*  
*Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,*  
*Perhaps bath spent his shafts* — P. Lost. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Ministers of Vengeance*, and so personified them, had he afterwards said *its Shafts* for *his Shafts*, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

*Should intermitted Vengeance arm again*  
*His red right hand* — P. L. II. 173.

In this Place *His Hand* is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *It's*, by immediately referring us to *God himself* the Avenger.

Ch.IV. tic in his Commentary on the Treatise, *de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be received with

---

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

*At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd  
Each to his place: they heard his voice and went  
Obsequious: Heav'n his wonted face renew'd,  
And with fresh florets Hill and Valley smil'd.*

P. L. VI.

See also p. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *smile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed. Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—*Each Hill retir'd to its Place—Heaven renewed its wonted Face*—how prosaic and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the *Prosopeia*, which he was aiming to establish? In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. 'Twere to be wished, his Correctors had been as wise on their parts.

with candour, rather than scrutinized Ch. IV.  
with rigour. *Varro's* words on a Subject  
near akin are for their aptness and elegance  
well worth attending. *Non mediocres enim*  
*tenebræ in silvâ, ubi bæc captanda; neque*  
*èò, quò pervenire volumus, semitæ tritæ;*  
*neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta,*  
*quæ euntem retinere possunt* \*.

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect, from what has been said, that both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to WORDS, because in the first place they appertain to THINGS ; that is to say, because Substances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex ; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter. There is however this difference between the two Attributes : NUMBER in strictness descends no lower, than

to

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\* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

Ch.IV. to the last Rank of Species (*k*): GENDER  
on the contrary stops not here, but de-  
scends to every *Individual*, however diver-  
sified. And so much for SUBSTANTIVES,  
PROPERLY SO CALLED.

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(*k*) The reason, why *Number* goes no lower, is,  
that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*; the  
cause of which see before, p. 39.

C H A P.

## C H A P. V.

*Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order.*

**W**E are now to proceed to a SECOND- CH. V.  
DARY RACE OF SUBSTANTIVES, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

EVERY Object, which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the *first time*, or else is recognized, as having been perceived *before*. In the former case 'tis called an Object *τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως*, of the *first knowledge or acquaintance* (*a*) ; in the latter

(*a*) See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priscian*—*Interest autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogacioni redditia, Primam Cognitionem ostendit;*  
*Quis*

Ch. V. ter 'tis called an Object τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως, of the second knowledge or acquaintance.

Now as all Conversation passes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς προτῆς γνώσεως, that is to say, till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been Δεῖξις, that is, *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But the Authors of Language were

Quis fecit? Ego: *relatio vero Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. Putschii.*

were not content with this. They invented a Race of Words to supply this Pointing; which Words, as they always stood for Substantives or Nouns, were characterized by the Name of Ἀντωνυμία, or PRONOUNS (*b*). These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them *Pronouns of the First, the Second, and the Third Person*, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and the

(*b*) Εἴκεινον τὸν Ἀντωνυμίαν, τὸ μέρα ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ Σὴν αὐτοφορὰς ἈΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of Individuals, that he does not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quæ pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Speaker himself*. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of *equal Power*, they furnished the Speaker with the *Pronoun*, I. *I write, I say, I desire, &c.* and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason *the Pronoun of the First Person.*

AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be *the Party addrest*. Here for similar reasons they invented the *Pronoun*, THOU. *Thou writeſt, Thou walkeſt, &c.* and as the Party addrest is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse ; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Person.*

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addrest, but *some third Object, different from both*. Here they provided another *Pronoun*, HE, SHE, or IT, which in

in distinction to the two former was called Ch. V,  
*the Pronoun of the Third Person.*

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be distinguished by their respective PERSONS (c).

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(c) The Description of the different PERSONS here given is taken from *Priscian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Personas Pronominum sunt tres, prima, secunda, tertia.* Prima est, cum ipsa, quæ loquitur, de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de eâ pronuntiat, ad quam directo sermone loquitur; Tertia, cum de eâ, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. *Theodore Gaza* gives the same distinctions. Πρῶτον (ωρόσωπον sc.) ὡς ωρὶ ταῦταις Φράζει ὁ λέγων δευτέρου, ὡς ωρὶ τοῖς, ωρὸς δν ὁ λόγος τρίτου, ὡς ωρὶ τέταρτου. *Gaz. Gram.* L. IV. p. 152.

This account of Persons is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the Speaker; the Second, the Party addrest; and the Third, the Subject. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the Speaker, the other the Party addrest; yet till they become subjects of the discourse, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the subject, this is a character, which it shares in common

Ch. V. As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each Person has it: (I) has the plural (WE), because

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with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, the second Person immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he addresses, the immediate subject of his Discourse,

*Infandum, Regina, jubes, reverare dolorum.*

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all that time the party address'd) we hear nothing farther of this Second Person, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the First Person may be seen every where, because the Speaker every where is himself the Subject. They were indeed Events, as he says him self,

—*queque ipse miserrima vidi,*  
*Et quorum pars magna fui*—

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the course of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Second

because there may be many Speakers at Ch. V.  
one of the same Sentiment; as well as  
one, who, including himself, speaks the  
Sentiment of many. (*Thou*) has the  
plural (*you*), because a Speech may  
be spoken to many, as well as to one.  
(*He*) has the plural (*they*) because  
the Subject of discourse is often many at  
once.

BUT tho' all these Pronouns have *Number*, it does not appear either in *Greek*, or  
*Latin*, or any modern Language, that  
those of the first and second Person carry  
the distinctions of *SEX*. The reason seems

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Second Persons by being introduced as *present*. The *real*  
Second Person (*Dido*) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgil*. But when we read *Euclid*,  
we find neither *First* Person, nor *Second* in any part of  
the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker  
nor Party address (in which light we may always view  
the Writer and his Reader) can possibly become the  
Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing  
else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks  
itself, nor is spoken to by another.

Ch. V. to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have mark'd a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (*d*) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages *the third Person* has its *Genders*, and that even *English* (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (*e*) distinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

## HENCE

(*d*) *Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit.* Priscian. L. XII. p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax.* L. II. c. 7. p. 109.

(*e*) The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should read in history these words—*He caused him*

HENCE too we see the reason why *a Ch. V.*  
*single Pronoun (f)* to each Person, an I *to*

F 4

to

*to destroy him*—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Persepolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed ; which was the destroyer ; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction ? But there are no such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished ; when instead of the ambiguous Sentence, *He caused him to destroy him*, we are told with the proper distinctions, that *SHE caused HIM to destroy IT*. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not ; that the Promoter was the Woman ; that her Instrument was the Hero ; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(f) *Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversæ indicent voces ? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentes inter se sunt, & demonstrativæ ; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Iste ; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c.* Priscian, L. XII. p. 933.

Ch. V. to the *First*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of Speech. But 'tis not so with respect to the *Third Person*. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but *many Pronouns*, such as *He*, *This*, *That*, *Other*, *Any*, *Some*, &c.

IT must be confess indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they stand by themselves, and represent some *Noun*, (as when we say, *This is Virtue*, or δεικνύως, Give me *THAT*) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are associated to some *Noun* (as when we say, *THIS Habit is Virtue*; or δεικνύως, *THAT Man defrauded me*) then as they supply not the place of a *Noun*, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed

deed a near relation between *Pronouns* Ch. V. and *Articles*, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this —The genuine PRONOUN always stands by itself, assuming the Power of a Noun, and supplying its place—The genuine ARTICLE never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as *Attributives* or (g) *Adjectives*.

## As

(g) Τὸ "Αρθρὸν μὲλα ὄνόματος, καὶ οὐ 'Αντιωνυμία ἀν' ὄνόματος. THE ARTICLE stands WITH a Noun; but THE PRONOUN stands FOR a Noun. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. 'Αυτὸς δὲ τὰ ἀρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὄνόματα συναρτίσεως ἀποσάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποτεταγμένην αντιωνυμίαν μεταπίπτει. Now Articles, themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid. Again—"Οταν τὸ "Αρθρὸν μὴ ὄνόματος παραλαμβάνεται, τοιούσιας δὲ σύνταξης ὄνόματος οὐ

τρέπεται

**Ch. V.** As to the *Coalescence* of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second

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προεκλεβέμεθα, ἐκ τῶντος αὐτάγκης εἰς ἀντωνυμίαν μεταλληφθήσεται, εἴγε ωὐ τύλισμόντος μετ' ὄνομαστῷ δινάμει φύτι ὄνοματῷ παρελάθη. When the Article is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the same Syntax, which the Noun has; it must of absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears without a Noun, and yet is in power assumed for one. Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96. Inter Pronomina & Articulos hoc interest, quod Pronomina ea pertinetur, quae, cum sola sint, vicem nominis complent, ut **QUIS, ILLE, ISTE**: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur. Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: **ARTICULIS autem PRONOMINA connumerantes, FINITOS et ARTICULOS appellabant; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus, INFINITOS ARTICULOS dicebant.** Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, & **ARTICULARIA eos PRONOMINA** vocabant, &c. Prisc. L. I. p. 574. Varro, speaking of *Quisque* and *Hic*, calls them both **ARTICLES**, the first *indefinite*, the second *definite*. *De Ling. Lat.* L. VII. See also L. IX. p. 132. Voscius indeed in his Analogy (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because *Hic* has not the same power with the Greek Article,

Second will, either of them, by them- Ch. V.,  
selves coalesce with the Third, but not ~~with~~  
with each other. For example, 'tis good  
sense, as well as good Grammar, to say  
in any Language—I AM He—Thou  
ART He—but we cannot say—I AM  
Thou—nor Thou ART I. The reason  
is, there is no absurdity for the *Speaker* to  
be the *Subject* also of the Discourse, as  
when we say, *I am He*; or for the *Person*  
*addrest*; as when we say, *Thou art He*.  
But for the same Person, in the same cir-  
cumstances, to be at once the Speaker,  
and the Party addrest, this is impossible;  
and so therefore is the Coalescence of the  
First and Second Person.

AND now perhaps we have seen enough  
of *Pronouns*, to perceive how they differ  
from

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ticle, &c. But he did not enough attend to the antient  
Writers on this Subject, who considered all Words, as  
ARTICLES, which being associated to Nouns (and not  
standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain,  
and determine their Signification.

Ch. V., from other Substantives. The others are ~~Primary~~, these are their *Substitutes*; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aids when for reasons already (b) mentioned the others could not be used. 'Tis moreover by means of these, and of Articles, which are nearly allied to them, that

(b) See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence," 'Tis therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in aid; and hence 'tis it becomes equivalent to *deīξis*, that is, to *Pointing or Indication* "by the Finger." 'Tis worth remarking in that Verse of Persius,

*Sed pulchrum est DIGITO MONSTRARI, & dicier,  
HIC EST,*

how the *deīξis*, and the Pronoun are introduced together, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of *deīξis*, the Pronoun of the third Person stands for the first.

*Quod si militibus parcer, erit HIC quoque Miles.*

That is, *I also will be a Soldier.*

Tibul. I. II. El. 6. v. 7. See *Vulpian*.

that " **L**ANGUAGE, tho' in itself only signifi- Ch. V.  
 " **n**ificant of *general Ideas*, is brought down  
 " to denote *that infinitude of Particulars*,  
 " which are for ever arising, and ceasing  
 " to be." But more of this hereafter in  
 a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns al-  
 ready mentioned, they may be called *Pre-  
 positive*, as may indeed all Substantives,  
 because they are capable of introducing  
 or leading a Sentence, without having  
 reference to any thing previous. But be-  
 sides those there is ANOTHER PRONOUN  
 (in

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a sort of *implied Presence*, which they are supposed to indicate, though the Parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in *Apollonius*, τας μὲν τῆς ὀψεως εἶναι  
 δεῖξεις, τας δὲ τῆς νόης, that some Indications are *ocular*, and some are *mental*. De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3.  
 p. 104.

Ch. V. (in Greek ὅς, ὅσις (*i*) ; in Latin, *Qui* ; in English, *Who*, *Which*, *That*) a Pronoun, having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE I was to say—**LIGHT is a Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity.**—  
These

(i) The Greeks, it must be confess, call this Pronoun υποτακτικὸν ἀρθρόν, *the Subjunctive Article*. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the ωποτακτικὸν or true *prepositive Article*, not only confesses it to differ, as being express by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, 'tis wholly different. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὅτεν δὴ καὶ οὐ πίστις τὸν ἀρθρὸν ταῦτα—*for these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article.* And just before he says, *κυρίως γενέντις ἀρθρὸν τὸ ωποτακτικόν*—however properly speaking 'tis the *Prepositive is the Article*. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

These would apparently be two distinct Ch. V. Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, **LIGHT**, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, **IT**, and say—**LIGHT is a Body; IT moves with great celerity**—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a *Connective* (as for Example an **AND**) saying—**LIGHT is a Body, AND it moves with great celerity**—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now 'tis *in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun*, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of **AND IT**, we substitute **THAT**, or **WHICH**, saying **LIGHT is a Body, WHICH moves with great celerity**—the Sentence still retains its *Unity* and *Perfection*, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the **SUBJUNCTIVE**, because it cannot (like the

Ch. V. the Prepositive) introduce an original Sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous (k).

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(k) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence, which Sentence contains, either express or understood, two Verbs, and two Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of Horace,

*Qui metuens vivit, liber mibi non erit unquam.*

*Ille non erit liber*—is one Sentence; *qui metuens vivit*—is another. *Ille* and *Qui* are the two Nominatives; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the two Verbs; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from *Apollonius* (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above Speculations are taken.

Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἀρθρον ἐπὶ ρῆμα ἴδιον Φέρεται, συνδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὄνόματι· καὶ ἐντεῖθεν ἀπλῶν λόγους καὶ παρισάντες κατὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ρήμάτων σύγκλισιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἀντῷ τῷ ἀρθρῷ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρελάμ-

ειν

THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, Ch. V.  
like the other Pronouns, is universal. It  
may

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Σανε τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἀρκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δὲ ἔτερου λόγου  
τάντως καὶ ἔτερον ῥῆμα ταρελάμβανε, καὶ ὅτῳ τὸ, ΠΑ-  
ΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, Ο Σ  
ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δινάμει τὸν αὐτὸν αποτελεῖ τῇ  
(*forst. τῷ*) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕ-  
ΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. *The subjunctive Article,*  
(that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) *is applied to a Verb*  
*of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent*  
*Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple*  
*Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean*  
*that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that*  
*which respects the Article or Relative. The same too fol-*  
*lows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative as-*  
*sumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being ap-*  
*plied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sen-*  
*tence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence 'tis*  
*that the Words—the Grammarian came, who dis-*  
*coursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if*  
*we were to say—the Grammarian came, AND dis-*  
*coursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See*  
*also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire*  
*générale & raisonnée, Chap. IX.*

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part *Pronoun*, and part *Connective*, in forming their

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qui

Ch. V. may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the *Animal*, *Which*, &c. the *Man*, *Whom*, &c. the *Ship*, *Which*, &c. *Alexander*, *Who*, &c. *Bucephalus*, *That*, &c. *Virtue*, *Which*, &c. &c.

NAY, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, *I*, who now read, have near finished this Chapter; *THOU*, who now readest; *HE*, who now readeth, &c. &c.

AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly a Pronoun from its Substitution, there being

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QUI & QUIS from QUE and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from KA1 and 'OΣ, KA1 and 'Ο. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

HOMER also expresses the Force of this *Subjunctive Pronoun or Article*, by help of the *Prepositive* and a *Connective*, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See *Iliad.* Α. γ. 270, 553. Ν. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

ing no Substantive existing, in whose place Ch. V.  
it may not stand. At the same time, it is  
*essentially distinguished* from the other Pro-  
nouns, by this peculiar, that 'tis not only  
*a Substitute*, but withal *a Connective* (!).

AND

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(!) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be im-  
proper to remark, that in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues  
the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First  
and Second Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu* are *implied* in  
the very Form of the Verb itself (*γράφω*, *γράφεις*,  
*scribo*, *scribis*) and are for that reason never *expressed*,  
unless it be to mark a Contradistinction; such as in  
*Virgil*,

*Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, latus in umbrā  
Formosam resonare doces &c.*

This however is true with respect only to the *Cofus rectus*, or *Nominative* of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their *oblique Cases*, which must always be added, because tho' we see the *Ego* in *Amo*, and the *Tu* in *Amas*, we see not the *Tu* or *Me* in *Amat*, or *Amant*.

Yet even these *oblique Cases* appear in a different manner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not. If they contradictinguish, then are they *commonly* placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.

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Thus

Ch. V. AND now to conclude what we have  
 said concerning Substantives. All Sub-  
 STANTIVES

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Thus *Virgil*,

— *Quid Theseia, magnum*  
*Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab Jove summo.*

Thus *Homer*,

‘ΤΜΙΝ μὲν θεὸς δοῖεν —

Παιδα δὲ ΜΟΓ λύσατε φίλην — IΛ. A.

where the ‘Τμιν and the Μοὶ stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the ‘Τμιν even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The Greek Language went farther still. When the oblique Cases of these Pronouns happened to contradictinguish, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὄρθοτονυμέναι, or *Pronouns uprightly accented*. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even *gave it their Accent*, and (as it were) *inclined themselves upon it*. And hence they acquired the name of Εγκλιτικαὶ, that is, *Leaning or Inclining Pronouns*. The Greeks too had in the first person 'Εμοῦ, 'Εμοί, 'Εμέ for *Contradistinctives*, and Μοῦ, Μοί, Μὲ for *Enclitics*. And hence 'twas that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read παιδα δ 'ΕΜΟΙ, for

**E**TANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Secondary*, that is to say, according to a Language more familiar and known, are either **NOUNS OR PRONOUNS**. The **NOUNS** denote *Substances*, and those either *Natural*, *Artificial*, or *Abstract* \*. They moreover denote Things either *General*, or *Special*, or *Particular*. The **PRONOUNS**, their Substitutes, are either *Prepositive*, or *Subjunctive*. THE **PREPOSITIVE** is distinguished into *three Orders* called the *First*, the *Second*, and the *Third Person*. THE **SUBJUNCTIVE** includes the powers

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for *waɪðə ðə MOɪ'*, on account of the Contradistinction, which there occurs between the *Grecians* and *Chryses*. See *Apoll. de Syntaxi L. I.* c. 3. p. 20. *L. II.* c. 2. p. 102, 103.

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pronouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the English Tongue. When we say, *Give me Content*, the (*Me*) in this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, *Give Mé Content*, *Give Him his thousands*, the (*Me*) and (*Him*) are no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an Accent of their own, and so become the true ὄρθονυμάται.

\* See before p. 37, 38.

Ch. V. of all those three, having *superadded*, as  
of its own, the peculiar force of a *Con-*  
*nective.*

HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES,  
we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES.

C H A P.

## C H A P. VI.

*Concerning Attributives.*

**A**TTRIBUTIVES are all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes. Such for example are the Words, *Black*, *White*, *Great*, *Little*, *Wise*, *Eloquent*, *Writeth*, *Wrote*, *Writing*, &c (a).

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(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives*, *Verbs*, and *Participles*, in as much as all of them equally denote the *Attributes of Substance*. Hence 'tis, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, *Snow is white*, Cicero *writeth*, &c.) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or VERB is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract de Interpretatione calls λευκὸς a Verb, tells us πᾶσαν φωνὴν, κακηγορύμενον ὄρον ἐν τροπάσει τοιόσαν, 'PH'MA καλεῖσθαι, that every Sound articulate, that forms the

Ch.VI. HOWEVER, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must *first* of necessity EXIST, before it can possibly be any thing else. For EXISTENCE may be considered as *an universal Genus*, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referr'd. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every Proposition, in which they may still be found, either *express*, or by *implication*; express, as when we say, *The Sun is bright*; by im-

*Predicate in a Proposition, is called a VERB.* p. 24.  
 Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. *Non Declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis.* L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—*non similitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis.* L. XIII. p. 970.

implication, as when we say, *The Sun Ch. VI. rises*, which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising* (*b*).

THE Verbs, *Is*, *Groweth*, *Becometh*, *Eſt*, *Fit*, ὑπάρχει, ἐστὶ, πίλει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this general Genus. The Latins have called them *Verba substantiva*, *Verbs substantive*, but the Greeks Πήματα ὑπάρχουμα, *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well Attribute, as Substance. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall here particularly consider, is the Verb, 'Eſt, *Eſt*, *Is*.

Now all EXISTENCE is either absolute or qualified—*absolute*, as when we say, *B is*; *qualified*, as when we say, *B IS AN ANIMAL*; *B IS BLACK*, *IS ROUND*, &c.

WITH

(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot.* L.V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall.

Ch.VI. WITH respect to this difference, the  
 Verb (*is*) can by itself express *absolute Existence*, but never the *qualified*, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not express'd, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (*is*) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of *a mere Assertion*. 'Tis under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, *Risetb* means, *is rising*; *Writeth*, *is writing*.

AGAIN—As to EXISTENCE in general, it is either *mutable*, or *immutable*; *mutable*, as in the *Objects of Sensation*; *immutable*, as in the *Objects of Intellec<sup>t</sup>ion and Science*. Now *mutable* Objects exist all in *Time*, and admit the several Distinctions

stinctions of present, past, and future. Ch.VI.  
But *immutable Objects know no such Distinctions*, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

AND hence two different Significations of the substantive Verb (*is*) according as it denotes *mutable*, or *immutable* Being.

FOR example, if we say, *This Orange is ripe*, (*is*) meaneth, *that it existeth so now at this present*, in opposition to *past time*, when it was green, and to *future time*, when it will be rotten.

BUT if we say, *The Diameter of the Square is incommensurable with its side*, we do not intend by (*is*) that it is incommensurable *now*, having been formerly commensurable, or being to become so hereafter; on the contrary we intend that *Perfection of Existence*, to which *Time and its Distinctions* are utterly unknown. "Tis under the same meaning we employ this

Ch.VI. this Verb, when we say, TRUTH IS,  
 or, GOD IS. The opposition is not of  
*Time present to other Times*, but of *necessary Existence* to *all temporary Existence*  
*whatever (c)*. And so much for *Verbs of Existence*, commonly called *Verbs substanti- tive*.

WE are now to descend to the common Herd of Attributives, such as *black* and *white*, *to write*, *to speak*, *to walk*, &c. among which when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive,

(c) *Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus NUNC ESSE, sed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiae, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, NUNC EST. Quare cum dicimus ESSE, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter EST addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid praesens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Ed. Serrani.*

stantive *make* without farther help a perfect assertive Sentence; while the rest, tho' otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, *Cicero eloquent*, *Cicero wise*, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an Assertion, to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Assertion elsewhere, an (*is*) or a (*was*) to complete the Sentence, saying, *Cicero is wise*, *Cicero was eloquent*. On the contrary, when we say, *Cicero writeth*, *Cicero walketh*, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the Words (*writeth*) and (*walketh*) imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Assertion likewise. Hence 'tis they may be resolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now

Ch.VI. Now all those Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call VERBS. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take *the Attribute alone* without the Assertion, then have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of ADJECTIVES.

AND thus is it, that ALL ATTRIBUTIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES.

BESIDES the Distinctions abovementioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in *Motion*; such are *to walk*, *to fly*, *to strike*, *to live*. Others have it in the *privation of Motion*; such are *to stop*, *to rest*, *to cease*, *to die*. And lastly, others have it in subjects, which have nothing to

*do with either Motion or its Privation;* Ch.VI.  
 such are the Attributes of, *Great and Little,*  
*White and Black, Wise and Foolish,*  
 and in a word the several *Quantities,* and  
*Qualities* of all Things. Now these last  
 are **ADJECTIVES**; those which denote  
*Motions, or their Privation,* are either  
**VERBS** or **PARTICIPLES.**

AND this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explain'd as follows. That *all Motion is in Time,* and therefore, wherever it exists, implies *Time* as its concomitant, is evident to all and requires no proving. But besides this, *all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise.* For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in *one Place* for *one Instant* only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. † To stop therefore or rest, is to be in *one Place* for *more than one Instant*, that is to say,  
*during*

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† Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning *Motion.* Ηρεμῶν ἐσὶ τὸ περιτερον καὶ ὕστερον  
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ὅν, καὶ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰ μέρη.

Ch.VI. during an Extension between two Instants,  
 and this of course gives us the Idea of TIME. As therefore Motions and their Privation imply Time as their Concomitant, so VERBS, which denote them, come to denote TIME also (d). And hence the Origin and Use of TENSES, “ which are so many “ different Forms, assigned to each Verb, “ to shew, without altering its principal “ Meaning, the various TIMES in which “ such Meaning may exist.” Thus *Scribit*, *Scripsit*, *Scriperat*, and *Scribet*, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

SHOULD

(d) The antient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb—*πημα δε εις το ωροτηματινον χρόνον*, a Verb is something, which signifies Time OVER AND ABOVE (for such is the force of the Proposition, Ηρόδ.) If it should be asked, over and above what? It may be answered over and above its principal Signification, which is to denote some moving and energizing Attribute. See *Arist. de Interpret. c. 3.* together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius.*

3

SHOULD it be asked, whether *Time* it-self may not become upon occasion the Verb's *principal Signification*; 'tis answered, No. And this appears, because the same *Time* may be denoted by different Verbs (as in the Words, *writeth* and *speaketh*) and *different Times* by the same Verb (as in the Words, *writeth* and *wrote*) neither of which could happen, were *Time* any thing more, than a meer *Concomitant*. Add to this, that when Words denote Time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be Verbs, and become either Adjectives, or Substantives. Of the Adjective kind are *Timely*, *Yearly*, *Dayly*, *Hourly*, &c. of the Substantive kind are *Time*, *Year*, *Day*, *Hour*, &c.

THE most obvious Division of TIME is into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any Language complete, whose Verbs have not TENSES, to mark these Distinctions. But we may go still farther. Time past and future are both *infinitely* extended.

H

Hence

Ch.VI. Hence 'tis that in *universal Time past* we  
may assume *many particular Times past*,  
and in *universal Time future*, *many partic-  
ular Times future*, some more, some less  
remote, and corresponding to each other  
under different relations. Even *present  
Time itself* is not exempt from these Dif-  
ferences, and as necessarily implies *some  
degree of Extension*, as does every given  
Line, however minute.

HERE then we are to seek for the Reason, which first introduced into Language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but 'twas necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, *what kind* of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all Languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.

How-

HOWEVER as the Knowledge of TENSES Ch.VI.  
depends on the Theory of TIME, and this  
is a subject of no mean Speculation, we  
shall reserve it by itself for the following  
Chapter.

H 2      C H A P.

## C H A P. VII.

*Concerning Time, and Tenses.*

C. VII. **T**IME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as such they both of them imply *Extension*. Thus between *London* and *Salisbury* there is the Extension of Space, and between *Yesterday* and *To-morrow*, the Extension of Time. But in this they differ, that all the Parts of Space exist *at once and together*, while those of Time only exist *in Transition or Succession* (a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of TIME, by considering it under the notion

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by Ammonius—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ἔλαττον ἀμά τι φίσ-αται, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ μόνον τὸ ΝΤΝ· εὐ γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. TIME doth not subfiit the whole at once, but only in a single Now or INSTANT; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b.

notion of *a transient Continuity*. Hence C. VII. also, as far as the affections and properties of *Transition* go, Time is *different* from Space; but as to those of *Extension* and *Continuity*, they perfectly coincide.

LET us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE we may assume any where a *Point*, and therefore in every given *Line* there may be assumed infinite *Points*. So in every given TIME we may assume any where a *Now* or *Instant*, and therefore in every given *Time* there may be assumed infinite *Nows* or *Instants*.


FARTHER still—A POINT is the *Bound* of every finite *Line*; and A *Now* or *Instant*, of every finite *Time*. But altho' they are *Bounds*, they are neither of them *Parts*, neither the *Point* of any *Line*, nor the *Now* or *Instant* of any *Time*. If this appear strange, we may remember, that the *Parts* of any thing *extended* are necef-

C. VII. *sarly extended also, it being essential to their character, that they should measure their Whole.* But if a *Point* or *Now* were extended, each of them would contain within it self *infinite other Points*, and *infinite other Nows* (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest Extension) and this, 'tis evident, would be absurd and impossible.

THESE Assertions therefore being admitted, and both *Points* and *Nows* being taken as *Bounds*, but not as *Parts* (*b*), it will follow,

(*b*) — Φανερὸν ὅτι ωδὲ μόριον τὸ ΝΤΝ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὡσπερ ωδὲ αἱ σύγματα τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ δύο τῆς μίας μόρια. 'Tis evident that A Now or Instant is no more a part of Time, than Points are of a Line. The Parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines, Natur. Ausc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before.—Τὸ δὲ ΝΤΝ ωδὲ μέρῳ μετρεῖ, τε γὰρ τὸ μέρῳ, καὶ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὄλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὃ δὲ ΧΡΟ'ΝΟΣ καὶ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν ΝΤΝ. A Now is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole, and the Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but TIME doth not appear to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14.

follow, that in the same manner as *the same* C. VII.  
*Point* may be the *End* of one Line, and the  
*Beginning* of another, so the *same Now* or  
*Instant* may be the *End* of one Time,  
and the *Beginning* of another. Let us  
suppose for example, the Lines. A B, B C.



I say that the Point B, is the End of the Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line, B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain Times, and let B be a *Now* or *Instant*. In such case I say that the *Instant* B is the End of the Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time, B C. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the *Now* or *Instant*, which they include, the first of them is necessarily PAST TIME, as being *previous* to it; the other is necessarily FUTURE, as being *subsequent*. As therefore every Now

H 4 or

C. VII. or INSTANT always exists in Time, and without being Time, is *Time's Bound*; the Bound of *Completion* to the *Past*, and the Bound of *Commencement* to the *Future*; from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is *to be the Medium of Continuity between the Past and the Future, so as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole* (c).

FROM the above Speculations, there follow some Conclusions, which may be perhaps called Paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place *there cannot* (strictly speaking) *be any such*

(c) Τὸ δὲ ΝΤ̄Ν ἐστι συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη· συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν ταρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως τέρας χρόνος ἐστίν· ἐστι γὰρ τὴ μὲν ἀρχὴ, τὴ δὲ τελευτή. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its Boundary, as being the Beginning of one Time and the Ending of another. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Junction or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.

*such thing as Time present.* For if all Time C. VII., be *transient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot like a Line be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its Continuity were to be present *at once*, it would so far quit its *transient* nature, and be *Time* no longer. But if no Portion of its Continuity can be thus *present*, how can *Time* possibly be *present*, to which such Continuity is essential?

FARTHER than this—If there be no such thing as *Time Present*, there can be *no Sensation of Time* by any one of the Senses. For ALL SENSATION is of the † *Present only*, the Past being preserved not by *Sense* but by *Memory*, and the Future being anticipated by *Prudence* only and wise *Fore-sight*.

BUT if *no Portion* of Time be the object of *any Sensation*; farther, if the Present

† Ταυτὴ γὰρ (αισθήσει sc.) οὔτε τὸ μέλλον, οὔτε τὸ γιγνόμενον γνωρίζουμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον.  
Αρις. περὶ Μνήμη. A. α.

C. VII. sent never exist ; if the Past be no more ;  
 if the Future be not as yet ; and if these  
 are all the Parts, out of which TIME is  
 compounded : how strange and shadowy  
 a Being do we find it ? How nearly ap-  
 proaching to a perfect Non-entity (d) ?  
 Let us try however, since the Senses fail  
 us, if we have not Faculties of higher  
 power, to seize this fleeting Being.

THE World has been likened to a va-  
 riety of Things, but it appears to resem-  
 ble no one more, than some moving Spec-  
 tacle

(d) "Οτι μὲν οὐ δύως οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ μόγις καὶ αἰμαδρῶς,  
 ἐκ τῶν δέ τις αὖ ὑποπένευσεν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς γέγονε,  
 καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ οὐπώ ἔστιν· ἐκ δὲ τέτων καὶ  
 ὁ ἀπειρῶν καὶ ὁ αἱ λαμβανόμενῶν χρόνον σύμχειται·  
 τὸ δὲ ἐκ μηδὲν των συμχείμενου, αἰδύνατον αὐτὸν δόξειε κατέ-  
 χειν ποτὲ οὔτις. That therefore TIME exists not at all,  
 or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may  
 suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more ;  
 a part of it is coming, and is not as yet ; and out of these  
 is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still  
 farther and farther. Now that which is made up of no-  
 thing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to  
 participate of Entity. Natural. Ausc. L. IV. c. 14.  
 See also Philop. MS. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

tacle (such as a Proceffion or a Triumph) C. VII.  
 that abounds in every part with splendid  
 Objects, fome of which are still departing,  
 as fast as others make their appearance.  
 The Senses look on, while the fight passes,  
 perceiving as much as is *immediately present*,  
 which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to  
 the Soul's superior Powers. Having done  
 this, they have done their duty, being con-  
 cerned with nothing, save what is present  
 and instantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to  
 the *Imagination*, and above all to the *Intel-  
 lect*, the feveral *Nows* or *Instants* are not lost,  
 as to the *Senses*, but are preserved and made  
 Objects of *steady* comprehension, however in  
 their own nature they may be *transitory* and  
*passing*. “ Now’tis from contemplating two  
 “ or more of these Instants under one view,  
 “ together with that Interval of Continuity,  
 “ which subsifts between them, that we  
 “ acquire insensibly the Idea of TIME (e).”

For

(d) Τότε Φχμέν. γεγονέας χρόνου, ὅταν τῇ προτέρᾳ  
 καὶ ὑστέρᾳ ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν. ‘Οριζομεν  
 δε

C. VII. For example : *The Sun rises ; this I remember ; it rises again ; this too I remember.* These Events are not together ; there is

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δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπολαβεῖν ἀντὰ, καὶ μεταξύ τι  
ἀντῶν ἔτερου ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἔτερα τῷ μέσῳ νοήσω-  
μεν, καὶ δύο ἐπη ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ΝΤΝ, τὸ μὲν πρότερον,  
τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τέτο Φαμὲν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ.  
'Tis then we say there has been TIME, when we can ac-  
quire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But  
we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first,  
then the other, together with an interval between them dif-  
ferent from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes  
to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two  
Now's, one prior and the other subsequent, then 'tis we say  
there is TIME, and this 'tis we call TIME. Natural.  
Auscult. L. IV. c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon  
this passage is to the same purpose. "Οταν γὰρ ὁ νῦς  
ἀναμυνθεὶς τῷ Νῦν, ὁ χθὲς ἐίπεν, ἔτερον πάλιν ἐίπη  
τὸ τήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνου ἐνθὺς ἐνενόπεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο  
Νῦν δριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπὸ περάτων δυοῖν· καὶ ἐτώ λέγειν  
ἔχει, ὅτι ποσόν ἐστι τωντεκαίδεκά ὥρῶν, ἡ ἑκατόδεκα,  
οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρω γραμμῆς πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτε-  
νόμενος. For when the Mind, remembering the Now,  
which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another Now  
to-day, then 'tis it immediately has an idea of TIME, ter-  
minated by these two Now's, as by two Boundaries ; and  
thus is it enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or  
of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length  
from an infinite Line by two Points. Themist. Op. edit.  
Aldi, p. 45. b.

is an *Extension* between them—not how- C. VII.  
ever of *Space*, for we may suppose the Place  
of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no  
sensible difference. Yet still we recognize  
*some Extension* between them. Now what  
is this Extension, *but a natural Day?* And  
what is that, *but pure Time?* 'Tis after the  
same manner, by recognizing two new  
Moons, and the Extension between these:  
two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension  
between these; that we gain Ideas of other  
Times, such as *Months* and *Years*, which are  
all so many Intervals, described as above;  
that is to say, *passing Intervals of Continuity*  
*between two Instants viewed together.*

AND thus 'tis THE MIND acquires the  
Idea of TIME. But this Time it must be  
remembred is PAST TIME ONLY, which  
is always the *first Species*, that occurs to  
the human Intellect. How then do we  
acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The  
answer is, we acquire it *by Anticipation*.  
Should it be demanded still farther, *And*  
*what is Anticipation?* We answer, that in

C. VII. this case 'tis a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar ; from Successions of Events, that are past already, to similar Successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example : I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night ; that night, by another day ; that day, by another night ; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a similar Succession* from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of Days and Nights *in futurity*. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical Returns of New and Full Moons ; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diversified Succession*, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, *in Time future*.

WE go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these *natural Periods*, but even in matters of *human* and *civil* concern. For example : Having observed in many past

past instances how Health had succeeded C. VII.  
to Exercise, and Sickness to Sloth; we an-  
ticipate *future* Health to those, who, being  
*now* sickly, use exercise; and *future* Sick-  
ness to those, who, being *now* healthy, are  
lothful. 'Tis a variety of such observa-  
tions, all respecting one subject, which when  
systematized by just reasoning, and made  
habitual by due practice, form the charac-  
ter of a Master-Artist, or Man of *practical*  
Wisdom. If they respect the human Body  
(as above) they form the Physician; if mat-  
ters military, the General; if matters na-  
tional, the Statesman; if matters of private  
life, the Moralist; and the same in other  
Subjects. All these several Characters in  
their respective ways may be said to possess  
a kind of prophetic discernment, which not  
only presents them *the barren prospect of*  
Futurity (a prospect not hid from the mean-  
est of Men) but shews withal those Events,  
which are likely to attend it, and thus en-  
ables them to act with superior certainty  
and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we  
except those, who have had diviner assist-  
ances)

C. VII. ances) we may justly say, as was said of old,  
 —————— *He's the best Prophet, who conjectures  
 well (f).*

FROM

(f) Μάντις δ' ἀριστός, ὅτις ἐναγέται καλῶς.

So Milton.

*Till old Experience do attain  
 To something like Prophetic Strain.*

*Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodam-  
 modo Divinationem.*

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as the Future does, since we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the Past. For tho' it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phrase) it actually was, yet was it then something Present, and not something Past. As Past, it has no existence but in THE MIND or MEMORY, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called Past. 'Twas this intimate connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made some Philosophers doubt, whether if there was no Soul, there could be any Time, since Time appears to have its Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ γάν τις ψυχῆς εἴη ἀν οὐ γόνος, ἀπορήτειν ἀν τις, κ. τ. λ. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 20. Themistius, who comments the above passage, expresses himself more positively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχάς λιγεται τέτε αἱριθμητὸν οὐ τὸ αἱριθμήματον, τὸ μὲν τὸ αἱριθμητὸν ἐνλαβεῖ δινάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεῖχ, ταῦτα δὲ οὐ τὸ ποστόν, μὴ ἔντος τῷ αἱριθμή-

σοντος

FROM what has been reasoned it appears, that Knowledge of the Future comes from Knowledge of the Past ; as does Knowledge of the Past from Knowledge of the Present, so that their Order to us is that of PRESENT, PAST, and FUTURE.

OF these Species of Knowledge, that of the Present is the lowest, not only as first in perception, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all animal Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess Sensation. Knowledge of the Past comes next, which is superior to the former, as being confined to those Animals, that have Memory as well as Senses. Knowledge of the Future comes last;

οντός μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ, Φανερὸν ως οὐκ ἀν ὁ χρόνος εἴη, μὴ δύνεις ψυχῆς. Them. p. 48. Edit. Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. de An. p. 94.

## I

C. VII. last, as being derived from the other two,  
 Arist. de An. II. 3. p. 28. and which is for that reason *the most ex-*  
*cellent as well as the most rare*, since Na-  
 ture in her superadditions rises from worse  
 always to better, and is never found to  
 sink from better down to worse\*.


AND now having seen, how we acquire  
 the Knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time future*; which is first in perception, which  
 first in dignity; which more common,  
 which more rare; let us compare them  
 both to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and  
 examine what relations they maintain to-  
 wards it.

IN the first place there may be *Times*  
 both *past* and *future*, in which the *pre-*  
*sent Now* has no existence, as for example  
 in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

AGAIN,

\* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.

AGAIN, the *present Now* may so far belong to Time of either sort, as to be *the End* of the past; and *the Beginning* of the future; but it cannot be included *within* the limits of either. For if it were possible, let us suppose C the *present Now* included



within the limits of the *past Time* A D. In such case C D, part of the past Time A D, will be subsequent to C the *present Now*, and so of course be *future*. But by the Hypothesis it is *past*, and so will be both, *Past* and *Future* at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a *future Time*, such as B E.

WHAT then shall we say of such *Times*, as *this Day*, *this Month*, *this Year*, *this*

I 2

Cen-

C. VII. Century, all which include within them  
*the present Now?* They cannot be *past*  
*Times* or *future*, from what has been  
 proved; and *present Time has no existence*,  
 as has been proved likewise\*. Or shall  
 we allow them to be present, *from the*  
*present Now, which exists within them*;  
 so that from the Presence of *that* we call  
*these* also present, tho' the shortest among  
 them has infinite parts always absent? If  
 so, and in conformity to custom we allow  
 such *Times present*, as *present Days, Months,*  
*Years, and Centuries, each must of neces-*  
*sity be a compound of the Past and the Future*,  
 divided from each other by some *present*  
*Now or Instant, and jointly called PRESENT*,  
*while that Now remains within them*. Let us  
 suppose for example the Time XY, which

f . . . X A B C D E Y . . . g

let

\* Sup. p. 104.

let us call a Day, or a Century; and let C.VII. the present *Now* or *Instant* exist at A. I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY, *Time present*. The same holds, if we suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or anywhere before Y. When the present Now exists at Y, then is the whole XY *Time past*, and still more so, when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In like manner before the Present Now entered X, as for example when it was at f, then was the whole XY *Time future*; 'twas the same, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became *Time present*. And thus 'tis that TIME is PRESENT, while passing, in its PRESENT Now or INSTANT. 'Tis the same indeed here, as it is in Space. A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that Plane *in a single Point at once*,

C. VII. while during the whole progression its  
 Parts absent are infinite (g).

FROM what has been said, we may perceive that ALL TIME, of every denomination,

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(g) PLACE, according to the antients, was either immediate, or immeiate. I am (for example) in Europe, because I am in England; in England, because in Wiltshire; in Wiltshire, because in Salisbury; in Salisbury, because in my own house; in my own house, because in my study. THIS IS IMMEDIATE PLACE. And what is my IMMEDIATE PLACE? 'Tis the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body. Τὸς ἀπίκεχοντος τῶν πατέρων, καθ' ὅ τε περιέχει τὸ ἀπίκεχόμενον. Now as this immediate Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, 'tis from this relation that those immediate Places also are called each of them my Place, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to TIME. The Present Century is present in the present Year; that, in the present Month; that, in the present Day; that, in the present Hour; that, in the present Minute. 'Tis thus by circumscription within circumscription that we arrive at THAT REAL AND INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itself the very Essence of the Present, diffuses PRESENCE throughout

*nomination, is divisible and extended.* But C. VII. if so, then whenever we suppose a definite Time, even though it be a Time present, it must needs have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. And so much for TIME.

Now from the above Doctrine of TIME, we propose by way of Hypothesis the following Theorie of TENSES.

THE TENSES are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either indefinitely

I 4 with-

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all, even the largest of Times, which are found to include it within their respective limits. Nicophorus Blennides speaks much to the same purpose. 'Ενεώς οὐ χρόνος ἐστιν οὐ ἐφ' ἕκατερα παράκειμενος τῷ κυρίῳ ΝΤΝ· χρόνος μερικός, ἐκ παρεληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος εὑνέσθαις, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὥρος τὸ κυρίως ΝΤΝ γεινίασιν, ΝΤΝ λεγόμενος καὶ αὐλός. PRESENT TIME therefore is that which adjoins to the REAL Now or INSTANT on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its vicinity to that REAL Now said to be Now also itself. 'Επι. Φυσικῆς Κεφ. 6'. See also Arist. Physic. L. IV. c. 6. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.

C. VII. without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or else *definitely*, in reference to such distinctions.

If *indefinitely*, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If *definitely*, then have we three Tenses to mark the *Beginnings* of these three Times; three, to denote their *Middles*; and three to denote their *Ends*; in all NINE,

THE three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Completive Present, the Completive Past, and the Completive Future,

AND thus 'tis, that the TENSES in their natural Number appear to be TWELVE;  
*three*

three to denote Time absolute, and nine to C. VII. denote it under its respective distinctions.

Aorist of the Present.

Γράφω. Scribo. I write.

Aorist of the Past.

\*Εγράψα. Scripti. I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.

Γράψω. Scribam. I shall write.

Inceptive Present.

Μέλλω γράφειν. Scripturus sum. I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. Scribo or Scribens sum. I am writing.

Completive Present.

Γέγραφα. Scripti. I have written.

Inceptive Past.

\*Εμελλον γράφειν. Scripturus eram. I was beginning to write.

Tempus praeter:

|                |                                                                                                                         |  |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| rei imperfecta | Middle                                                                                                                  |  |
|                | illibat-he was going. si o' en affai<br>canabat-he used to support. It's about<br>Odi faciat he was intiating. on bathe |  |
| rei perfecta   | Middle                                                                                                                  |  |
|                | liberaat-he was gone. It's on it's a<br>canauat-he had stopped. It avoid some<br>Odi faciat he was built. on a          |  |

## C. VII.

## Middle or extended Past.

\*Ἐγράφον οὐ ἐτύχανον γράφων. *Scribebam.*  
I was writing.

## Compleutive Past.

\*Ἐγεγράφειν. *Scripseram.* I had done  
writing.

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## Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero.* I  
shall be beginning to write.

## Middle or extended Future.

\*Ἐσομαι γράφων. *Scribens ero.* I shall  
be writing.

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## Compleutive Future.

\*Ἐσομαι γεγραφώς. *Scripsero.* I shall  
have done writing.

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It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with Tenses,

Abit. he is gone. Il s'en est allé.  
i just. can not. he has stopped. Il n'a pas  
Modificatum est. it is built. Be à bâtie.

Tenses, as with other Affections of Speech; C. VII.  
 be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of  
 all Analogy, to the harsh laws of mere  
 Authority and Chance.

IT may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this System, either in Languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

IN the first place, as to AORISTS. *Aorists* are usually by Grammarians referred to the *Past*; such are  $\eta\lambda\thetaov$ , *I went*;  $\epsilon\nu\tau\sigma ov$ , *I fell*, &c. We seldom hear of them in the *Future*, and more rarely still in the *Present*. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscription, than that of Simple present past or future, the Tense is AN AORIST.

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Teach: for. {   
 1.  $\alpha\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu$  *abitur he will be going . i. t. HU.S.*  
 2.  $\alpha\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu$  *re: imp. creabitur - he will be at supper - i. t. sora a sorpe*  
     { *a diificabatur - it will be building on bakra*  
 3.  $\alpha\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu$  *abitur he will be gone . i. t. sora a te.*  
 4.  $\alpha\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu\mu$  *canaverit - he will have supped . i. t. auna sopa*  
     { *a diificatur erit . it will be built on auna*

C. VII.

Thus Milton,

*Millions of spiritual creatures WALK the earth*

*Unseen, both when we wake, and when we sleep.*

P. L. IV. 277.

Here the Verb (**WALK**) means not that they were walking *at that instant only, when Adam spoke, but ἀορίσως indefinitely, take any instant whatever.* So when the same Author calls *Hypocrisy*,

— *the only Evil, that WALKS*

*Invisible, except to God alone,*

the Verb (**WALKS**) hath the like *aoristic* or *indefinite application.* The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the *Gnomologic* kind, such as

*Ad pœnitendum PROPERAT, cito qui  
judicat.*

*Avarus, nisi sum moritur, nil recte  
FACIT, &c.*

ALL

ALL these Tenses are so many AORISTS C. VII.  
OF THE PRESENT.

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise AORISTS OF THE FUTURE.

*Tu nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine  
pænæ.* Hor.

So too *Legislative* Sentences, *Thou SHALT not kill, Thou SHALT not steal, &c.* for this means no one particular future Time, but is a prohibition extended indefinitely to every part of Time future (*b*).

WE

(*b*) The Latin Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aorists*. It has no peculiar Form even for *an Aorist of the Past*, and therefore (as Priscian tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of *that Aorist*, and of the *perfect Present*, its application in particular instances being to

**C.VII.** WE pass from *Aorists*, to THE INCEP-TIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by Verbs auxiliar. ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφειν. *Scripturus sum.* I AM GOING to write. But the Latins go farther, and have a Species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo*, I am warm, comes *Calesco*, I begin to grow-warm; from *Tumeo*, I swell, comes *Tumesco*, I begin to swell. These *Inchoative* Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the Beginnings of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its *Completion*, and there-

be gathered from the Context. Thus 'tis that *FACT* means (as the same author informs us) both *τετροίησα* and *τέτοιησα*, I have done it, and I did it; *VIDI* both *ἴώπεια* and *εἶδο*, I have just seen it, and, I saw it once. *Prisc. Gram.* L. VIII. p. 814, 838. *Edit. Putsch.*

therefore have neither Perfectum, Plus C. VII. quam-perfectum, or Perfect Future. There is likewise a species of Verbs called in Greek Ἐφετικὰ, in Latin *Desiderativa*, the *Desideratives* or *Meditatives*, which if they are not strictly *Inceptives*, yet both in Greek and Latin have a near affinity with them. Such are *πολεμησεῖω*, *Bellaturio*, *I have a desire to make war*; *βρωσεῖω*, *Efurio*, *I long to eat* (i). And so much for THE INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THE two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called (k) THE MIDDLE TENSES (which express Time as *extended* and

(i) As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is *future*, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a future Participle. From *πολεμήσω* and *βρώσω* come *πολεμησείω* and *βρωσείω*; from *Bellatus* and *Efurus* come *Bellaturio* and *Efurio*. See *Macrobius*, p. 69r. Ed. Var. οὐ τάν γέ με νῦν δὴ ΓΕΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ εποίησας γελάσαι. Plato in *Phædone*.

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these *middle* Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among Grammarians.

C. VII. and *passing*) and the **PERFECT** or **COMPLETIVE**, which express its *Completion* or *End*.

Now for these the Authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational Edition of *Homer's Iliad*. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same Scheme in *Scaliger*, and by him (*I*) ascribed to † *Grocinus*, as its Author. The learned *Gaza* (who

(*I*) *Ex his p̄cipitius Grociniū acutē admodum Tempora divisiſſe, sed minus commode. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, sed quæ bifariam ſecat, Perfectum & Imperfectum: ſic, Præteritum imperfectum, Amabam: Præteritum perfectum, Amaveram. Reclī ſanè. Et Præſens imperfectum, Amo. Reclī haclenū; continuat enim amorem, neque abſolvit. At Præſens perfectum, Amavi: quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non male ſentit, ita controverſum eſt. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum, Amabo: Perfectum, Amavero. Non malè, inquam: ſignificat enim Amavero, amore futurum & abſolutum iri: Amabo perfectionem nullam indicat. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113.*

† His Name was *William Grocius*, an *Englishman*, contemporary with *Erasmus*, and celebrated for his Learning. He went to *Florence* to study under *Landin*, and was Professor at *Oxford*. *Spec. Lit. Flor.* p. 205.

(who was himself a Greek, and one of the ablest restorers of that language in the western world) characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same manner (*m*). What *Apollonius* hints, is exactly consonant (*n*).

*Priscian*

(*m*) The PRESENT TENSE (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐντάμενον καὶ ἀτελὲς, *that which is now instant and incomplete*; THE PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθός ἔρτι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τὸ ἐνεστῶτος, *that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present*; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρατελιαμένον καὶ ἀτελὲς τὸ παρωχημένον, *the extended and incomplete part of the Past*; and THE PLUSQUAM-PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθός παλαι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τὸ παρακειμένον, *that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum*. Gram. L. IV.

(*n*) Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι καὶ παρωχημένος συντέλειαν σημαίνει ὁ παρακειμένος, τὸν γε μὴ ἐνεστῶσαν —Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but PRESENT COMPLETION. *Apollon.* L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle *αὐ*, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would assort (he says) with any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never with this PERFECTUM, because this implied such a *complete* and *indefeasible existence*, as never to be qualified into the nature of a *Contingent*.

K

C. VII. *Priscian* too advances the same Doctrine from the *Stoics*, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to *Dialectic*, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these *Grammatical Speculations* (o).

## BEFORE

(o) By these Philosophers the *vulgar present Tense* was called THE IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the *vulgar Præteritum*, THE PERFECT PRESENT, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear *Priscian*, from whom we learn these facts. *PRÆSENS TEMPUS propriæ dicitur, cuius pars jam præteriit, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, instabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in præsenti, hoc est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) vel præteriit vel futura est.*—Unde STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRESENS etiam IMPERFECTUM vocabant (*ut dictum est*) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteriit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam, scribo versum, priore ejus parte scriptâ, cui adhuc deest extrema pars, præsenti utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed IMPERFECTUM est, quod deest adhuc versui, quod scribatur.—Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nascitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat incepsum, statim utimur PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, scripsi versum.—And soon after speaking of the Latin Per-

BEFORE we conclude, we shall add a C. VII. few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the Hypothesis here advanced, and serve withal to confirm its truth.

AND first the *Latins* used their *Præteritum Perfectum* in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the Verb in its natural signification. Thus, *VIXIT*, signified, IS DEAD; *FUIT*, signified, NOW IS NOT, IS NO MORE. 'Twas in this sense that *Cicero* addressed the People of *Rome*, when he had put to death the leaders in the *Catilinarian Conspiracy*. He appeared in the

K 2

Forum,

*Perfectum*, he says, — *sciendum tamen, quod Romani PRÆTERITO PERFECTO non solum in re modo completâ utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos τωρα-κείμενος vocatur, quem STOICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΩΤΑ nominaverunt) sed etiam pro Ἀορίστῳ accipitur, &c.* Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.

C. VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice,  
 — \* VIXERUNT. So *Virgil*,

— || *Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium & ingens*

*Gloria Dardanidum* — AEn. II.

And

\* So among the *Romans*, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken; the Cryer used to proclaim, DIXERUNT, i. e. *they have done speaking*. Ascon. Pæd. in Verr. II.

|| So *Tibullus* speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

— *Hæc fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,*  
*Prodigia indomit is merge sub æquoribus.*

Eleg. II. 5. v. 19.

*Let these Events HAVE BEEN in days of old;—by Implication therefore—But HENCEFORTH let them be no more.*

So *Eneas* in *Virgil* prays to *Phæbus*.

*Hac Trojana tenuis fuerit fortuna secuta.*

*Let Trojan Fortune* (that is, adverse, like that of *Troy*, and its Inhabitants,) *HAVE so far FOLLOWED us.* By Implication therefore, *But let it follow us 'no farther, Here let it end, Hic sit Finis*, as *Servius* well observes in the Place.

In which Instances, by the way, mark not only the Force of the *Tense*, but of the *Mood*, the PRECATIVE or IMPERATIVE; not in the *Future* but in the *Past*. See p. 154, 155, 156.

And again,

C. VII.

—*Locus Ardea quondam*

*Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet  
Ardea nomen,*

\* *Sed fortuna FUIT* — AEn. VII.

THE reason of these Significations is derived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs are maintained by the reciprocal succession of *Contraries*. 'Tis thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the instances above, the completion of one contrary is put for the commencement of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, or, HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, or, IS NO MORE.

K 3

IT

\* *Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:*

*Cumque nihil speres firmius esse, FUIT.*

Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. §. 190.

*Sive erimus, seu nos Fata FUISSE volent.*

Tibull. III. 5. 32.

C. VII. IT is remarkable in \* *Virgil*, that he frequently joins in the same Sentence this complete and perfect Present with the extended and passing Present; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same Species of Time, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

— *Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens  
Scorpions, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

G. I.

*Terra tremit; fugere feræ—* G. I.

*Præsertim si tempesta a vertice sylvis  
Incubuit, glomeratque ferens incendia  
ventus.* G. II.

— *illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ,  
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit  
alto.* AEn. V.

IN

\* See also *Spenser's Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19.  
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.

*He hath his Shield redeem'd,  
And forth his Sword he draws.*

IN the same manner he joins the same C. VII. two modifications of *Time in the Past*, that is to say, the *complete* and *perfect* Past with the *extended* and *passing*.

—Inruerant *Danai*, & te~~cum~~ omne tenebant.      Æn. II.

*Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquosæ*  
Addiderant, *rutuli tris ignis, & alitis*  
*austri.*

*Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque me-*  
*tumque*

*Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus*  
*iras (p).*      Æn. VIII.

As

(p) The Intention of *Virgil* may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into English.

—*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens*  
*Scorpions, & cæli justâ plus parte reliquit.*

For thee the Scorpion IS NOW CONTRACTING his claws,  
and HATH ALREADY LEFT thee more than a just por-  
tion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic  
adulation, supposes the Scorpion so desirous of admitting  
Augustus among the heavenly signs, that though he has  
already made him more than room enough, yet he still

K 4.      con-

C. VII. As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is sometimes employed to denote what is *usual* and *customary*. Thus *surgebat* and *scribebat* signify not only, *he was rising*, *he was writing*, but upon occasion they signify, *he USED to rise*, *he USED to write*. The reason of this is, that whatever is *customary*, must be something which has been *frequently repeated*. But what has been *frequently repeated*, must needs require *an Extension of Time past*, and thus we fall insensibly into the TENSE here mentioned.

AGAIN,

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*continues* to be making him more. Here then we have two Acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the Use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *relinquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean manuscript*.

—*Illa noto citius, volucrique sagittā,  
Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.*

*The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING to land, and IS HID within the lofty harbour.* We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was *completely hid* from those Spectators, who had gone out to see

AGAIN, we are told by *Pliny* (whose C. VII. authority likewise is confirmed by many <sup>many</sup> Gems and Marbles still extant) that the ancient Painters and Sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of Inscription*, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. 'Twas 'Απελλῆς ἐποίει, *Apelles faciebat*, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίησε or *fecit*. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work itself, that *it was once indeed in hand*, but no pretension that *it was ever finished* (*q*).

## IT

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see the Ship-race, but yet might *still continue sailing* towards the shore within.

—Inruerant *Danai, & tectum omne tenebant.*

*The Greeks HAD ENTERED, and WERE THEN POSSESSING the whole House*; as much as to say, *they had entered, and that was over*, but their Possession *continued still*.

(*q*) *Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I.* The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of

C. VII. IT is remarkable that the very manner, in which the *Latins* derive these Tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the System here advanced. From *the passing Present* come the passing Past, and Future. *Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam.* From *the perfect Present* come the perfect Past, and Future. *Scripsi, Scripsoram, Scripsero.* And so in all instances, even where the Verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuleram* and *Tulero*.

WE shall conclude by observing, that the ORDER of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our Perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already

the antient Artists used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes*.

ready (*r*). Hence it is, that the *Present C. VII.* *Tense* stands first; then *the Past Tenses*; and lastly *the Future*.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it *definitely*; (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Completive) we here finish the subject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to consider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which 'twill be necessary to deduce from other Principles.

(*r*) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—*Ordo autem (Temporum scil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præteriit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere ponи videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem Præsens Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quae memoriam prædicta sunt. Futurum vero etiam patueribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiae officium. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecæ Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit præsentia; præteriorum, &c.*

## C H A P.

## C H A P. VIII.

*Concerning Modes.*

C.VIII. **W**E have observed already (*a*) that the Soul's leading Powers are those of *Perception* and those of *Volition*, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that *all Speech or Discourse* is a *publishing* or exhibiting some part of our Soul, either a certain *Perception*, or a certain *Volition*. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in *a different part*, or after *a different manner*, hence I say the variety of **Modes** or **Moods** (*b*),

IF

(*a*) See Chapter II.

(*b*) *Gaza* defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is — βέλημα, ἵν' ἐν τάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημανόμενον — a *Volition or Affection of the Soul, signified through some Voice, or Sound articulate.* Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence 'tis *Apollo-nius*

IF we simply *declare*, or *indicate* some- C.VIII.  
 thing to be, or not to be, (whether a Per-  
 ception or Volition, 'tis equally the same)  
 this constitutes that Mode called the DE-  
 CLARATIVE OR INDICATIVE.

A Perception.

— *Nosco crinis, incanaque menta*  
*Regis Romani* — Virg. Aen. VI.

A Volition.

*In nova FERT ANIMUS mutatas dicere*  
*formas*  
*Corpora* — Ovid. Metam. I.

IF we do not strictly assert, as of some-  
 thing absolute and certain, but as of some-  
 thing *possible* only, and in the number of  
*Con-*

*nius observes* — *τοῖς ψήμασιν ἐξαιρέτως ταράκειται οἱ ψυ-χικὴ διάθεσις* — *the Soul's Disposition is in an eminent de-  
 gree attached to Verbs.* De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus  
 too Priscian: *Modi sunt diversæ INCLINATIONES ANIMI, quas varia consequitur DECLINATIO VERBI.*  
 L. VIII. p. 821.

C.VIII. *Contingents*, this makes that Mode, which  
 Grammarians call the **POTENTIAL**; and  
 which becomes on such occasions the lead-  
 ing Mode of the Sentence.

*Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus,* HA-  
 BERET

*Plus dapis,* &c.

Hor.

Y E T sometimes 'tis not the leading Mode, but only *subjoined* to the Indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the *End*, or *final Cause*; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our Foresight, is therefore express'd most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

*Ut JUGULENT homines, surgunt de nocte latrones.* Hor.

*Thieves rise by night, that they may cut mens throats.*

HERE

HERE that they *rise*, is *positively asserted* C.VIII.  
in the *Declarative* or *Indicative* Mode; but  
as to their *cutting mens throats*, this is only  
delivered *potentially*, because how truly so-  
ever it may be the *End* of their rising, it is  
still but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps  
happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this  
manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians  
not the Potential, but THE SUBJUNCTIVE.

BUT it so happens, in the Constitution  
of human affairs, that it is not always suffi-  
cient merely to *declare* ourselves to others.  
We find it often expedient, from a con-  
sciousness of our Inability, to address them  
after a manner more interesting to our-  
selves, whether to have *some Perception in-*  
*formed*, or *some Volition gratified*. Hence  
then new Modes of speaking; if we *inter-*  
*rogate*, 'tis the INTERROGATIVE MODE;  
if we *require*, 'tis the REQUISITIVE. Even  
the Requisitive itself hath its *subordinate*  
*Species*: With respect to inferiors, 'tis  
an IMPERATIVE MODE; with respect to

C.VIII. equals and superiors, 'tis a PRECATIVE or  
 OPTATIVE\*,

AND thus have we established a variety of Modes; the INDICATIVE or DECLARATIVE, to assert what we think certain; the POTENTIAL, for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent; THE INTERROGATIVE, when we are doubtful, to procure us Information; and THE REQUISITIVE, to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions. The Requisitive too appears under two distinct Species, either as 'tis IMPERATIVE to inferiors, or PRECATIVE to superiors (c).

As

\* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of *Protagoras*. Homer (says he) in beginning his Iliad with—Sing, *Muse, the Wrath,*—when he thinks to pray, in reality commands. εὐχετόθαι οἴομενος, ἐπιτάτλει. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The Solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical Form being in both cases the same.

(c) The Species of *Modes* in great measure depend on the Species of *Sentences*. The Stoicks increased the number of Sentences far beyond the *Peripatetics*. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had many

As therefore all these several Modes C.VIII.  
have their foundation in nature, so have  
certain

many more, as may be seen in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive. There is no mention of a *Potential Sentence*, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive, or Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικὸν, but the Stoicks more properly προσωμα-ριτικὸν) was nothing more than the Form of Address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. *Ammonius* and *Boethius*, the one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latin, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the following manner.

'Αλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ τίνει εἰδῶ, τῷ τε ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,  
"Ω μάκαρ Ἀτρέιδη—  
ἢ τῷ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ", ὡς τὸ,  
Βάσκ' θι, "Ιφι ταχεῖα—

C.VIII. certain marks or signs of them been introduced into Languages, that we may be enabled

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$\chi$  τὸν ἘΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ, ὡς τὸ,

Τίς, πόθεν εἰς αὐδρῶν;

$\chi$  τὸν ἘΤΚΤΙΚΟΤ, ὡς τὸ,

Ἄς γαρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ—

$\chi$  ἵπι τέτοις, τὸν ἈΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΤ, καθ' ὃν πάτερ  
Φαινόμενα περὶ ὅτουεν τῶν πράγματων, ὅτου

Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν—

ἢ περὶ παντὸς, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἔργον. p. 4.

Boethius's Account is as follows. *Perfectiarum vero Orationum partes quinque sunt: DEPRECATIVA, ut,*

*Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,  
Da deinde auxilium, Pater, atque haec omnia firma.*

**IMPERATIVA, ut,**

*Vade age, Natus, voca Zephyros, Et labere pennis.*

**INTERROGATIVA, ut,**

*Dic mihi, Dameta, cujum pecus?*—

**VOCATIVA, ut,**

*O! Pater, O! dominum rerumque aeterna potestas.*

**ENUNTIATIVA, in qua Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut,**

*Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.*

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

In

enable by our discourse to signify them, C.VIII.  
one to another. And hence those various  
MODOES or MOODS, of which we find in  
common Grammars so prolix a detail, and  
which are in fact no more than “so many  
“ *literal* Forms, intended to express these  
“ *natural Distinctions*” (d).

## ALL

In *Milton* the same Sentences may be found, as follows. THE PRECATIVE,

—Universal Lord! be bounteous still  
To give us nought but Good—

THE IMPERATIVE,

Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.

THE INTERROGATIVE,

Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape?

THE VOCATIVE,

—Adam, earth's hallow'd Mold,  
Of God inspir'd—

THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNCIATIVE,

The conquer'd also and enslave'd by war  
Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.

(d) The Greek Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes,

C.VIII. ALL these MODES have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the

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and all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in multiplying or diminishing the number of Syllables, or else in lengthening or shortening their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a Species of *Greek* somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives 'tis so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the *Auxiliar, sum*. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the English Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May* and *Can*; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, *I am writing*,

the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their C.VIII.  
Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part,  
as follows.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGA-  
TIVE MODES are distinguished from *the*  
*Indicative and Potential*, that whereas these  
*last* seldom want a *Return*, to the two *for-*  
*mer* it is *always necessary*.

IF we compare THE REQUISITIVE  
MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we  
shall find these also distinguished, and that  
not only in the *Return*, but in other Pe-  
culiarities.

L 3

To

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ing, I *have* written ; sometimes two together, as, I  
*have been* writing, I *should have* written ; sometimes no  
less than three, as I *might have been* lost, he *could have*  
*been* preserved. But for these, and all other Specula-  
tions, relative to the *Genius* of the *English Language*,  
we refer the Reader, who wishes for the most authen-  
tic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned  
Dr. Lowth, intitled, *A short Introduction to English  
Grammar*.

C.VIII. *The Return to the Requisitive is sometimes made in Words, sometimes in Deeds.*

*To the Request of Dido to Eneas—*

—*a primā dic, bōspes, origine nobis  
Infidias Danāum*—

the proper Return was in *Words*, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief—*date obolum Belisario*—the proper Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to the *Interrogative*, the Return is necessarily made in *Words alone*, in *Words*, which are called a *Response* or *Answer*, and which are always actually or by implication some *definitive assertive Sentence*. Take Examples. *Whose Verses are these?*—the Return is a Sentence—*These are Verses of Homer.* *Was Brutus a worthy Man?*—the Return is a Sentence—*Brutus was a worthy Man.*

AND hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive

the near affinity of this *Interrogative Mode* C.VIII. with the *Indicative*, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form (*e*), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small Particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the Words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (*f*).

## BUT

(e) "Ηγε τὸν προκειμένην ὄρισ-ικὴν ἔγκλισις, τὸν ἔγκει-  
μένην καταφάσιν ἀποβάλλεσσα, μεθίστας τὴν καλεῖ-  
σθαι ὄρισ-ικήν—ἀναπληρώθεισα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑπο-  
στρέψεις εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὄρισ-ικήν. The *Indicative Mode*, of  
which we speak, by laying aside that Assertion, which by  
its nature it implies, quits the name of *Indicative*—when it  
reassumes the Assertion, it returns again to its proper Char-  
acter. Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. Theodore Gaza  
says the same, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(f) It may be observed of the **INTERROGATIVE**,  
that as often as the *Interrogation* is simple and definite,  
the Response may be made in almost the *same Words*,

**C.VIII.** BUT to return to our comparison between the *Interrogative Mode* and the *Requisitive*.

THE

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by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—*Are these Verses of Homer?*—Response—*These Verses are of Homer.* *Are those Verses of Virgil?*—Response—*Those are not Verses of Virgil.* And here the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses, Yes, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we say—*Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil?*—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we say in general—*Whose are these Verses?*—we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no Interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple No, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible Answers to admit only one. Now the least complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the lan- C.VIII.  
guage of Grammarians) has all *Persons*  
of

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instance—*Are these Verses Homer's, or Virgil's?* (1.) *They are Homer's*—(2.) *They are not Homer's*—(3.) *They are Virgil's*—(4.) *They are not Virgils*—we may add, (5.) *They are of neither*. The indefinite Interrogations go still farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance—*Whose are these Verses?* We may answer affirmatively—*They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.*—or negatively—*They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's*, and so on, either way to infinity. How then should we learn from a single *Yes*, or a single *No*, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which must be always answered by a *Sentence*. Yet even here Custom hath consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the *single essential characteristic Word*, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—*How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?*—we answer in the short monosyllable, *Two*—whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—*Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle.*

The

C.VIII. of both *Numbers*. The REQUISITIVE or IMPERATIVE has no first Person of the singular, and that from this plain reason, that 'tis equally absurd in *Modes* for a person to *request* or give *commands to himself*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the speaker to become *the subject of his own address*\*.

AGAIN, we may interrogate as to all Times, both Present, Past, and Future. Who was Founder of Rome? Who is King of China? Who will DISCOVER the Longitude?—But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the Essence of the

Re-

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The Antients distinguished these two Species of Interrogation by different names. The simple they called Ἐρώτημα, *Interrogatio*; the complex, πυσμα, *Perconsatio*. Ammonius calls the first of these Ἐρώτητις διαλέξικη; the other, Ἐρώτησις πυσματική. See Am. in Lib. de *Interpr.* p. 160. Diog. Laert. VII. 66. Quintil. Inst. IX. 2.

\* Sup. p. 74, 75.

*Requisitive Mode) have a necessary respect to the Future (g) only. For indeed what*

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(g) *Apollonius's Account of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing.* Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινομένοις ή μὴ γεγονόσιν ή ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ή μὴ γεγονότα, ἐπιπλεούσηται δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεσθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἐστι. A COMMAND has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to THE FUTURE. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—*Ἄπαντα τὰ προσ-ακίστα ἔκειμένην ἔχει τὸν τῆς μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χρέον γὰρ εἰ νῶ τοῖς, Ο ΤΤΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩ,* τῷ, ΤΙΜΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἔνοιαν· τῇ ἐπαλίστε, δηλωσχός, καθὼ τὸ μὲν προσ-ακίστον, τὸ δὲ δριστικόν. All IMPERATIVES have a disposition within them, which respects THE FUTURE—with regard therefore to TIME, 'tis the same thing to say, LET HIM, THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONOURED, or, HE, THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is IMPERATIVE, the other INDICATIVE or Declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Present to be

C. VIII. what have they to do with the present or  
 the past, the natures of which are im-  
 mutable and necessary?

"Tis

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be nothing else than *an immediate Future*, as opposed to a more distant one. *Imperativus vero Præsens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsentis statim volumus fieri sine aliquâ dilatatione, vel in futuro.* Lib. VIII. p. 8c6.

"Tis true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aorists*. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their *temporary Character*, or else are used to insinuate such a *Speed of execution*, that the deed should be (as it were) *done*, in the very instant when *commanded*. The same difference seems to subsist between our *English Imperative*, BE GONE, and those others of, Go, or BE GOING. The first (if we please) may be styled *the Imperative of the Perfectum*, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands; the others may be styled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

"Tis thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between σκαπίέτω τὰς ἀμπίλις, *Go to digging the Vines*, and σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλις, *Get the Vines dug.*

'Tis from this connection of *Futurity* C.VIII. with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is sometimes used for the *Imperative*, and that to say to any one, You SHALL DO THIS, has often the same Force with the Imperative, Do THIS. So in the Decalogue — THOU SHALT NOT KILL — THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS

Aug. The first is spoken (as he calls it) εἰς ταράταν, by way of Extension, or allowance of Time for the work; the second, εἰς αὐτελείωσιν, with a view to immediate Completion. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses; Σκάπτε and Σκάψον, he says of the last, ἡ μόνον τὸ μὴ γεόμενον ἀρσοσάστι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γεόμενον εἰς ταράταν εἰς απαγόρευεν, that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an Extension, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, 'twould be wrong to say in Greek, ΓΡΑΦΕ, WRITE (for that he is now, and has been long doing) but ΓΡΑΨΟΝ, GET YOUR WRITING DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See Apoll. L. III. c. 24. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. & Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Latini non astimaverunt, &c.

C.VIII. WITNESS — which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative Commands.

As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its *subordinate* or *subjunctive* Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the *Requisitive* and *Interrogative*, by implying a kind of feeble and weak *Affection*, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be said potentially, *This may be*, or, *This might have been*, we may remark without absurdity, *'Tis true*, or *'Tis false*. But if it be said, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or, *Can this be done?* meaning, *to square the Circle*, we cannot say in either case, *'tis true* or *'tis false*, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the Potential does not aspire to the Indicative, because it implies but a *dubious* and *conjectural Affection*,

Assertion, whereas that of the Indicative C.VII.  
is absolute, and without reserve.

THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars 'tis the first in order, so is truly first both in Dignity and Use. 'Tis this, which publishes our sublimest Perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of Desires and Wants; which includes the whole of *Time*, and its minutest Distinctions; which, in its various *Past Tenses*, is employed by History, to preserve to us the Remembrance of former Events; in its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its *Present Tense* serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish *necessary Truth*; THAT TRUTH, which from its nature only exists

C.VIII. *is in the Present*; which knows no distinctions either of Past or of Future, but is every where and always invariably one (b).

## THROUGH

(b) See the quotation, Note (c), Chapter the Sixth.  
*Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non cum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.*

*Boethius*, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a *Roman* of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as *Themistius*, *Porphry*, *Iamblichus*, *Ammonius*, and others. There were no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction between things existing *in Time* and *not in Time*, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since 'tis these that *Boethius* here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

“ THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are  
 “ those whose Existence Time can measure. But if their  
 “ Existence may be measured by Time, then there  
 “ may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence  
 “ of any one of them, as there may be assumed a  
 “ number greater than the greatest multitude, that is  
 “ capable

THROUGH all the above Modes, with C.VIII.  
their respective Tenses, the Verb being  
con-

" capable of being numbered. And hence 'tis that  
" things temporary have their Existence, as it were li-  
" mited by Time; that they are confined within it, as  
" within some bound; and that in some degree or other  
" they all submit to its power, according to those com-  
" mon Phrases, that *Time is a destroyer*; that *things*  
" *decay through Time*; that *men forget in Time, and lose*  
" *their abilities*, and seldom that they improve, or grow  
" young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, *Time al-*  
" *ways attends Motion*. Now the natural effect of Mo-  
" tion is to put something, which now is, out of that  
" state, in which it now is, and so far therefore to de-  
" stroy that State.

" The reverse of all this holds with THINGS THAT  
" EXIST ETERNALLY. These exist not in Time, be-  
" cause Time is so far from being able to measure their  
" Existence, that no Time can be assumed, which their  
" Existence doth not surpass. To which we may add,  
" that they feel none of its effects, being no way ob-  
" noxious either to damage or dissolution.

" To instance in examples of either kind of Being.  
" There are such things at this instant, as *Stonehenge*  
" and the *Pyramids*. 'Tis likewise true at this instant,  
" that the *Diameter of the Square is incommensurable*  
" *with its side*. What then shall we say? Was there

M

" ever

C.VIII. considered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE,  
 has always reference to some Person, or  
 SUBSTANCE. Thus if we say, *Went*, or,  
*Go*, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gone*,  
 we must add a Person or Substance, to  
 make the Sentence complete. Cicero  
*went*; Cæsar *might have gone*; *whither*  
*goeth the Wind? Go! Thou Traitor!* But  
 there is a Mode or Form, under which  
 Verbs sometimes appear, where they have  
 no reference at all to Persons or Sub-  
 stances. For example—*To eat is pleasant*;  
 but

“ ever a Time, when it was *not incommensurable*, as  
 “ ‘tis certain there was a Time, when there was no  
 “ Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it *daily growing less*  
 “ *incommensurable*, as we are assured of Decays in both  
 “ those massy Structures?” From these unchangeable  
 Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the  
 unceasing Intellection of the universal Mind, ever perfect,  
 ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c. See *Nat.*  
*Ausc* L. IV. c. 19. *Metaph.* L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9,  
 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII.  
 The following Passage may deserve Attention.

Τοῦ γὰρ Νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῦν ὁ δὲ τὸν πέφυκεν,  
 καὶ νοῦ. ἀλλὰ καὶ δύτος ὅνπω τέλεος, αὐτὸν μὴ προσθῆ; αὐτῷ τὸν πέφυκεν  
 οὐεῖν αὐτὸν, καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀλλοτε ἀλλα. ἦτε εἴτε αὐτὸν  
 οὐ νοῦν αὐτὸν, καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἄμα. Max. Tyr. Diff. XVII.  
 p. 201. Ed. Lond.

*but to fast is wholesome.* Here the Verbs, *To eat*, and, *To fast*, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the *Latin* and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, **INFINITIVES**. *Sanctius* has given them the name of *Impersonals*; and the *Greeks* that of Ἀπαρέμφατα. from the same reason of their *not discovering either Person or Number.*

THESE INFINITIVES go farther. They not only lay aside the character of *Attributives*, but they also assume that of *Substantives*, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several *Attributes*: Thus in the instance above, *Pleasant* is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, *To Eat*; *Wholesome* the attribute attending the Infinitive, *To Fast*. Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like kind are innumerable.

*Dulce & decorum est pro patria mori.*

*Scire tuum nihil est —*

M 2

'Ov

C.VIII. 'Οὐ κατθανεῖν γὰρ δεινὸν, ἀλλ' αἰσχρός  
θανεῖν (i).

THE Stoics in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that they

(i) 'Tis from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes 'Ονομα ρηματικὸν, A VERBAL NOUN; sometimes 'Ονομα ρήματος, THE VERB'S NOUN. The Reason of this Appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all cases; τὸ γράφειν, τῷ γραφεῖν, τῷ γράφειν. The same construction is not unknown in English.

Thus Spencer,

*For not to have been dipp'd in Lethe lake,  
Could save the Son of Thetis FROM TO DIE—*

ἀπὸ τῷ θανεῖν. In like manner we say, *He did it, to be rich*, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, FOR. *He did it, for to be rich*, the same as if we had said, *He did it, for gain*—ινέκα τῷ πλευτεῖν, ινέκα τῷ κέρδεις — in French, pour s'enricher. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, *I choose TO PHILOSOPHIZE, rather than TO BE RICH*, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βάλομαι, ὑπὲρ τὸ πλευτεῖν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, *I choose PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES*, τὸ φιλο-

they held this alone to be the genuine C. VIII. PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and unmixed in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the Infinitives, Περπαλεῖν, *Ambulare*, *To walk*, mean simply that Energy, and nothing more. The other Modes, besides expressing this Energy, superadd certain Affections, which respect Persons and Circumstances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not simply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and, *Walk Thou*.

M 3

And

Φιλοσοφίαν βέλομαι, ἢπερ τὸν πλῦτον. Thus too Priscian, speaking of *Infinitives*.—CURRERE enim est. CURSUS; & SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA; & LEGERE, LECTIO. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis casuibus, more Nomina; ut Persus,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dicier, hic est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, BONUM EST LEGERE, nihil aliud significo, nisi, BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See also Apoll. L. I. c. 8. Gaza Gram. L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφατον, σύνομά ἐστι φύκατος κ. τ. λ.

C. VIII. And hence they are all of them resolvable into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, together with some Sentence or Word, expressive of their proper Character, *Ambulo*, I walk; that is, *Indico me ambulare*, I declare myself to walk. *Ambula*, Walk Thou; that is, *Impero te ambulare*, I command thee to walk; and so with the Modes of every other Species. Take away therefore the Assertion, the Command, or whatever else gives a Character to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE, which (as Priscian says) significat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum (k).

## THE

(k) See Apollon. L. III. 13. Καθόλες τῶν ταρπυμένου ἀπό τινος κ. τ. λ. See also *Gaza*, in the note before. *Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est, Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere INFINITIVUM possimus dignoscere*; res autem in Personas distributa facit alios verbi motus.—*Itaque omnes modi in hunc, id est, Infinitivum, transsumuntur sive resolvuntur*. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131. From these Principles Apollonius calls the Infinitive *Πῆμα γενικώτατον*, and Priscian, *Verbum generale*.

THE Application of this Infinitive is C.VIII. somewhat singular. It *naturally coalesces* with all those Verbs, that denote any *Tendency, Desire, or Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus 'tis Sense as well as Syntax, to say *βέλομαι ζῆν*, *Cupio vivere*, *I desire to live*; but not to say *Ἐσθίω ζῆν*, *Edo vivere*, or even in *English*, *I eat to live*, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of, *I eat for to live*; as we say *ἐνεκα τῷ ζῆν*, or *pour vivre*. The Reason is, that though *different Actions* may unite in the *same Subject*, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, *He walked and discoursed*) yet the Actions notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But 'tis not so with respect to *Volitions*, and *Actions*. Here the Coalescence is often so intimate, that *the Volition* is unintelligible, till *the Action* be express. *Cupio, Volo, Desidero*—*I desire, I am willing, I want*—What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect.

C VIII. We must help them then by *Infinitives*, which express the proper Actions to which they tend. *Cupio legere, Volo discere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see.* Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in Sentiment, as in Syntax (1).

AND so much for MODES, and their several SPECIES. Were we to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent Characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary Truth, and every demonstrative Syllogism (which last is no more than a Combination of such Truths) must always be express under positive Assertions, and as po-

fitive

(1). Priscian calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluptativa*; they are called in Greek Ποθεωτικά. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see Apollonius, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat. p. 685. Ed. Var.

—*Nec omne ἀταρέψιον φατος cuiuscunq; Verbo, &c.*

sitive Assertions only belong to the *Indicative*. C.VIII.  
*cautus*, we may denominate it for that reason the MODE OF SCIENCE (*m*). Again, as the *Potential* is only convervant about *Contingents*, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode, THE MODE OF CONJECTURE. Again, as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming *Proficients*; hence we may call the *Interrogative*, THE MODE OF PROFICIENCY.

*Inter cuncta leges, & percontabere  
doctos,*

*Quâ ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,*

*Quid purè tranquillet, &c.* Hor.

Farther still, as the highest and most excellent use of the *Requisitive* Mode is legislative

(*m*) *Ob nobilitatem præivit INDICATIVUS, solus Modus aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis.* Scal. de Caus. L. Lat. c. 116.

C. VIII. gislative Command, we may stile it for this reason THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE. *Ad Divos adeunto castè*, says Cicero in the character of a Roman law-giver; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the Laws of England; and in the same Mode speak the Laws of every other nation. 'Tis also in this Mode that the Geometrician, with the authority of a Legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that Science, which he is about to establish.

THERE are other *supposed* Affections of Verbs, such as *Number* and *Person*. But these surely cannot be called a part of their Essence, nor indeed are they the Essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the Properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant Languages are provided with certain Terminations, which respect the *Number* and *Person* of every *Substantive*, that we may

know with more precision. in a complex C. VIII.  
Sentence, each particular Substance, with  
its attendant verbal Attributes. The same  
may be said of *Sex*, with respect to Ad-  
jectives. They have Terminations which  
vary, as they respect Beings male or fe-  
male, tho' *Substances* past dispute are alone  
susceptible of sex (n). We therefore pass  
over these matters, and all of like kind,

as

(n) 'Tis somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammian as *Sanctius*, should justly deny *Genders*, or the distinction of *Sex* to *Adjectives*, and yet make *Persons* appertain, not to *Substantives*, but to *Verbs*. His commentator *Perizonius* is much more consistent, who says—*At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus & Pronominibus vel maxime, imò unicè inest ipsa Persona ; & Verba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva, quibus solis autor* (*Sanctius scil. L. I. c. 7.*) *& rectè Genius adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis.* *Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12.* There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of *Sex* and *Person*. There are but two *Sexes*, that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two *Persons* (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addrest. The third Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.

C.VIII. as being rather among the Elegancies, than  
the Essentials of Language, which Essentials are the Subject of our present Inquiry.  
The principal of these now remaining is  
THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO  
THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which we en-  
deavour to explain in the following man-  
ner,

C H A P.

## C H A P. IX.

*Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their other remaining Properties.*

ALL Verbs, that are strictly so called, Ch.IX.  
 denote (a) Energies. Now as all Energies are *Attributes*, they have reference of course to certain *energizing Substances*. Thus 'tis impossible there should be such Energies, as *To love, to fly, to wound, &c.* if there were not such Beings as *Men, Birds, Swords, &c.* Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some Subject. For example, if we say, *Brutus loves—*we must needs supply—*loves Cato, Cælius,*

(a) We use this word ENERGY, rather than Motion, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both Motion and its Privation. See before, p. 94, 95.

Ch.IX. *Cassius, Portia, or some one. The Sword*  
*wounds—i. e. wounds Hector, Sarpedon,*  
*Priam, or some one.* And thus is it, that  
 every Energy is necessarily situate between  
 two Substantives, an Energizer which is  
*active*, and a Subject which is *passive*.  
 Hence then, if the Energizer lead the  
 Sentence, the Energy follows its Charac-  
 ter, and becomes what we call A VERB  
**ACTIVE.**—Thus we say *Brutus amat,*  
*Brutus loves.* On the contrary, if the pas-  
 sive Subject be principal, it follows the  
 Character of this too, and then becomes  
 what we call A VERB PASSIVE.—Thus  
 we say, *Portia amatur,* *Portia is loved.*  
 'Tis in like manner that the *same Road* be-  
 tween the Summit and Foot of the *same*  
 Mountain, with respect to the Summit is  
*Ascent*, with respect to the Foot is *Descent*.  
 Since then every Energy respects an Ener-  
 gizer or a passive Subject; hence the Rea-  
 son why every Verb, whether active or  
 passive, has in Language a necessary Re-  
 ference

ference to some *Noun* for its *Nominative Case* (b). Ch.IX.

BUT to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. *Brutus loved Portia*.—Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; *loved*, the Energy, and *Portia*, the Subject. But it might have been, *Brutus loved Cato*, or *Cassius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the Energy is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among these infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer also, as when we say *Brutus loved himself*, *flew himself*, &c. in such Case *the Energy* hath to the *same Being* a double Relation, both Active and Passive. And this 'tis which gave rise among

(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priscian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. sub fin. In all which places they will see a proper Nominative supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.

Ch.IX. among the *Greeks* to that Species of Verbs, called VERBS MIDDLE (*c*), and such was their true and original Use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other Languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*se* or *bimself*) is express like other Accusatives.

AGAIN, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within the Energizer*, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, *Cæsar walketh, Cæsar fitteth, 'tis impossible*

(c) Τὰ γάρ καλύμενα μέσοτης χήματα συνέμπλωσι ανεδέξατο ἐνεργετικῆς καὶ ταθητικῆς διαθέσεως. The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and passive Character. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic Kuster, entitled, *De verbo Uso Verborum Mediorum*. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.

ble the Energy should pass out (as in the Ch. IX. case of those Verbs called by the Grammarians VERBS TRANSITIVE) because both the *Energizer* and the *Passive Subject* are united in the same Person. For what is the Cause of this walking or fitting? — 'Tis the *Will* and *Vital Powers* belonging to *Cæsar*. And what is the Subject, made so to move or to fit? — 'Tis the *Body* and *Limbs* belonging also to the same *Cæsar*. 'Tis this then forms that Species of Verbs, which Grammarians have thought fit to call VERBS NEUTER, as if indeed they were void both of Action and Passion, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather said to imply both. Not however to dispute about names, as these Neuters in their *Energizer* always discover their *passive Subject* (c), which other

(c) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily express by the Terms, 'Αὐτοράθεια and 'Ιδιοράθεια, which Priscian renders, *qua ex se in seipso sit intrinsecus Pappa*. L. VIII. 790. *Consentit Ars apud Priscum. p. 205.*

Ch.IX. other Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects  
 being infinite; hence the reason why 'tis  
 as superfluous in these Neuters to have the  
 Subject express, as in other Verbs it is ne-  
 cessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus  
 'tis that we are taught in common Gram-

mars

It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called *Actives*, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive Character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and *assume the Form of Neuters*, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere *Energy* or *Affection* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, *εἰδέν αἴσχυνόσκειν Ιτος*, *This Man knows not how to read*, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them. *εἰδέν αἴσχυνόσκειν τὰ Ὀμήρου*, *He knows not how to read Homer*, or *Virgil*, or *Cicero*, &c.

Thus Horace,

*Qui CUPIT aut METUIT, juvat illum sic domus  
 aut res,  
 Ut lippum pictæ tabulae —*

*He that DESIRES or FEARS (not this thing in parti-  
 cular nor that, but in general he within whom)*

marks that *Verbs Active require an Accusative*, while *Neuters require none*. Ch.IX.

Of the above Species of Verbs, the *Middle* cannot be called necessary, because most Languages have done without it. THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore remaining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and the NEUTER, and those seem essential to all Languages whatever (d).

N 2

THERE

these affections prevail) *has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.* So Cæsar in his celebrated Laconic Epistle of, VENI, VI-DI, VICI, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was in the rapid Sequel of the Events. Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. *Whom* he saw, and *whom* he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. See Apoll. L. III. c. 31. p. 279.

(d) The STOICS, in their logical view of Verbs, as making a part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts.

When

**Ch. IX.** THERE remains a Remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. 'Tis true in general that the greater Part of them denote Attributes of *Energy*

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When a *Verb*, co-inciding with the *Nominative of some Noun*, made without further help a perfect assertive Sentence, as Σωκράτης περιπατᾷ, *Socrates walketh*; then as the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect *Predicate*, they called it for that reason *Katηγόρημα*, a *Predicable*; or else, from its readiness συμπέσων, to co-incide with its *Noun* in completing the Sentence, they called it *Σύμβαμα*, a *Co-incider*.

When a *Verb* was able with a *Noun* to form a perfect assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such *Noun*, but under some *oblique Case*, as Σωκράτει μεταμέλει, *Socratem pænitet*: Such a Verb, from its *near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication*, they called *Παραισύμβαμα* or *Παρακατηγόρημα*.

When a *Verb*, though regularly co-inciding with a *Noun* in its *Nominative*, still required, to complete the Sentiment, *some other Noun under an oblique Case*, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίαν, *Plato loveth Dio*, (where without *Dio* or some other, the *Verb Loveth* would rest indefinite :)

*Energy and Motion.* But there are some Ch. IX; which appear to denote nothing more, than a mere simple *Adjective*, joined to an Assertion, Thus *ἴσαζει* in Greek, and *Equalleth* in English, mean nothing more

N 3 than

nite:) Such Verb, from this Defect they called ἥτλος ἢ σύμβασις, or ἡ κατηγόρησις, something less than a Co-incider, or less than a *Predicable*.

Lastly, when a Verb required two *Nouns in oblique Cases*, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we say Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδες μέλει, *Tædet me Vitæ*, or the like: Such Verb they called ἥτλον, or ἔλατλον ἡ ταρα-  
σύμβασις, or ἡ ταραχατηγόρησις, something less than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect *Predicable*.

These were the *Appellations* which they gave to Verbs, when employed along with Nouns to the forming of Propositions. As to the Name of 'P.H.M.A, &c VERB', they denied it to them all, giving it only to the *Infinitive*, as we have shewn already. See page 164. See also Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 37. Apollon. de Syntaxi L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Theod. Gaz. Gram. L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all *Verbs Neuter* are Συμβάσατα; *Verbs Active*, ἥτλονα ἢ συμ-  
βάσατα.

Ch. IX. than *τόσος εἰσι*, is equal. So *Albeo* in Latin  
 [is] no more than *albus sum*.

—*Campique ingentes offibus albent.* Virg.

THE same may be said of *Tumeo*. *Mōns tumet*, i. e. *tumidus est*, is *tumid*. To express the Energy in these instances, we must have recourse to the Inceptives.

*Fluctus uti primo cœpit cum ALBESCERE*  
*Vento.* Virg.

— — — — — *Freta ponti*  
*Incipiunt agitata TUMESCERE.* Virg.

THERE are Verbs also to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in *Abstract Nouns* (such as *Whiteness* from *White*, *Goodness* from *Good*) as also in the *Infinitive Modes* of Verbs, the *Attributive* is converted into a *Substantive*; here the *Substantive on the contrary* is converted into an *Attributive*. Such are *Kuviζειν* from *κύων*, *to act the part of a Dog*, or *be a Cy-*  
*nic*.

nic; Φίλιππίζειν from Φίλιππος, to Philip- Ch.IX.  
 pize, or favour Philip; Syllaturire from  
 Sylla, to meditate acting the same part as  
 Sylla did. Thus too the wise and virtuous  
 Emperour, by way of counsel to him-  
 self—ὅπα μη ἀποκαισαρώθης, beware thou  
 beest not BECÆSAR'D; as though he  
 said, Beware, that by being Emperor, thou  
 daſt not dwindle into A MERE CÆSAR (e).  
 In like manner one of our own witty Poets,  
 Logternhold himself be OUT-STER-  
 VEN S HOLDED.

And long before him the facetious Fuller,  
 speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary Bi-  
 shop in the Reign of Queen Mary, says of  
 him, that he OUT-BONNER'D even Bon-  
 ner himself. \*

<sup>2</sup> AND so much for that Species of AT-  
 TRIBUTES, called VERBS IN THE STRICT-  
 EST SENSE.

(e) Marc. Antonin. L. VI. §. 30.

\* Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21.

C. 1. J.

## C H A P. X.

*Concerning those other *Attributives*,  
Participles and *Adjectives*.*

Ch. X. **T**H E Nature of Verbs being understood, that of PARTICIPLES is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an *Attribute*; of *Time*; and of an *Assertion*. Now if we take away the *Assertion*, and thus destroy the *Verb*, there will remain the *Attribute* and the *Time*, which make the Essence of a PARTICIPLE. Thus take away the Assertion from the Verb, Γράφει, *Writeth*, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, *Writing*, which (without the *Assertion*) denotes the same *Attribute*, and the same *Time*. After the same manner, by withdrawing the *Assertion*, we discover Γράψας in Εγράψει, Γράψων in Γράψει, for we chuse to refer to the Greek, as being of all languages the

the most complete, as well in this respect, Ch. X.  
as in others.

AND so much for PARTICIPES. (a).

THE

(a) The *Latin* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or*, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as *Loquens*, *Locutus*, *Locuturus*) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as *Scribens*, and *Scripturis*) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as *Scriptus*) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as *Scribendus* and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for γράψας they say, *cum scripsisset*—for γραφόμενος, *dum scribitur*, &c. In English we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliaries, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The English Grammar lays down a good Rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions, as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our

Lan.

**Ch. X.** THE Nature of *Verbs* and *Participles* being understood, that of **ADJECTIVES** becomes easy. A *Verb* implies (as we have said) both an *Attribute*, and *Time*, and an *Affection*; a *Participle* only implies an *Attribute*, and *Time*; and an **ADJECTIVE** only implies an *Attribute*; that is to say, in other Words, an **ADJECTIVE** has no *Affection*, and only denotes such an *Attribute*, as hath not its *Essence* either in *Motion* or its *Privation*. Thus in general the Attributes of **Quantity**, **Quality**, and **Relation** (such as *many* and *few*, *great* and *little*,

Language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few Traces, that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all Writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a Corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, *it was wrote*, for, *it was written*; *he was drove*, for, *he was driven*; *I have went*, for, *I have gone*, &c. in all which instances a *Verb* is absurdly used to supply the proper *Participle*, without any necessity from the want of such Word.

little, black and white, good and bad, double, treble, quadruple, &c.) are all denoted by ADJECTIVES.

It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the Idea of Motion, assume an Assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in *al-beo*, *tumeo*, *irāgō*, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, *Verbal Adjectives*. 'Tis in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus *Doctus* in *Latin*, and *Learned* in *English* lose their power, as *Participles*, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual *Quality*. Thus *Vir eloquens* means not *a man now speaking*, but a man, *who possesses the habit of speaking*, whether he speak or no. So when we say in *English*, he is a *Thinking Man*, an *Understanding Man*, we mean not a person, whose mind is *in actual Energy*,

**Ch. X.** Energy, but whose mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers. 'Tis indeed no wonder, as all Attributives are homogeneous, that at times the several Species should appear to interfere, and the Difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in *natural* Species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific Difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

WE have shewn already (*b*) in the Instances of Φιληππίζειν, *Syllaturike*, Ἀποκαυσαραθῆναι, and others, how *Substantives* may be transformed into *Verbal Attributives*. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into *Adjectives*. When we say the Party of *Pompey*, the Stile of *Cicero*, the Philosophy of *Socrates*, in

(*b*) Sup. p. 182, 183.

in these cases the Party, the Stile, and the Ch. X. Philosophy spoken of, receive a Stamp and Character from the Persons, whom they respect. Those Persons therefore perform the part of Attributes, that is, stamp and characterize their respective Subjects. Hence then *they actually pass into Attributes*, and assume, as such, the Form of *Adjectives*. And thus 'tis we say, the *Pompeian Party*, the *Ciceronian Stile*, and the *Socratic Philosophy*. 'Tis in like manner for a *Trumpet of Brass*, we say a *Brazen Trumpet*; for a *Crown of Gold*, a *Golden Crown*, &c. Even *Pronominal Substantives* admit the like mutation. Thus instead of saying, the *Book of Me*, *of Thee*, and *of Him*, we say *My Book*, *Thy Book*, and *His Book*; instead of saying the *Country of Us*, *of You*, and *of Them*, we say, *Our Country*, *Your Country*, and *Their Country*; which Words may be called so many *Pronominal Adjectives*.

IT

Ch. X. It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no Sex (*c*). And yet their having Terminations conformable to the Sex, Number, and Case of their Substantive, seems to have led Grammarians into that strange Absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as *never properly denoting Substances*. But of this we have spoken before (*d*).

THE

(*c*) Sup. p. 171.

(*d*) Sup. C. VI. Note (*a*). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.

THE ATTRIBUTIVES hitherto treated, that Ch. X;  
is to say, VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and  
ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBU-  
TIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. The  
reason of this Name will be better un-  
derstood, when we have more fully dis-  
cussed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND  
ORDER, to which we now proceed in the  
following Chapter.

C H A P.

## C H A P. XI.

*Concerning Attributives of the Second Order.*

**Ch.XI.** **A**S the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote *the Attributes of Substances*, so there is an inferior Class of them, which denote *the Attributes only of Attributes*.

To explain by examples in either kind —when we say, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent*; *Statius and Virgil both of them wrote*; in these instances the Attributives, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*, are immediately referable to the Substantives, *Cicero*, *Virgil*, &c. As therefore denoting THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we say, *Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent*; *Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably*; in

In these instances, the *Attributives*, *Moderately*, *Exceedingly*, *Indifferently*, *Admirably*, are not referable to *Substantives*, but to other *Attributives*, that is, to the words, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*. As therefore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER.

GRAMMARIANS have given them the Name of Ἐπιφήματα, ADVERBIA, ADVERBS. And indeed if we take the word Ρῆμα, or, *Verb*, in its most comprehensive Signification, as including not only *Verbs properly so called*, but also *Participles* and *Adjectives* [an usage, which may be justified by the best authorities (*a*)] we shall find

(*a*) Thus Aristotle in his *Treatise de Interpretatione*, instances Αὐθρωπος as a *Noun*, and Λεῦκος as a *Verb*. So Ammonius — κατὰ τῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον, τό μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ ὅσα τουτά — ΡΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἰκὸν ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this Signification (that is of denoting the *Attributes of Substance*, Q and

Ch.XI. find the name, *Επίρρημα*, or ADVERB, to  
 be a very just appellation, as denoting a  
 PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL AP-  
 PENDAGE OF VERBS. So great is this  
 dependence in grammatical Syntax, that  
 an *Adverb* can no more subsist without its  
*Verb*, than a *Verb* can subsist without its  
*Substantive*. 'Tis the same here, as in cer-  
 tain natural Subjects. Every Colour for  
 its existence as much requires a Superfi-  
 cies, as the Superficies for its existence re-  
 quires a solid Body (b).

## AMONG

and the Predicate in Propositions} the words, FAIR,  
 JUST, and the like, are called VERBS, and not NOUNS.  
 Am. in libr. de Interp. p. 37. b. Arift. de Interp. L. I.  
 e. i. See also of this Treatise, c. 6. Note (a). p. 87.

In the same manner the Stoicks talked of the Partici-  
 ple. *Nam PARTICIPIUM connumerantes Verbis, PAR-*  
*TICIPIALE VERBUM vocabant vel CASUALE. Pris-*  
*cian. L. I. p. 574.*

(b) This notion of ranging the *Adverb* under the same  
 Genus with the *Verb* (by calling them both Attributives)  
 and of explaining it to be the *Verb's Epithet or Adjective*  
 (by

AMONG the Attributes of Substance are Ch.XI.  
reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus  
we say, *a white Garment*, *a high Mountain*.  
Now some of these Quantities and Quali-  
ties are capable of Intension, and Remis-  
sion. Thus we say, *a Garment EXCEED-  
INGLY white*; *a Mountain TOLERABLY  
high*.

O<sub>2</sub>                      *high,*

(by calling it the *Attributive of an Attributive*) is conformable to the best authorities. *Theodore Gaza* defines an **ADVERB**, as follows — μέρος λόγυα ἀπίλιτου, κατὰ ρήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ρῆματι, καὶ οἷον ἐπίθετος ρῆματος. *A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective.* L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an *Aptote*, since its Principal sometimes has cases, as in *Valde Sapiens*; sometimes has none, as in *Valde amat*). *Priscian's definition of an Adverb is as follows—ADVERBIUM est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cuius significatio Verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adiectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix Vir; feliciter vivit.* L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the Stoicks, he says — *Etiam ADVERBIA Nominibus vel VERBIS CONNUMERABANT, & quasi ADJECTIVA VERBORUM nominabant.* L. I. p. 574. See also *Apoll. de Synt.* L. I. c. 3. *sub fin.*

Ch.XI. *high*, or MODERATELY *high*. 'Tis plain therefore that Intension and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of secondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, *Intension*, and *Remission*. The Greeks have their θαυμασῶς, μάλιστα, πολὺ, ἥκιστα; the Latins their *valde*, *vehementer*, *maxime*, *satis*, *mediocriter*; the English their *greatly*, *vastly*, *extremely*, *sufficiently*, *moderately*, *tolerably*, *indifferently*, &c.

FARTHER than this, where there are different Intentions of the same Attribute, they may be compared together. Thus if the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY *White*, and the Garment B be MODERATELY *White*, we may say, *the Garment A is MORE white than the Garment B.*

IN these instances the Adverb MORE not only denotes Intension, but *relative Intension*. Nay we stop not here. We not

not only denote Intension *merely relative*, Ch.XI,  
*but relative Intension, than which there is*  
*none greater.* Thus we not only say *the*  
*Mountain A is MORE high than the Moun-*  
*tain B,* but that 'tis the MOST high of all  
*Mountains.* Even *Verbs*, properly so called,  
as they admit *simple* Intentions, so they  
admit also these *comparative* ones. Thus  
in the following Example — *Fame be*  
*LOVETH MORE than Riches, but Virtue of*  
*all things be LOVETH MOST* — the Words  
*MORE* and *MOST* denote the different *com-*  
*parative Intentions* of the Verbal Attribu-  
*tive, Loveth.*

AND hence the rise of COMPARISON,  
and of its different *Degrees*; which can-  
not well be more, than the two Species  
above mentioned, one to denote *Simple*  
*Excess*, and one to denote *Superlative*.  
Were we indeed to introduce *more* degrees  
than these, we ought perhaps to introduce  
*infinite*, which is absurd. For why stop  
at a limited Number, when in all subjects,

Ch.XI. susceptible of Intension, the intermediate Excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of *more White*, between the first *Simple White*, and the *Superlative, Whitest*; the same may be said of *more Great, more Strong, more Minute, &c.* The Doctrine of Grammarians about three such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is † no Comparison at all, and because their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* it self. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the MOST WISE of all the Athenians—Homer was the MOST SUBLIME of all Poets.—*

—*Cadit et Ripheus, JUSTISSIMUS UNUS  
Qui fuit in Teucris—* Virg.

IT

† *Qui (scil. Gradus Positivus) quoniam perfectus est,  
a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur.* Consentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

It must be confessed these Comparatives, Ch.XI.  
as well the *simple*, as the *superlative*, seem  
sometimes to part with their *relative Nature*, and only retain their *intensive*. Thus  
in the Degree, denoting *simple Excess*,

*Tristior, et lacrumis oculos suffusa nitentes.* Virg.

*Rusticior paulo est—* Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more usual.  
*Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man,—*that is to say,  
not the *bravest* and *most learned* Man, that  
ever existed, but a Man possessing those  
Qualities *in an eminent Degree*.

THE Authors of Language have con-  
trived a method to retrench these Compa-  
rative Adverbs, by expressing their force in  
the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of  
*More fair*, they say FAIRER; instead of  
*Most fair*, FAIREST, and the same holds

O 4                      true

Ch.XI. true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*. This Practice, however has reached no farther than to *Adjectives*, or at least to *Participles*, *sharing the nature of Adjectives*. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some *Attributives*, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote *that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure*; as when we say, a *Circular Table*, a *Quadrangular Court*, a *Conical Piece of Metal*, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it *equally*, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is *more or less* quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all *Attributives*, denoting *definite Quantities*, whether *continuous* or *discrete*, whether *absolute* or *relative*. Thus the *two-foot Rule*

A

A cannot be *more a two-foot Rule*, than any Ch.XI, other of the same length. *Twenty Lions* ~~—~~ cannot be *more twenty*, than *twenty Flies*. If A and B be both *triple*, or *quadruple* to C, they cannot be *more triple*, or *more quadruple*, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be *no Comparison* without *Intension and Remission*; there can be no Intension and Remission in things *always definite*; and such are the *Attributives*, which we have last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause, why *no Substantive* is *susceptible of these Comparative Degrees*. A Mountain cannot be said *MORE TO BE*, or *TO EXIST*, than a *Mole-hill*, but the *More* and *Less* must be sought for in their Quantities. In like manner, when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the Lion A cannot be called *more a Lion*, than the Lion B, but if more any thing, he is *more fierce, more speedy*, or exceeding in some such Attribute. So again, in referring many Species to one Genus,

**Ch.XI.** Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are *more bulky, more strong, &c.* the Excess, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that saying of the acute *Stagirite*—that *SUBSTANCE is not susceptible of More and Less (c)*. But this by way of digression, to return to the subject of Adverbs.

Of the Adverbs, or secondary Attributives already mentioned, those denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of *Quantity continuous*; *Once, Twice, Thrice*, are Adverbs of *Quantity discrete*; *More and Most, Less and Least*, to which may be added *Equally, Proportionally, &c.*

are

(c) ὃν ἀν ἐπιδέχοιτο οὐ στίχα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἔτελον.  
Categor. c. 5. See also *Santius*, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the Subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also *Priscian*, p. 598. *Dervantur igitur Comparativa a Non-minibus Adjectivis, &c.*

are Adverbs of *Relation*. There are others Ch.XI. of *Quality*, as when we say, HONESTLY ~~is~~<sup>be</sup> industrious, PRUDENTLY *brave*, they fought BRAVELY, *be painted* FINELY, a Portico form'd CIRCULARLY, a Plain cut TRI-  
ANGULARLY, &c.

AND here 'tis worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same *Essence*, assumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ *Honest*, *Honestly*, and *Honesty*. The Answer is, they are in *Essence* the same, but they differ, in as much as *Honest* is the *Attributive* of a *Substantive*; *Honestly*, of a *Verb*; and *Honesty*, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes the *Power* of a *Substantive*, so as to stand by itself.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to *Verbs* of every *Species*; but there

Ch.XI. there are some, which are peculiar to *Verbs*  
 properly so called, that is to say, to such as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Pri-vations*. All MOTION and REST imply TIME and PLACE, as a kind of necessary Coincidents. Hence then, if we would express the Place or Time of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper Adverbs; of Place, as when we say, *he stood THERE*; *he went HENCE*; *he travelled FAR*, &c. of Time, as when we say, *he stood THEN*; *he went AFTERWARD*; *he travelled FORMERLY*, &c. Should it be asked — why *Adverbs of Time*, when Verbs have *Tenses*? The Answer is, tho' Tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of Time, yet to denote them all by Tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote *Yesterday*, *To-day*, *To-morrow*, *Formerly*, *Lately*, *Just now*, *Now*, *Immediately*, *Presently*, *Soon*, *Here-after*, &c.? Twas this then that made  
 the

the *Temporal Adverbs* necessary, over and Ch.XI.  
above the *Tenses*.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the *Intensions* and *Remissions* peculiar to Motion, such as *speedily*, *hastily*, *swiftly*, *slowly*, &c. as also *Adverbs of Place*, made out of *Prepositions*, such as *ἀνω* and *κάτω* from *ἀνα* and *κατα*, in *English upward* and *downward*, from *up* and *down*. In some instances the Preposition suffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we say, *CIRCA equitat, he rides ABOUT*; *PROPE cecidit, he was NEAR falling*; *Verum ne POST conferas culpam in me, But do not AFTER lay the blame on me (d)*.

## THERE

(d) *Sofip. Charisiu Inst. Gram.* p. 170. *Terent. Eun.*  
*Act. II. Sc. 3.*

Ch.XI. THERE are likewise *Adverbs of Interrogation*, such as *Where*, *Whence*, *Whither*, *How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their *Interrogative* power, they assume that of a *Relative*, so as even to represent the *Relative or Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus Ovid,

*Et Seges est, ubi Troja fuit—*

translated in our old English Ballad,

*And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town  
stood.*

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, IN QUO,*  
*&c. Corn groweth in that place, IN WHICH,*  
*&c. the power of the Relative, being implied in the Adverb.* Thus Terence,

*Hujusmodi mibi res semper comminiscere,  
UBI me excarnufices— Heaut. IV. 6.*

where *UBI* relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus.*

'Tis

'Tis in like manner that the *Relative Ch. XI.*  
*Pronoun* upon occasion becomes an *Interrogative*, at least in *Latin* and *English*.  
Thus *Horace*,

*QUEM Virum aut Heroa lyrâ, vel acri  
Tibid sumes celebrare, Clio?*

So *Milton*,

*Who first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?*

THE reason of all this is as follows. *The Pronoun* and *Adverbs* here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, **RELATIVES**. Even when they become *Interrogatives*, they lose not this character, but are still *Relatives*, as much as ever. The difference is, that *without* an *Interrogation*, they have reference to a *Subject*, which is *antecedent*, *definite* and *known*; *with* an *Interrogation*, to a *Subject* which is *subsequent*, *indefinite*, and *unknown*, and which

Ch.XI. which 'tis expected that *the Answer* should  
 express and ascertain,

*Who first seduc'd them? —*

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, tho' *unknown*, the Pronoun, Who, has a reference.

*Tb' infernal Serpent —*

Here in the *Answer* we have *the Subject*, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the Who in the Interrogation is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any Interrogation at all, 'Twas *the Infernal SERPENT, WHO first seduced them.*

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for **ADVERBS**, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all **Attributives**. We have likewise at-

tempted to explain their general Nature, Ch. XI.  
 which we have found to consist in being  
*the Attributes of Attributes.* There re-  
 mains only to add, that ADVERBS *may be*  
*derived from almost every Part of Speech:*  
 from PREPOSITIONS, as when from *After*  
 we derive *Afterwards*—from PARTICI-  
 PLES, and through these from *Verbs*, as  
 when from *Know* we derive *Knowing*, and  
 thence *Knowingly*; from *Scio, Sciens*, and  
 thence *Scienter*—from ADJECTIVES, as  
 when from *Virtuous* and *Vicious*, we derive  
*Virtuously* and *Viciously*—from SUBSTAN-  
 TIVES, as when from Πίθηκός, *an Ape*, we  
 derive Πιθήκειον βλέπειν, *to look APISHLY*;  
 from Λέων, *a Lion*, Λεονιδῶς, *Leoninely*—  
 nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when  
 from *Socrates* and *Demosthenes*, we derive  
*Socratically* and *Demosthenically*. 'Twas  
*Socratically reasoned*, we say; 'twas *De-*  
*mōsthenically spoken*\*. Of the same sort  
 P are

\* Aristotle has Κυκλωπικῶς *Cyclopically*, from Κύκλωψ  
*a Cyclops.* Eth. Nic. X 9.

Ch.XI. are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, such as *Catiliniter* from *Catiline*, *Sisenniter* from *Sisenna*, *Tullianè* from *Tullius*, &c. (e).

Nor are they thus extensive in *Derivation*, but in *Signification* also. Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs us (f), that ADVERBS may be found in every one of the Predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their Infinitude, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal Genera. The Stoics too called the ADVERB by the name of Πανδεκῆς, and that from a view to the same multi-form Nature. *Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessâ fibi rerum variâ potestate.* 'Tis thus that Sofipater explains the

(e) See *Prisc.* L. XV. p. 1022. *Sof. Charis.* 161. Edit. *Putschii.*

(f) — διὸ δὴ καὶ ἀμείνον τέως δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐπιρρημάτων γένη θέσθαι ἔχεινα, υσίαν, τροιὸν, τοσὸν, πρόσ τι, τ. λ. Gram. Introd. L. II. 4.

the Word (*g*), from whose authority Ch.XI.  
we know it to be *Stoical*. But of this ~~is~~  
enough.

AND now having finished those PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, we proceed to those AUXILIARY PARTS, which are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as these make the Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

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(g) *Sofsp. Char.* p. 175. Edit. *Putschii*.



# H E R M E S

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY  
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

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## B O O K. II.

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### C H A P. I.

*Concerning Definitives.*

WHAT remains of our Work, Ch. I.  
is a matter of less difficulty,  
it being the same here, as in  
some Historical Picture; when the prin-  
cipal Figures are once formed, 'tis an easy  
labour to design the rest.

P 3

DE-

Ch. I. DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ΑΡΤΙΚΛΑ. They are of two kinds, either those *properly and strictly so called*, or else the *Pronominal Articles*, such as *This, That, Any, &c.*

We shall first treat of those *Articles more strictly so denominated*, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

THE visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least

least to some Genus. For example—a Ch. I. certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it *Dog*, or *Horse*, or *Lion*, or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, *Animal*.

BUT this is not enough, The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? *Known*, or *unknown*? Seen now *for the first time*, or *seen before*, and now remembred?— ‘Tis here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (THE). (A) respects our *primary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *unknown*; (THE) respects our *secondary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *known*. To explain by an example—I see an object pass

Ch. I. by, which I never saw till then. What  
do I say?—*There goes A Beggar, with A  
long Beard.* The Man departs, and re-  
turns a week after. What do I say then?  
—*There goes THE Beggar with THE long  
Beard.* The Article only is changed, the  
rest remains un-altered,

YET mark the force of this apparently  
minute Change. The Individual, *once  
vague*, is now recognized *as something  
known*, and that merely by the efficacy of  
this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates  
a kind of *previous acquaintance*, by refer-  
ring the present Perception to a like Per-  
ception already past (a).

THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and  
(THE) are both of them *definitives*, as  
they circumscribe the latitude of Genera  
and Species, by reducing them for the  
most

(a) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63, 64.

most part to denote Individuals. The Ch. I. difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself *unascertained*, whereas the Article (THE) *ascertains the Individual also*, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

'Tis perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the *Greeks* have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article, 'O. 'Ο ἄνθρωπος ἐπεσεν, *The man fell* — ἄνθρωπος ἐπεσεν, *A Man fell*, without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (*b*). Even in *English*, where the Article

(*b*) Τὰ γὰρ ἀρχιστῶδης πότε νοήμενα, οὐ τὴν ἀρθρὸν παράθεσις ὑπὸ ὁρίσμον τὴν προσώπου ἀγεῖ. *Those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person.* Apoll. L. IV. c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36.  
ποιεῖ

Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is express by the same Negation. *Those are the Men*, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some previous Knowledge. *Those are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many *vague* and *uncertain* Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

BUT

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ποιεῖ (τὸ Ἀρθρὸν sc.) δὲ ἀναπόληπτὸν προεγνωσμένον τὸ  
ἐν τῇ συντάξει οἷον εἰ μὲν λέγοι τις, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ  
ΗΚΕ, ἀδηλον τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει· εἰ δὲ Ο ΑΝ-  
ΘΡΩΠΟΣ, δῆλον, προεγνωσμένον γάρ τινα ἄνθρωπον  
λέγει. Τότε δὲ αὐτὸς βλέπονται καὶ οἱ Φάσκοντες τὸ ἄρ-  
θρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως καὶ δευτέρας. The Article  
causes a Review within the Mind of something known  
before in the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one  
says "Aνθρωπός ήτε, MAN CAME (which is the same,  
as when we say in English A man came) it is not evident,  
of whom he speaks. But if he says οἱ ἄνθρωποί ήτε,  
THE MAN CAME, then 'tis evident; for he speaks of  
some Person known before. And this is what those mean,  
who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Sec-  
ond Knowledge together. Theod. Gazæ, L. IV.

BUT tho' the Greeks have no Article Ch. I. correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be nearer related, than their 'O, to the Article, THE. 'Ο βασιλεῦς, THE King; ΤΟ' δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the Greek Article, as they are described by *Apollonius*, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Graminarians, now remaining.

"Ἐτῶν τὸν καθὸ. καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις ἀπεφυγάμεθα,  
ἴδιον ἄρθρων η̄ ἀναφορὰ, η̄ ἐσι τροκατειλεύ-  
μένη προσώπῳ παραβατική.—Now the peculi-  
iar Attribute of the Article, as we have  
shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which  
implies some certain Person already men-  
tioned. Again—Οὐ γὰρ δῆγε τά ὄνόματα  
ἢ ἀυτῶν ἀναφορὰν παρίσησιν, εἰ μὴ συμπα-  
ραλαβούσι τὸ ἄρθρον, οὐδὲ αἱρετός ἐσιν η̄ ἀναφο-  
ρά. For Nouns of themselves imply not

Re-

Ch. I. Reference, unless they take to them the Article, whose peculiar Character is Reference.

Again—Τὸ ἄρθρον προῦφεσσαν γνῶσιν δῆλοι  
—The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance (c).

His reasoning upon Proper Names is worth remarking. Proper Names (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two Grecian Chiefs, who bore the name of *Ajax*. 'Twas not therefore without reason, that *Menestheus* uses Epithets, when his intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

Ἄλλα

(c) *Apoll. de Synt.* L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of REFERENCE is as follows—Ιδίωμα ἀντιφορῆς προκατειλεγμένης προσώπῳ δευτέρᾳ γνῶσις. The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.

Ἄλλας τερ νῖστος οὐ τελαμώνιος ἀλκηψίος Ch. I.  
Ajax. Hom.

If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared,  
— — at least alone  
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.

*Apollonius* proceeds — Even Epithets themselves are diffused thro' various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

In order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes *an Article* before it, that it may indicate *a Reference to some single Person only*, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορά, according to the Author's own Phrase. And thus 'tis we say, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματίκος, Trypho THE Grammariān; Απολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, Apollodorus THE Cyrenean, &c. The Author's Conclusion of this

Ch. I. this Section is worth remarking. Δεόντως ἡ τὸς ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοιότον ἡ πρόσθετίς ἐστι τῆς ἀρθρῆς, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ χυρίῳ ὄνοματι—'Tis with reason therefore that the Article is here also added, as it brings the Adjective to an Individuality, as precise, as the proper Name (*d*).

We may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the Article even common Appellatives come to have the force of proper Names, and that unassisted by epithets of any kind. Among the Athenians Πλοῖον meant *Ship*; "Εὐδεκα, Eleven; and "Αὐθωπός, *Man*. Yet add but the Article, and Τὸ Πλοῖον, THE SHIP, meant *that particular Ship, which they sent annually to Delos*; 'Οι Εὐδεκα, THE ELEVEN, meant, *certain Officers of Justice*; and 'Ο Αὐθωπός, THE MAN, meant *their public Executioner*. So in English, *City*, is a Name

(d) See *Apoll.* L. I. c. 12. where by mistake *Menelaus* is put for *Menestheus*.

Name common to many places ; and Ch. I.  
Speaker, a Name common to many Men.  
 Yet if we prefix the Article, THE CITY  
 means our Metropolis ; and THE SPEAK-  
 ER, a big Officer in the British Parlia-  
 ment.

AND thus 'tis by an easy transition, that  
 the Article, from denoting *Reference*, comes  
 to denote *Eminence* also ; that is to say,  
 from implying an *ordinary* pre-acquain-  
 tance, to presume a kind of *general and universal Notoriety*. Thus among the  
 Greeks Ὁ Ποιητὴς, THE POET, meant *Homer* (e) ; and Ὁ Σταγειρίτης, THE STAGI-  
 RITE, meant *Aristotle* ; not that there were  
 not

(e). There are so few exceptions to this Observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet Aristotle twice denotes *Euripides* by the Phrase ὁ των θηρίων, once at the end of the seventh Book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, and again in his *Physics*, L. II. 2. Plato also in his tenth Book of *Laws* (p. 901, *Edit. Serr.*) denotes *Hesiod* after the same manner.

Ch. I. not many Poets, beside *Homer*; and many  
 Stagirites, beside *Aristotle*; but none equally  
 illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

'Tis on a like principle that *Aristotle* tells us, 'tis by no means the same thing to assert—*εἴρηι τὴν ἡδονὴν αἰγαλίν*, or, TO' *αἰγαλίν*—that, *Pleasure is A Good*, or, *THE Good*. The first only makes it a common *Object of Desire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it *that supreme and sovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (f).

BUT to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require *defining*, for

(f) *Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.*

for it is by nature a *Definitive*.—And Ch. I.  
what Words are these?—Not those which  
already are *as definite*, *as may be*. Nor  
yet those, which, *being indefinite*, *cannot*  
*properly be made otherwise*. It remains  
then they must be *those*, *which though in-*  
*definite, are yet capable, through the Article,*  
*of becoming definite.*

UPON these Principles we see the reason,  
why 'tis absurd to say, Ο ΕΓΩ, THE I, or  
Ο ΣΥ, THE THOU, because nothing can  
make those Pronouns more *definite*, than  
they are (g). The same may be asserted  
of

(g) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition, to refuse co-alescence with the Article. Ἐκεῖνο  
Ἐν Ἀιτωνυμίᾳ, τὸ μετὰ δεῖξεως ἢ αὐτοφορῆς ἀντονομα-  
ζόμενον, ὃ & σύνεστι τὸ ἀρθρον. *That therefore is a Pro-*  
*noun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a*  
*Noun, and WITH WHICH THE ARTICLE DOETH*  
*NOT ASSOCIATE.* L.II. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking  
of Pronouns—Πάντη δὲ — εἰς ἐπιδέχονται ἀρθρον. L.IV.  
Priscian says the same. *Jure igitur apud Græcos prima*

Q

et

Ch. I. of Proper Names, and though the Greeks say ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Εἰρήνη, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in Greek ΟΙ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in English, THE BOTH, because these Words *in their own nature* are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus if it be said, *I have read BOTH Poets*, this plainly indicates *a definite pair*, of whom some mention has been made already; Δυὰς ἔγνωσμένη, a known Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself, (b) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, *I have read Two Poets*, this may mean *any Pair out of*

*et secunda persona pronominum, quæ sine dubio demonstrativa sunt, articulis adjungi non possunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est.* L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.*

(b) *Apollon.* L. I. c. 16.

of all that ever existed. And hence this Ch. I.  
 Numeral, being in this Sense *indefinite* (as  
 indeed are all others, as well as itself) is  
 forced to assume the Article, whenever it  
 would become *definite*\*. And thus 'tis,  
 THE Two in *English*, and ΟΙ ΔΥΟ in  
*Greek*, mean nearly the same thing, as  
 ΒΟΤΗ or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence also it  
 is, that as Two, when taken alone, has  
 reference to some *primary* and *indefinite*  
 Perception, while the Article, THE, has  
 reference to some *secondary* and *definite* † ;  
 hence I say the Reason, why 'tis bad *Greek*  
 to say ΔΥΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad  
*English*, to say Two THE MEN. Such  
 Syntax is in fact a *Blending of Incompati-*

Q 2

bles,

\* This explains Servius on the XII<sup>th</sup> Æneid. v. 51 r. where he tells us that *Duorum* is put for *Amborum*. In *English* or *Greek* the Article would have done the business, for the *Two*, or τοῖν δυοῖν are equivalent to *Both* or αἱμφότερων, but not so *Duorum*, because the *Latins* have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216.

Ch. I. bles, that is to say of a *defined Substantive* with an *undefined Attributive*. On the contrary to say in Greek ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in *English*, *Both THE MEN*, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, 'tis correct to say, ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, *THE TWO MEN*, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends it's Power* as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, *because they are by Nature as definite as may be*, so there are others, which admit it not, *because they are not to be defined at all*. Of this sort are all **INTERROGATIVES**. If we question about *Substances*, we cannot say Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, *THE WHO IS THIS*; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥ-

ΟΤΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS? (*i*). The same Ch. I.  
as to Qualities and both kinds of Quantity.  
We say without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟ-  
ΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in English, WHAT  
SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT.  
The Reason is, that the Articles O, and  
THE respect Beings *already known*; Inter-  
rogatives respect Beings, *about which we*  
*are ignorant*; for as to what we know,  
Interrogation is superfluous.

IN a word *the natural Associators with Articles* are all those common Appellatives, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. 'Tis these, which, by assuming a different Article, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge (*k*).

Q 3

WE

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(*i*) Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναλιώτατον τῶν ἀρθρων, a Part of Speech, most contrary, most averse to Articles. L. IV. c. i.

(*k*) What is here said respects *the two Articles*, which we have in English. In Greek, the Article does no more, than imply a Recognition. See before p. 216, 217, 218.

Ch. I. We shall here subjoin a few Instances  
 of the peculiar Power of ARTICLES.

EVERY Proposition consists of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *English* these are distinguished by their Position, the *Subject* standing first, the *Predicate* last. *Happiness* is *Pleasure*—Here, *Happiness* is the *Subject*; *Pleasure*, the *Predicate*. If we change their order, and say, *Pleasure* is *Happiness*; then *Pleasure* becomes the *Subject*, and *Happiness* the *Predicate*. In *Greek* these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the *Article*, which the *Subject* always assumes, and the *Predicate* in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. *Happiness* is *Pleasure*—ἡδονὴ η ἐυ-  
 δαιμονία—*Pleasure* is *Happiness*—η ἡδονὴ ἐυ-  
 δαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπά  
 τὰ καλά—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χα-  
 λεπά καλά.

IN Greek 'tis worth attending, how in Ch. I. the same Sentence, the same Article, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ο Πτολεμᾶς γυμνασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη —Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publicly honoured. The Participle γυμνασιαρχήσας has here no other force, than to denote to us the Time, when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the Article; and say, Ο γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμᾶς ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured. The Participle in this case, being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (?).

Q 4

IN

(l) Apollon. L. I. c. 33, 34.

Ch. I. IN English likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the *Articles*, tho' we leave every other Word of the sentence untouched.—

*And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART THE MAN\**. In that single, THE, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. 'Tis possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the Article, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—*And Nathan said unto David, THOU ART A MAN.* Might not the King well have, demanded upon so impertinent a position,

*Non dices hodie, quorsum haec tam putida tendant?*

BUT

\* ΣΤΕΙΟΑΝΗΠ, Βασιλ, Β', ριφ. 16'.

BUT enough of such Speculations. The Ch. I. only remark, which we shall make on them, is this; that “ minute Change in “ PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in “ EFFECTS; so that well are PRINCIPLES “ intitled to our regard, however *in appearance* they may be trivial and low.”

THE ARTICLES already mentioned are those *strictly* so called; but besides these there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, such as *This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None, &c.* Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (*m*), where

(m) See B.I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue—*Noster sermo Articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur.* Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. *His declaratis, satis constat Graecorum Articulos non negligentes a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum.* Nam ubi aliiquid praescribendum est, quod Graeci per articulum efficiunt (Ἑλέγεν ὁ δύλος) expletur a Latinis per Is aut ILLE; Is, are

Ch. I. where we have shewn, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be *to define and ascertain*, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, *THIS Picture I approve, but THAT I dislike*, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more near*, the other as *the more distant*? So when we say, *SOME men are virtuous, but ALL men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of this ALL and SOME, but to define that *Universality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them

*aut, Ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio fit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus fit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cuius antea non nescii sumus, aut ad praescribendam intellectionem, que latius patet queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græcè Καῖσαρ ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.*

them away? The same is evident in such Ch. I. Sentences, as—SOME substances have sensation; OTHERS want it—Chuse ANY way of acting, and SOME men will find fault, &c. For here **SOME**, **OTHER**, and **ANY**, serve all of them to *define* different Parts of a given Whole; **SOME**, to denote a *definite Part*; **ANY**, to denote an *indefinite*; and **OTHER**, to denote the *remaining Part*, when a Part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last Word denotes a *large indefinite Portion*, set in opposition to some *single, definite, and remaining Part*, which receives from such Opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus *Virgil*,

*Excudent ALII spirantia mollius æra;  
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore  
vultus;*

*Orabunt causas melius, cælique meatus  
Describent radio, et surgentia fidera  
dicent:*

*Tu regere imperio populos, ROMANE,  
memento, &c.*                                   Æn. VI.

NOTHING

Ch. I. NOTHING can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; *one Act* set as equal to *many other Acts taken together*, and the Roman *singly* (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to *all other Men*; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of *ALII* to *Tu*.

BUT here we conclude, and proceed to treat of CONNECTIVES.

C H A P.

## C H A P. II.

*Concerning Connectives, and first those  
called Conjunctions.*

CONNECTIVES are the subject of what Ch. II. follows; which, according as they connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are called by the different Names of CONJUNCTIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of these Names, that of the *Preposition* is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the Part, which it connects. The name of the *Conjunction*, as is evident, has reference to its *essential character*.

Of these two we shall consider the CONJUNCTION first, because it connects, not Words, but *Sentences*. This is conformable to the Analysis, with which we began this inquiry \*, and which led us, by parity

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\* Sup. p. 11, 12.

Ch. II. parity of reason, to consider *Sentences themselves* before *Words*. Now the Definition of a CONJUNCTION is as follows—a Part of Speech, void of Signification itself, but so formed as to help Signification, by making TWO or more significant Sentences to be ONE significant Sentence (a).

THIS

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(a) Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather single Parts of Speech, than whole Sentences, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This Sanctius justly explodes. *Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsae enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit.* Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. *Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodiderunt; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsae enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed Conjunctio est, qua conjungit Orationes plures.* De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

THIS

THIS therefore being the general Idea of Ch. II.  
 CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species  
 in

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This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by *Apollonius*, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sentences, and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support *Scaliger* and *Sanctius*, and that is *Aristotle's* Definition, as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is Φωνὴ ἀσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν Φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν ἐξ, τοιεῦ τε φυχῆ μίαν Φωνὴν σημαντικήν. An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make ONE significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. If Men were by nature social, 'tis their Interest to be just, though it were

Ch. II. in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS,  
 while they connect sentences, either connect  
 also

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were not so ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences. (1.) Men are by nature social. (2.) 'Tis Man's Interest to be just. (3.) 'Tis not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Men should be just. The first two of these Sentences are made One by the Conjunction, IF; these, One with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, THO'; and the three, thus united, make that Φωνὴ μία σημαντικὴ, that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. Ο γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν τοις τὰ τολλάξ ὡστε ἔαν ἐξαιρεθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι τεναντίου ἐσται τὸ ἐν τολλάξ. The Conjunction makes many, ONE; so that if it be taken away, 'tis then evident on the contrary that one will be MANY. Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, ηλθο, ἀπήνησα, ἐδέσμην, veni, occurri, rogavi, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for ηλθο, ἀπήνησα, and ἐδέσμην, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's

*also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these two Sentences—* Ch. II.  
*Rome was enslaved—Cæsar was ambitious*  
*—and connect them together by the Conjunction, BECAUSE. Rome was enslaved,*  
*BECAUSE Cæsar was ambitious. Here the Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear*  
*to be connected. But if I say,—Manners*  
*must be reformed, OR Liberty will be lost—*  
*here the Conjunction, OR, though it join*  
*the*

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Ammonius's account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπάρχειν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἰς, ἀνάλογος ἀντίτιτον τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνὶ λεγομένῳ ὁ δὲ ταλείοντας ὑπάρχεις δηλῶν, ἔνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνῶσθαι τὰς δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ υπὶ τῇ ἐκ τολλῶν συγκειμένῃ ξύλων, ὃπο δὲ τῶν γράφων Φαινομένην ἔχεσθη τὴν ἴνωσιν. Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence simply, and which is strictly ONE, may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet sever'd, and called in this account One. That, which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made ONE by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity. Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6.

R.

Ch. II. *the Sentences, yet as to their respective Meanings, is a perfect Disjunctive.* And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions *conjoin Sentences*, yet with respect to the *Sense*, some are **CONJUNCTIVE**, and some **DISJUNCTIVE**; and hence (b) 'tis that we derive their different Species.

*THE Conjunctions, which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings, are either COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES.* The principal Copulative in *English* is, **AND**. The Continuatives are, **IF**, **BECAUSE**, **THEREFORE**, **THAT**, &c. The Difference between these is this — *The Copulative does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures are not incompatible.* *Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate*

I

Sen-

(b) Thus Scaliger. *Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero disjungunt.* De C. L. Lat. c. 167.

Sentences into one continuous Whole, and Ch. II.  
are therefore applicable only to Subjects,  
which have an *essential Co-incidence*.

To explain by Examples—'Tis no way improper to say, *Lyssippus was a Statuary, AND Priscian was a Grammarian*—*The Sun shineth, AND the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, *Lyssippus was a Statuary, BECAUSE Priscian was a Grammarian*; tho' not to say, *the Sun shineth, BECAUSE the Sky is clear*. The Reason is, with respect to the first, the *Co-incidence* is merely *accidental*; with respect to the last, tis *essential*, and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives* (c).

As

(c) *Copulativa est, que copulat tam Verba, quam Sensem.* Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more explicit—*si Sensem conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessariò,*

Ch. II. As to *Continuatives*, they are either ~~Suppositives~~<sup>Suppositive</sup>, such as, If; or *Positive*, such as, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, AS, &c. Take Examples of each—you will live happily, if you live honestly—you live happily, BECAUSE you live honestly. The Difference between these Continuatives is this—The *Suppositives* denote *Connection*, but assert not actual *Existence*; the *Positives* imply both the one and the other (d).

## FARTHER

cessario, aut non necessario: &c., si non necessario, tum sunt *Copulativa*, &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of Continuatives is as follows. *Continuativa* sunt, quae continuationem & consequentiam rerum significant—ibid. Scaliger's account is—causam aut præstituant, aut subdunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the Copulative was Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the Continutive, συναπλικός; the Etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

(d) The old Greek Grammarians confined the name Συναπλικοί, and the Latins that of *Continuativa* to those  
Con-

FARTHER than this, the Positives above Ch. II. mentioned are either CAUSAL, such as, BECAUSE, SINCE, AS, &c. or COLLECTIVE, such as, THEREFORE, WHEREFORE, THEN, &c. The Difference between these is this—the *Causals* subjoin *Causes to Effects*—*The Sun is in Eclipse*,

BE-

Conjunctions, which we have called *Suppositive* or *Conditional*, while the Positive they called  $\omega\alpha\rho\sigma\nu\alpha\pi\lambda\xi\kappa\iota$ , or *Subcontinuative*. They agree however in describing their proper Characters. The first according to Gaza are,  $\delta\imath\ \bar{\nu}\pi\alpha\varrho\xi\iota\mu\eta\ \bar{\nu}$ ,  $\bar{\alpha}\kappa\lambda\gamma\theta\iota\alpha\iota\delta\ \bar{d}\epsilon\ \tau\eta\alpha\ \bar{\nu}$ ,  $\tau\alpha\xi\iota\mu\eta\ \bar{\delta}\eta\lambda\gamma\eta\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ —L. IV. Priscian says, they signify to us, *qualis est ordinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitazione aliquâ effentiâ rerum*—p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin *sine subsistentiâ necessariâ; potest enim subsistere & non subsistere; utrumque enim admittunt*. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Positive, or  $\omega\alpha\rho\sigma\nu\alpha\pi\lambda\xi\kappa\iota$  (to use his own name) Gaza tells us,  $\delta\tau\iota\ \bar{\nu}\pi\alpha\varrho\xi\iota\mu\eta\ \bar{\tau}\alpha\xi\epsilon\omega\ \bar{\sigma}\eta\mu\alpha\iota\eta\eta\sigma\iota\ \bar{\varepsilon}\tau\eta\gamma\epsilon$ —And Priscian says, *causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum effentia rerum*—And Scaliger, *non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod substituit, conjungunt*. Ibid.

R 3

It

Ch. II. BECAUSE *the Moon intervenes*—The Collectives subjoin Effects to Causes—*The Moon intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in Eclipse.* Now we use Causals in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and Collectives, in Demonstrations, and Science properly so called, where the Cause being known

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It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the *Positive* Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the *Suppositive*, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what *actually is*; the Suppositive extend to *Possibles*, nay even as far as to *Impossibles*? Thus 'tis false to affirm, *As it is Day, it is Light*, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, because the, *If*, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even Impossibles. We may say, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks.* Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—*amplitudinem Continuative percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando presupponit.* De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continutive, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

known first; by its help we discern conse- Ch. II.  
quences (*e*). —

ALL these *Continuatives* are resolvable into *Copulatives*. Instead of, BECAUSE it is Day, it is light, we may say, It is Day, AND it is Light. Instead of, IF it be Day, it is Light, we may say, 'Tis at the same time necessary to be Day, AND to be Light, and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connections, as well to the *essential*, as to the *casual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the *Continuative* may be resolved into a *Copulative* and something more, that is to say, into a *Copulative* implying an *essential* Co-incidence (*f*) in the Subjects conjoined.

R 4

As

(*e*) The Latins called the Causals, *Causales* or *Causativæ*; the Collectives, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*: The Greeks called the former Ἀιτιολογυῖκοι, and the latter Συλλογυῖκοι.

(*f*) *Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæc, propterea quod Causa cum Effectu Suâpce naturâ conjuncta est.*  
*Scal. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.*

Ch. II. As to *Causal* Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting : for example, THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE 'tis made of Metal*—THE FORMAL—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE 'tis long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet sounds, BECAUSE an Artist blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet sounds, THAT it may raise our courage*. Where 'tis worth observing, that the three first Causes are express by the strong affirmation of the *Indicative Mode*, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential*. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be *first in Speculation*, is always *last in Event*. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which.

which like other Contingents, may either Ch. II.  
happen, or not (g.) Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind,  
such as, THAT, *ινα*, UT, &c.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS,  
*which connect both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTINUATIVE; the Continuatives are either Conditional, or Positive; and the Positives are either Causal or Collective.

AND now we come to the DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, because, while they *disjoin the Sense*, they *conjoin the Sentences* (b).

WITH

(g) See B.I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes see Vol. I. Note XVII. p. 280.

(b) Οἱ δὲ διαζευχῆικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντίθεσθαι, ἢ ἡ ὥραγμα ἀπὸ ὥραγματῶν, ἢ ὥροςωπον ἀπὸ ὥρωσπες διαζευγνῦντες, τὴν Φράσιν ἐπισυνδέσσειν. *Gazæ Gram.*

**Ch. II.** WITH respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of UNION diffused throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation ; so there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order (*i*).

Now

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Gram. L. IV. *Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent.* Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative Truth. For though this as to its Intellection be *disjunctive* (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, 'tis as truly *synthetical*, as any Truth, that is *affirmative*. See Chap. I. Note (*b*). p. 3.

(*i*) The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately lose all Distinction : such for instance are *Socrates* and *Plato*. Others differ as to *Species*, but as to *Genus* are the same : such are

Now 'tis to express in some degree the Ch. II.  
*Modifications of this Diversity*, that DIS-  
JUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS seem first to  
have been invented.

OF these DISJUNCTIVES, some are SIMPLE, some ADVERSATIVE—*Simple*, as when we say, EITHER *it is Day*, OR *it is*

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are *Man* and *Lion*. There are others again, which differ as to Genus, and co-incide only in those *transcendental Comprehensions* of Ens, Being, Existence, and the like: such are Quantities and Qualities, as for example *an Ounce*, and the Colour, *White*. Lastly ALL BEING whatever differs, as *Being*, from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION with respect to each other, in as much as each thing is *it self*, and not *any* of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not *the same*. In RELATIVES, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in these 'tis more striking, than in ordinary Subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In CONTRARIES, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous

Ch. II. is *Night*—*Adversative*, as when we say, *It*  
 ——— *is not Day, but it is Night.* The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than merely *disjoin*; the *Adversative* disjoin, with an *Opposition concomitant*. Add to this, that the *Adversative* are *definite*; the Simple, *indefinite*. Thus when we say, *The Number Three is not*  
 —————— *an*

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Virtuous and Vicious, in these the Opposition goes still farther, because these not only *differ*, but are even *destructive of each other*. But the most potent Opposition is that of *'AvlīQātis*, or CONTRADICTION, when we oppose *Proposition* to *Proposition*, *Truth* to *Falshood*, asserting of any Subject, either it is, or is not. This indeed is an *Opposition*, which extends it self to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its *Negative*, though multitudes by nature have neither *Relatives*, nor *Contraries*.

Besides these Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others that deserve notice; such for instance, as the Diversity between the *Name* of a thing, and its *Definition*; between the *various Names*, which belong to the *same thing*, and the *various things*, which are denoted by the *same Name*; all which *Diversities* upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of DIVERSITY.

*an even Number, BUT an odd,* we not only Ch. II.  
 disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we de-  
 finitely affirm one, and deny the other.  
 But when we say, *The Number of the Stars*  
*is EITHER even OR odd,* though we assert  
 one Attribute *to be*, and the other *not to*  
*be*, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is  
 left indefinite. And so much for *simple*  
*Disjunctives (k).*

As

(k) The simple Disjunctive *ἢ*, or *Vel*, is mostly used *indefinitely*, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used *definitely*, so as to leave no Alternative, 'tis then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with *καὶ οὐ*, or, *Et non.* 'Tis thus *Gaza* explains that Verse of *Homer*.

Βέλοι μὲν εἴγε λαὸν σώσαι ζημιεναι, η ἀπολέσθαι.

ΙΛ. Α.

That is to say, *I desire the people should be saved, AND NOT be destroyed*, the Conjunction *ἢ* being *ἀντιρετικός*, or *sublative*. It must however be confess, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of *μᾶλλου*, or *ἀυτής*, concerning which see the Commentators.

**Ch. II.** As to *Adversative Disjunctives*, it has been said already that they imply OPPOSITION. Now there can be no Opposition of the *same Attribute*, in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the Opposition must be either of the *same Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Brutus was a Patriot, BUT Cæsar was not*—or of *different Attributes* in the *same Subject*, as when we say, *Gorgias was a Sophist, BUT not a Philosopher*—or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we say, *Plato was a Philosopher, BUT Hippias was a Sophist*.

THE *Conjunctions* used for all these purposes may be called **ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES**.

BUT there are *other Adversatives*, besides these; as when we say, *Nireus was more beautiful, THAN Achilles—Virgil was*

AS

As great a Poet, As Cicero was an Orator. Ch. II.  
The Character of these latter is, that they ~~—~~  
go farther than the former, by marking  
not only *Opposition*, but that *Equality* or  
*Excess*, which arises among Subjects from  
their being *compared*. And hence 'tis they  
may be called ADVERSATIVES OR COM-  
PARISON.

BESIDES the Adversatives here men-  
tioned, there are two other Species, of  
which the most eminent are UNLESS and  
ALTHO'. Forexample—*Troy will be taken,*  
*UNLESS the Palladium be preserved*—*Troy*  
*will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it.* The  
Nature of these *Adversatives* may be thus  
explained. As every *Event* is naturally allied  
to its *Cause*, so by parity of reason 'tis opposed  
to its *Preventive*. And as every Cause is  
either *adequate* (*I*) or *in-adequate* (*in-ade-*  
*quate*,

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(I) This Distinction has reference to *common Opinion*,  
and the *form of Language*, consonant thereto. In strict  
metaphysical truth, *No Cause, that is not adequate, is*  
*any Cause at all.*

Ch. II. quate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every *Preventive*. Now *adequate Preventives* are express by such Adversatives, as UNLESS—*Troy will be taken, UNLESS the Palladium be preserved*; that is, *This alone is sufficient to prevent it*. The *In-adequate* are express by such Adversatives, as ALTHO'—*Troy will be taken, ALTHO' Hector defend it*; that is, *Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual*.

THE Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures (m). They may be better perhaps called **ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE**, and **IN-ADEQUATE**.

AND thus it is that all **DISJUNCTIVES**, that is **CONJUNCTIONS**, which conjoin *Sentences*,

(m) They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, *Adversative*, or 'Εναντιωμανικοί.

tences, but not their Meanings, are either Ch. II.  
SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE; and that all  
ADVERSATIVES are either *Absolute* or *Comparative*;  
or else *Adequate* or *Inadequate*.

WE shall finish this Chapter with a few  
miscellany Observations.

IN the first place it may be observed,  
through all the Species of Disjunctives,  
that the *same Disjunctive* appears to have  
*greater or less force*, according as the Sub-  
jects, which it disjoins, are more or less  
disjoined by Nature. For example, if  
we say, *Every Number is even, or odd*—  
*Every Proposition is true, or false*—nothing  
seems to disjoin *more strongly* than the  
*Disjunctive*, because no things are in Na-  
ture more *incompatible* than the Subjects.  
But if we say, *That Object is a Triangle,*  
*or Figure contained under three right lines*  
—the (*or*) in this case hardly seems to  
disjoin, or indeed to do more, than *di-  
finitely to express the Thing, first by its*

S

Name,

Ch. II. *Name*, and then by its *Definition*: So if we say, *That Figure is a Sphere, or a Globe, or a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the *several Names*, which belong to the *same Thing* (n).

AGAIN—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the same nature, such as, *Whence*, *Whither*, *Whenev'er*, *Wherev'er*, &c. may be properly called ADVERBIAL CONJUNCTIONS, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions —of *Conjunctions*, as they *conjoin Sentences*;

(n) The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called *Subdisjunctiva*, a *Subdisjunctive*; and that was *SIVE*. Alexander *sive Paris*; Mars *sive Mavors*. The Greek 'Ειτ' ίν seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, Scaliger thus speaks—*Et sive quomen Subdisjunctivarum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam plane disjungit, quam Disjunctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris.* De C. L. Lat. c. 170.

ties; of *Adverbs*, as they denote the At- Ch. II.  
tributes either of *Time*, or of *Place*.

AGAIN—these *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps *most of the Prepositions* (contrary to the Character of *accessory Words*, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of *obscure Signification*, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence 'tis, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophites* in Nature; a *kind of (o) middle Beings*, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (*p*).

AND

(o) Πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δῆλη γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβαίνεις, ὅτε ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τίνου, πότερον ζῶν ή φυτὸν. Themist. p. 74. Ed. Ald. See also Arist. de Animal. Part. p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.

(p) 'Tis somewhat surprizing that the politest and most elegant of the Attic Writers, and *Plato* above all

Ch. II. AND so much for CONJUNCTIONS, their  
Genus, and their Species.

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the rest, should have their Works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite Works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there must be *Words had to connect*; but that where the Connection is little or none, such Connectives are of little use? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one would chuse to dwell? Is this the Cause? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

*Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c.*

C H A P.

## C H A P. III.

*Concerning those Connectives, called  
Prepositions.*

PREPOSITIONS by their name express Ch. III.  
their *Place*, but not their *Character*.  
Their Definition will distinguish them  
from the former Connectives. A PRE-  
POSITION is a Part of Speech, devoid itself  
of Signification, but so formed as to unite  
two Words that are significant, and that re-  
fuse to coalesce or unite of themselves (a).

This

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος, *Præpositiva Conjunctio*, A Prepositive Conjunction. 'Ως μὲν ἐν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραβέσεις ἀι προθέσται συνδεσμικῆς συνίαζεως γίνονται παρεμφάτικά, λέλεκται ἡμῖν. ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀΦορμὴ ἔργται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τῷ καλεῖσθαι ἀντίας Προθετικὸς Συνδέσμος. Now in what manner even in other applications (besides the present) Prepositions give proof of their Conjunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence too the Stoicks

Ch.III. This connective Power, (which relates to  
~~—~~ Words only, and not Sentences) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

SOME things co-alesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone co-alesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In Nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities co-alesce immediately with their Substances. Thus'tis we say, *a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain;* and from this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident, arises the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective. In like

*took occasion to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTIONS.* Apollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive Sketch, than a complete Definition, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See Gaz. L. IV. de Præposit. Prisc. L. XIV. p. 983.

like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus 'tis we say, *Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered*. Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, *Agent, Energy, and Patient*, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, *Alexander conquers Darius*. And hence, that is from these Modes of natural Co-alescence, arises the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb. Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such Attributives as *ran, beautiful, learned*, *he ran swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was moderately learned, &c.* And hence the Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Particles, and Adjectives.

THE general Conclusion appears to be this. “ THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE  
“ OF THEMSELVES IN GRAMMAR, WHOSE  
“ ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF

S 4

“ THEM-

Ch.III. " THEMSELVES IN NATURE." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that *the great Objects of Natural Union are Substance and Attribute.* Now tho' *Substances* naturally co-incide with their *Attributes*, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, *one with another* (b). And hence those known Maxims in Physics, that *Body is impenetrable*; that *two Bodies cannot possess the same place*; that *the same Attribute cannot belong to different Substances, &c.*

FROM these Principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the *Substantive* without difficulty co-incides with the *Verb*, from the natural Co-incidence of *Substance* and *Energy*—THE SUN WARMETH. So likewise the *Energy* with the *Subject*, *an  
which*

(b) *Causa, propter quam duo Substantiva non ponuntur sine copulâ, e Philosophia petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse potest, sicut Substantia et Accidens; itaque non dicas, CÆSAR CATO PUGNAT.* Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.

which it operates —— WARMETH THE EARTH. So likewise both Substance and Energy with their proper Attributes.—  
THE SPLENDID SUN,—GENIALLY WARMETH—THE FERTILE EARTH. But suppose we were desirous to add other Substantives, as for instance, AIR, or BEAMS. How would these co-incide, or under what Character could they be introduced? Not as *Nominatives* or *Accusatives*, for both those places are already filled; the Nominative by the Substance, SUN; the Accusative by the Substance, EARTH. Not as Attributes to these last, or to any other thing; for *Attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made.* Here then we perceive the Rise and Use of PREPOSITIONS. By these we connect those Substantives to Sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce *of themselves*. Let us assume for instance a pair of these Connectives, THRO' and, WITH, and mark their Effect upon the Substances here mentioned, *The splendid Sun WITH his Beams genially*

Ch.III. genially warmth<sup>s</sup> THRO' the Air the fertile Earth. The Sentence, as before, remains *intire and one*; the *Substantives* required are both *introduced*; and not a Word, which was there before, is detrued from its proper place.

IT must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the *Relations of Place* (c). The reason is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies or natural Substances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion, or at rest.

IT may be said indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this UNIVERSE  
or

(c) *Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliquâ notâ, qua τὸ πότι significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus sit, sive esset in altero extremonum, in quibus sit quies.* Hinc elicimus Præpositiōnis essentialē definitionem. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.

or VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as Ch.III. much ONE by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus 'tis we have Prepositions to denote the *contiguous Relation* of Body, as when we say, *Caius walked WITH a Staff; the Statue stood UPON a Pedestal; the River ran OVER a Sand;* others for the *detached Relation*, as when we say, *He is going TO Italy; the Sun is risen ABOVE the Hills; these Figs came FROM Turkey.* So as to Motion and Rest, only with this difference, that here the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, *that Lamp hangs FROM the Ceiling,* the Preposition, FROM, assumes a Character of *Quiescence*. But if we say, *that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling,* the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of *Motion*. So in *Milton*,

—*To support uneasy Steps  
OVER the burning Marle*—Par. L. I.

Here *OVER* denotes *Motion*.

Again

## Ch.III. Again—

—He—with looks of cordial Love  
Hung over her enamour'd—Par. L.IV.

Here OVER denotes *Reft.*

BUT though the original use of Prepositions was to denote the *Relations of Place*, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual*, as *local*. Thus, because in Place he, who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him, who is *below*, hence we transfer OVER and UNDER to *Dominion* and *Obedience*; of a King we say, *he ruled OVER his People*; of a common Soldier, *he served UNDER such a General*. So too we say, *with Thought*; *without Attention*; *thinking over a Subject*; *under Anxiety*; *from Fear*; *out of Love*; *through Jealousy*, &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind,

kind, shew that the *first Words* of Men, Ch. III. like their *first Ideas*, had an immediate reference to *sensible Objects*, and that in after days, when they began to discern with their *Intellect*, they took those Words, which they found *already* made, and transferred them by metaphor to *intellectual Conceptions*. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new Words*, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion (*d*).

## IN

(*d*) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to *Anaxagoras*, Ὀμοιομέρεια; to *Plato*, Ποιότης; to *Cicero*, *Qualitas*; to *Aristotle*, Ἐνίλεχεια; to the *Stoics*, Ὁτις, κεράτις, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from *common* to *special Meanings*, to the *Platonics* we may ascribe *Ideas*; to the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, *Katηγορία*, and *Katηγορεῖν*; to the *Stoics*, *Katáληψις*, *ὑπόληψις*, *καθήκοντος*; to the *Pyrrhonists*, *Βξεις*, *ἐνδέχεσται*, *ἐπέχω*, &c.

And

Ch.III. IN the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied *κατά τα πράγματα*, by way of *Juxta-position*; that is to say, where they are prefixt to a Word, with-

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And here I cannot but obferve, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the Greek Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical; — He, I say, that, without this p:revious preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the Wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps 'tis impossible he should attain.

without becoming a Part of it. But they Ch.III. may be used also *κατὰ σύνθεσιν*, by way of *Composition*, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it (e). Thus in *Greek* we have *Ἐπίσταθαι*, in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in *English*, to *Understand*. So also, to *foretel*, to *overact*, to *undervalue*, to *outgo*, &c. and in *Greek* and *Latin*, other Instances innumerable. In this case the Prepositions commonly trans-fuse something of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of PLACE, (f) as used either in its *proper* or *metaphorical* acceptation.

## LASTLY,

(e) See *Gaz. Gram.* L. IV. Cap. de *Præpositione*.

(f) For example, let us suppose some given Space. E & Ex signify *out of* that Space; PER, *through it*, from beginning to end; IN, *within it*; SUB, *under it*.

Hence

Ch.III. LASTLY, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature,  
being

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Hence then E and PER in composition *augment*; *Enormis*, something not simply big, but big in excess; something got *out of the rule*, and *beyond the measure*; *Dico*, to speak; *Edico*, to speak out; whence *Edictum* an *Edict*, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So Terence,

*Dico, Edico uobis*—Eun. V. 20.

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an "Αὐξητις. *Fari*, to speak; *Effari*, to speak out—hence *Effatum*, an *Axiom*, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. Cic. Acad. II. 29. *Permagnus*, *Perutilis*, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, IN and SUB diminish and lessen. *Injustus*, *Iniquus*, *unjust*, *iniquitable*, that lies *within* Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; *Subniger*, blackish; *Subrubicundus*, reddish; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

*Emo* originally signified *to take away*; hence it came to signify *to buy*, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. *INTER*, *Between*, implies *Discontinu-*

being converted into Adverbs, and used in Ch.III.  
Syntax accordingly. Thus *Homer*,

—Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθῶν.

—And Earth smil'd all around.

I& T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter (g). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things ; but their force and power is express by two Methods,

ance, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, *Interimo*, to kill, that is to say, to take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also *Perimo*, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly ; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed ? The Greek Verb, Αναιγεῖν, and the English Verb, To take off, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus 'tis that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(g) See before p. 205.

T

Ch. III. thods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*; the *Nominative and Accusative Cases* by *Situation*; the rest, by *Prepositions*. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself concluding here our Inquiry concerning *Prepositions*.

C H A P.

## C H A P. IV.

*Concerning Cases.*

**A**S CASES, or at least their various Ch. IV. Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepositions*; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present.

THERE are no CASES in the modern Languages, except a few among the primitive Pronouns, such as I, and Me; Je, and Moy; and the English Genitive, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances what a Case is, the Periphrasis, which sup-

T 2 plies

Ch.IV. plies its place, being *the Case* (as it were) *unfolded*. Thus *Equi* is analized into *Du Cheval*, *Of the Horse*; *Equo* into *Au Cheval*, *To the Horse*. And hence we see that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive's Preposition being *A*, *De*, or *Ex*, the Dative's Preposition being *Ad*, or *Versus*.


WE have not this assistance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted), is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE VOCATIVE we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the *Nominative*.

THE ABLATIVE likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Case they seem to have adopted

adopted to associate with their Prepositions, Ch. IV. as they had deprived their Genitive and Dative of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the Greeks do as well without it, and because with the Romans themselves 'tis frequently undistinguished.


THERE remains the Nominative, which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The Peripatetics held it to be no Case, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary* and *original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line A B.



The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to A C, or A D. Hence then they only called these Variations, ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, CASES, or

Ch. IV. FALLINGS. The Stoics on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the *Nominative* a CASE also. Words they considered (as it were) to fall from the Mind, or *discursive Faculty*. Now when a Noun fell thence *in its primary Form*, they then called it ΠΤΩΣΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ, CASUS REC-TUS, AN ERECT, or UPRIGHT CASE or FALLING, such as A B, and by this name they distinguished the *Nominative*. When it fell from the Mind under any of its variations, as for example in the form of a *Genitive*, a *Dative*, or the like, such variations they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASUS OBLIQUE, OBLIQUE CASES, or SIDE-LONG FALLINGS (such as A C, or A D) in opposition to the other (that is A B) which was erect and perpendicular (a). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, ΚΛΙΣΙΣ, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION, it

(a) See Ammon. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.

it being a sort of *progressive Descent from Ch. IV.*  
*the Noun's upright Form thro' its various*   
*declining Forms*, that is, a Descent from  
A B, to A C, A D, &c.

Of these CASES we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the **NOMINATIVE**, the **ACCUSATIVE**, the **GENITIVE**, and the **DATIVE**.

IT has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are **SUBSTANCE** and **ATTRIBUTE**. Now from this *Natural Concord* arises the *Logical Concord* of **SUBJECT** and **PREDICATE**, and the *Grammatical Concord* of **SUBSTANTIVE** and **ATTRIBUTIVE** (b). These CONCORDS in SPEECH produce **PROPOSITIONS** and **SENTENCES**, as that previous CONCORD in NATURE produces **NATURAL BEINGS**. This being

T 4                   admitted,

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(b) See before, p. 264.

Ch. IV. admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, *Nature's Substance*, the *Logician's Subject*, and the *Grammatician's Substantive* are all denoted by that Case, which we call the **NOMINATIVE**. For example, CÆSAR *pugnat*, ÆS *fingitur*, DOMUS *adficatur*. We may remark too by the way, that the *Character of this Nominative* may be learnt from its *Attributive*. The Action implied in *pugnat*, shews its Nominative CÆSAR to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in *tingitur*, shews its Nominative ÆS to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in *adficatur* prove DOMUS to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attributive would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a *Nominative* also. So we find it in such instances as—CICERO *est* ELOQUENS; VITIUM *est* TURPE; HOMO *est*

**ANIMAL, &c.** When it has no Cases; Ch. IV.  
 (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to  
 content itself with such assimilations as it  
 has, those of Number and Person \* ; as  
 when we say, CICERO LOQUITUR; NOS  
 LOQUIMUR; HOMINES LOQUUNTUR.

FROM what has been said, we may  
 make the following observations—that as  
 there can be *no Sentence without a Sub-*  
*stantive*, so that Substantive, if the Sen-  
 tence be *regular*, is always denoted by a  
*Nominative*—that on this occasion *all the*  
*Attributives, that have Cases*, appear as  
*Nominatives also*—that there may be a re-  
 gular and perfect Sentence *without any of*  
*the other Cases*, but that *without one Nomi-*  
*native at least*, this is utterly impossible.  
 Hence therefore we form its Character and  
 Description—THE NOMINATIVE is *that*  
*CASE, without which there can be no regu-*  
*lar*

\* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see  
 before, p. 170, 171.

Ch.IV. *lar (c) and perfect Sentence.* We are now  
to search after another Case.

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is some *Verb denoting Action*, we may be assured the principal *Substantive* is some active efficient Cause. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lyfippus* in such Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit*, *Lyfippus fecit*. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still *in suspense*, and finds its conception incomplete. ACTION, it well knows, not only requires some *Agent*, but it must have a *Subject* also to work on, and it must produce some *Effect*. 'Tis then to denote one of these (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors of Language

(c) We have added *regular* as well as *perfect*, because there may be *irregular* Sentences, which may be *perfect without a Nominative*. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics Παρασυμέματα or Παρακατηγορήματα, such as Σωκράτει μετάμελει, *Socratem pænitet*, &c. See before, p. 180.

guage have destined THE ACCUSATIVE. Ch.IV.  
*Achilles vulneravit HECTOREM*—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. *Lyfippus fecit STATUAS*—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—THE ACCUSATIVE is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

IT has been said in the preceding Chapter (*d*), that when the Places of the *Nominative*

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(d) See before, p. 265.

Ch.IV. *nominative* and the *Accusative* are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of *Prepositions*. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method ; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones ; and these are; the *Term* or *Point*, which something commences FROM, and the *Term* or *Point*, which something tends TO. These Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar Terminations of their own, which express their force, without the help of a *Preposition*. Now 'tis here we behold the Rise of the ancient Genitive, and Dative, the GENITIVE being formed to express all Relations

com-

commencing from itself; THE DATIVE, Ch. IV.  
*all Relations tending to itself.* Of this  
there can be no stronger proof, than the  
Analysis of these Cases in the modern  
Languages, which we have mentioned  
already (*e*).

Tis on these principles that they say in  
Greek—Δεομαί ΣΟΥ, δίδωμι ΣΟΙ, Of  
**tbee I ask, To thee I give.** The reason  
is, in requests the person requested is one  
whom something is expected *from*; in  
donations, the person presented, is one  
whom something passes *to*. So again—  
(*f*) Πεποίηται λίθος, 'tis made of Stone. Stone  
was the passive Subject, and thus it appears  
in the Genitive, as being the *Term from,*  
or *out of which.* Even in Latin, where  
the Syntax is more formal and strict, we  
read—

*Implentur*

(*e*) See before, p. 275, 276.

(*f*) Χρυσοῦ πεποιημένος, ἡ ἐλέφαντος, *made of Gold*  
*and Ivory.* So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter,  
L. V. p. 400. See also Hom. *Iliad.* Σ. 574.

Ch.IV. *Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferinae.* Virg.

The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πίνω τῷ υδατος, is a Phrase in Greek; and, *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phrase in French, as much as to say, *I take some or a certain part, FROM or OUT OF a certain whole.*

WHEN we meet in Language such Genitives as *the Son of a Father*; *the Father of a Son*; *the Picture of a Painter*; *the Painter of a Picture*, &c. these are all RELATIVES, and therefore each of them reciprocally a *Term or Point* to the other, **FROM** or **OUT OF** which it derives its *Eſſence*, or at least its *Intellec‐tion* (g).

THE

(g) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often express by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς φέρουσα λέγεται, οἴον

THE *Dative*, as it implies *Tendency to*, Ch.IV. is employed among its other uses to denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Cause to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. 'Tis thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

— *Tibi suaveis dædala tellus  
Submittit flores* — Lucret.

— *Tibi brachia contrahit ardens  
Scorpios* — Virg. G. I.

— *Tibi serviat ultima Thule.*  
Ibid.

AND so much for CASES, their Origin and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,

οῖον ὁ δελφιδεσπότες δελφιδ, καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δελφιδεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεως διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἡμίσιον διπλασία ἡμιστυ. *Omnia vero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ reciprocantur.* Ut *servus* dicitur *domini servus*; et *dominus*, *serui dominus*; necnon *duplum*, *dimidii duplum*; et *dimidium*, *duplici dimidium*. *Categor. C. VII.*

Ch.IV. tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (*b*), both in the Greek and Latin Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

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(*b*) *Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas, plena*  
*nas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse;* modernas, *bis fere destitutas, plurima per prepositio*  
*nies et verba auxiliaria segnitè expedire? Sanè facile*  
*quis conjiciat (utunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia pri*  
*orum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtili*  
*ora. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.*

C H A P.

## C H A P. V.

*Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—Conclusion.*

BESIDES the Parts of Speech before Ch. V. mentioned, there remains THE INTERJECTION. Of this Kind among the Greeks are "Ω, Φεῦ, "Αι, &c. among the Latins, *Ab!* *Heu!* *Hei!* &c. among the English, *Ab!* *Alas!* *Fie!* &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their *Adverbs*; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an *Attributive*. Now INTERJECTIONS co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in † separating

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† *Vid. Servium in Aeneid XII. v. 486.*

Ch. V. rating them by themselves, and giving  
 them a name by way of distinction from  
 the rest.

SHOULD it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events (*a*).

" AND

(*a*) *INTERJECTIONES a Grecis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inseruntur, ut nota affectus, velut spirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut que NATURALES sint NOTÆ; non, aliarum vocum inflar, ex instituto significant.*

*Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. 1. INTERJECTIO est Vox affectum mentis significans, ac circa verbi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classum extrema, INTERJECTIO. Hujus appellatio non*

“ AND thus we have found that ALL Ch. V.  
 “ WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY  
 “ THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT,

U 2

“ WHEN

*similiter se habet ac Conjunctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur Conjunctionio, quia conjungat; Interje<sup>c</sup>tio tamen, non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nec tamen de στο<sup>τ</sup>ια ejus est, ut interjicitur; cum per se compleat sententiam, nec raro ab eâ incipiat oratio.* Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. *INTERJECTIONEM non esse partem Orationis sic ostendo: Quod naturale est, idem est apud omnes: Sed genitus & signa lætitiae idem sunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam eae partes, secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturâ, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci Adverbii adnumerant; sed falso. Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Græci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam—Papæ! quid video?—vel per se—Papæ!—etiam si non addatur, Miror; habet in se ipsum verbi significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores separatim hanc partem ab Adverbii accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in se Verbi, et plenam motu animi significationem, etian si non addatur Verbum, demonstrare. Interje<sup>c</sup>tio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci σχετλικμὸν, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ cujuscunque passionis animi pulsū per exclamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. L. XV.*

Ch. V. " WHEN ASSOCIATED—that those significant by themselves, denote either SUBSTANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are called for that reason SUBSTANTIVES and ATTRIBUTIVES—that the Substantives are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS—that the ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY or SECONDARY—that the Primary ATTRIBUTIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary, ADVERBS—Again, that the Parts of Speech, only significant when associated, are either DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES—that the Definitives are either ARTICULAR, or PRONOMINAL—and that the Connectives are either PREPOSITIONS or CONJUNCTIONS."

AND thus have we resolved LANGUAGE, AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS, which was the first thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry (b).

BUT

(b) See before, p. 7.

BUT now as we conclude, methinks I Ch. V.  
hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule—“ *Is there  
no speaking then without all this trouble?  
Do we not talk every one of us, as well  
unlearned, as learned; as well poor Pea-  
sants, as profound Philosophers?*” We  
may answer by interrogating on our part  
—Do not those same poor Peasants use  
the Levar and the Wedge, and many  
other Instruments, with much habitual  
readiness? And yet have they any con-  
ception of those Geometrical Principles,  
from which those Machines derive their  
Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance  
of these Peasants, a reason for others to  
remain ignorant; or to render the Subject  
a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Ani-  
mals, and Vegetables, that occur every  
day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion  
—of Light, of Colours, and of Gravita-  
tion—of our very Senses and Intellect,  
by which we perceive every thing else—

U 3

THAT

Ch. V. THAT they are, we all know, and are  
 ~~~~~ perfectly satisfied—WHAT they are, is  
 a Subject of much obscurity and doubt.
 Were we to reject this last Question, be-
 cause we are certain of the first, we should
 banish all Philosophy at once out of the
 world (c).

BUT a graver Objector now accepts us.
 “What (says he) is the UTILITY?
 “Whence the Profit, where the Gain?”
 Every Science whatever (we may an-
 swer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excel-
 lent

(c) Ἀλλ' οὐτις πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἀπὸ τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξίην
 ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν ρύσιαν ὥσπερ
 ἡτε κίνησις, -καὶ ὁ τόπος, οὐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος.
 Ἐκάστη γάρ τέτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμου καὶ ἀναμφίλε-
 τον· τίς δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν οὐδεία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων
 ἐραθῆναι. Εἰτι δὲ δὴ τὶ τῶν ποιήτων καὶ οὐ ψυχή τὸ
 μὲν γάρ εἶναι τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμώτατου καὶ φανε-
 ρώτατου· τί δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ράδιον καταμαθεῖν.
 Ἀλεξανδ. Ἀρρεν. Περὶ ψυχῆς, Β. p. 142.

Ient for gauging of Liquors ; Geometry, Ch. V. for measuring of Estates ; Astronomy, for ~~the~~ making of Almanacks ; and Grammar perhaps, for drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

THUS much to the *Sordid*—If the *Liberal* ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.

Ch. V. PERHAPS too there is a *Pleasure even in Science itself*, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of *Body* desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen? And have not Health and Strength of *Mind* their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid Emolument? Why should there not be a *Good* (could we have the Grace to recognize it) in the mere *Energy of our Intellect*, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, *why they pursue such things*; but if they answer, *they pursue them, because they are Good*, 'twould be folly to ask them farther, *WHY they PURSUE what is Good*. It might well in such case be replied on

their behalf (how strange soever it may Ch. V.
at first appear) *that if there was not some-
thing Good, which was in no respect USE-
FUL, even things useful themselves could not
possibly have existence.* For this is in fact
no more than to assert, that some things
are ENDS, some things are MEANS, and
that if there were NO ENDS, there could
be of course NO MEANS.

IT should seem then the Grand Question
was, WHAT IS GOOD—that is to say,
*what is that which is desirable, not for
something else, but for itself;* for whe-
ther it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or
the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since
Men in each instance are far from being
agreed.

IN the mean time 'tis plain from daily
experience, there are infinite Pleasures,
Amusements, and Diversions, some for
Summer, others for Winter; some for
Country,

Ch. V. Country, others for Town ; some, easy, indolent and soft ; others, boisterous, active, and rough ; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as **PERFECT GOOD**, without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at times fought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called *Misers*, or Miserable.

IF there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the subordinate kind ; shall we not allow the same praise to the *sublimeſt* of all Objects ? Shall THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleasures in its Energy, when we allow them to the grosseſt Energies of Appetite, and Sense ? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods were

were to be controverted, may not the *In-* Ch. V.
Intellectual Sort be defended, as rationally as
any of them? Whatever may be urged in
behalf of the rest (for we are not now
arraigning them) we may safely affirm of
INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that 'tis "the
" Good of that Part, which is most ex-
" cellent within us; that 'tis a Good ac-
" commodated to all Places and Times;
" which neither depends on the will of
" others, nor on the affluence of external
" Fortune; that 'tis a Good, which de-
" cays not with decaying Appetites, but
" often rises in vigour, when those are no
" more (d)."

THERE is a Difference, we must own,
between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral*
Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Em-
ployment, may be called more HUMAN,

as

(d) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.

Ch. V. as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes
of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL
VIRTUE may be surely called more DI-
VINE, if we consider the Nature and Sub-
limity of its End.

INDEED for *Moral Virtue*, as it is al-
most wholly conversant about Appetites,
and Affections, either to reduce the natural
ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel
the unnatural and vicious, 'twould be im-
pious to suppose THE DEITY to have oc-
casion for such an Habit, or that any
work of this kind should call for his at-
tention. Yet GOD IS, and LIVES. So
we are assured from Scripture it self.
What then may we suppose the DIVINE
LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as
Fables tell us of *Endymion*. If we may
be allowed then to conjecture with a be-
coming reverence, what more likely, than
A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST
INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-
COMPREHENSIVE

**COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTEL- Ch. V.
LECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO
OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT IT-
SELF?** For in pure INTELLECTION it
holds the reverse of all Sensation, that
**THE PERCEIVER AND THING PER-
CEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND THE
SAME (e).**

'TWAS

(e) Ἐτὶ δὲ οὐτως εὑρέχει, ως ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς αἰεὶ,
θαυμαστόν· ἐτὶ μᾶλλον, ἐτὶ θαυμαστότερον· ἔχει δὲ
ὤδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· η γὰρ Νῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωὴ·
Ἐκεῖνος δὲ, η ἐνέργεια ἐνέργεια δὲ η καθ' αὐτὴν, ἔκεινε
ζωὴ αἰρίση καὶ αἰδίος. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον
αἰδίον, αἴρισον ως εἰς ζωὴν καὶ αἰώνιην συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδίος
ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ· ΤΟΤΤΟ γὰρ ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν
μετὰ τὰ Φυσ. Λ'. ζ'. 'Tis remarkable in Scripture
that GOD is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING
GOD, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities,
of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others
to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and
the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose
existence was circumscribed by the short period of Hu-
manity.

To

Ch. V. Twas Speculation of this kind concerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which induced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—“ That the Man, “ who could live in the pure enjoyment “ of his *Mind*, and who properly culti- “ vated that *divine Principle*, was *happiest* “ *in himself*, and *most beloved by the Gods*. “ For if the Gods had any regard to “ what past among Mēn (as it appeared “ they had) 'twas probable they should “ rejoice in *that which was most excellent*, “ and by nature *the most nearly allied to* “ *themselves*; and, as this was MIND, “ that they should requite the Man, who “ most loved and honoured *This*, both “ from his regard to *that which was* “ *dear*

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νῆς κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν νοντῶν νοντὸς γὰρ γίνεται, Σιγμένος οὐ νῶν· ὥστε ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΝΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ.

“ dear to themselves, and from his act- Ch. V.
“ ing a Part, which was laudable and right
“ right (f).”

AND thus in all SCIENCE there is something *valuable for itself*, because it contains within it something which is *divine*.

(f) Ἡθικὸν Νικομάχον τὸ Κ'. μεφ.

End of the SECOND Book.

H E R-

HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts.

SOME things the MIND performs Ch. I.
thro' the BODY; as for example, the various Works and Energies of Art. Others it performs *without such Medium*; as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last

X

more

Ch. I. more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as
 being immediately referable to its own in-
 nate Powers. And thus is MIND *ulti-*
mately the Cause of all; of every thing at
 least that is *Fair and Good*.

AMONG those Acts of Mind more im-
 mediately its own, that of *mental Separ-
 ation* may be well reckoned one. *Corporeal*
 Separations, however accurate otherwise,
 are in one respect incomplete, as they may
 be repeated without end. The smallest
 Limb, severed from the smallest Animal-
 cule (if we could suppose any instrument
 equal to such dissection) has still a triple
 Extension of length, breadth, and thick-
 ness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps
 many other qualities; and so will continue
 to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But
 (a) the *Mind* surmounts all power of *Con-
 cretion*,

(a) *Itaque Naturæ facienda est prorsus Solutio et Sepa-
 ratio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ig-
 nem divinam.* Bacon. Nov. Organ. Lib. II. 16.

cretion, and can place in the simplest Ch. I. manner every Attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.

AND thus 'tis that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conspicuous Parts*, but persisting, till it even separate those *Elementary Principles*, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the *minutest Part*, as much as in the *mightiest Whole*. (b).

Now if MATTER and FORM are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as *the principal* among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whether *these*, or *any things analogous to them*, may be found in

X 2

SPEECH

(b) See below, p. 312.

Ch. I. SPEECH or LANGUAGE (c). This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

EVERY

(c) See before p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in Greek ΤΛΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their Beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the *tangible*, *corporeal* or *concrete*, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Process.

The original meaning of the Word ΤΛΗ, was SYLVA, a Wood. Thus Homer,

———Τρέμε δ' ὕρεα μωχρὰ καὶ ΤΛΗ,
Ποσεῖν ὑπ' αὐθανάτοις Ποσειδάωνος ἵόρος.

*As Neptune past, the Mountains and the Wood
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.*

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word "Τλη", which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this sense Brains was called the "Τλη" or *Matter* of a Statue; Stone, the "Τλη" or *Matter* of a Pillar; and so in other instances. The *Platonic Chalcidius*, and other Authors

EVERY thing in a manner, whether Ch. I.
natural or artificial, is in its constitution

com-

Authors of the latter Latinity use SYLVA under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER and BODY have been taken to denote the same thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. With these, every thing was called ΤΛΗ, or MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was *capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else*, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called *Brafs* the "ΤΛΗ of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "Τλας; of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "Τλας; of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "Τλας; of Syllogisms. The *Stoicks* held all things out of our own power ($\tau\alpha\ \delta\chi\ \epsilon\phi'\ \eta\mu\bar{\nu}$) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour,

Ch. I. compounded of something COMMON, and
 something PECULIAR; of something Common,

Health and Sickness, Life and Death, to be the "Τλαῖς,
 or Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodness, which had its
 essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these.

(Vid. *Arr. Epict.* L. I. c. 29. Also Vol. the first of
 these miscellaneous Treatises, p. 187, 309. *M. Ant.*
XII. 29. *VII.* 29. *X.* 18, 19. where the 'Τλικὸν and
 'Αἰριώδες are opposed to each other). The Peripatetics,
 tho' they expressly held the Soul to be αἰσώματος, or
 Incorporeal, yet still talked of a Νύστικός, a material Mind or Intellect. This to modern Ears may possibly sound something harsh. Yet if we translate the Words, Natural Capacity, and consider them as only denoting that original and native Power of Intellec[t]ion, which being previous to all human Knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception; there seems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the Idea of ΤΛΗ, or MATTER. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim.* p. 144. b. 145. *Arist. Metaph.* p. 121, 122, 141. *Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid.* p. 22, 23.

As to ΕΙΔΟΣ, its original meaning was that of FORM or FIGURE, considered as denoting visible Symmetry, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from Εἶδω to see, Beauty of person being one of the noblest, and most excellent Objects of Sight. Thus Euripides,

Πρῶτον μὲν Εἶδος ἀξίον τυραννίδες.

Fair FORM to Empire gave the first pretence.

Now

mon, and belonging to many other things; Ch. I.
and of something *Peculiar*, by which it
is

Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of visible Beings tended principally to *distinguish* them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its "Τλην" or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or *FORM*. Thus not only the *Shape* given to the Bras was called the Εἶδος; or *Form* of the Statue; but the *Proportion* assigned to the Drugs was the Εἶδος; or *Form* of the Medicine; the *orderly Motion* of the human Body was the Εἶδος; or *Form* of the Dance; the *just Arrangement* of the Propositions, the Εἶδος; or *Form* of the Syllogism. In like manner the *rational and accurate Conduct of a wise and good man*, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἶδος; or *Form*, described by Cicero to his Son,—*FORMAM quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem HONESTI vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiae, &c.* De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes,

X 4

this

Ch. I. is distinguished, and made to be its true
 and proper self.

HENCE

this supreme Intelligence has been called ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being those *essential* and *distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing else*.

And so much concerning FORM, as before concerning MATTER. We shall only add, 'tis in the *uniting* of these, that every thing, which is generable, may be said to *commence*; as on the contrary, in their *Separation*, to *perish* and be at an end—that while they co-exist, 'tis not by mere *juxta-position*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate *Co-incidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *Form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the *Artificer*, or if natural, within the *supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse.*

Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared ac- Ch. I.
cording to this notion to the murmurs of ~~the~~

2

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their *immediate generating Cause*; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows.

MATTER.

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciantus enim tractando usitatis hoc verbum et tritus) MATERIAM quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (que tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. I. 8.

FORM.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ulla genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ulla sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur.—HAS RERUM FORMAS appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque digni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentia contineri: cetera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem

Ch. I. a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is a Sound*. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language *a MEANING or SIGNIFICATION is essential*. Again, *Language*, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from NATURE*, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from COMPACT (d)*.

FROM

codem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et viâ disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis Formam speciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

(d) The *Peripatetics* (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant κατὰ συνθήσεων, by *Compact*. See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius translates the Words κατὰ συνθήσεων, *ad placitum*,

FROM hence it becomes evident, that Ch. I.
LANGUAGE, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings; and that of these two Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the MEANING as that peculiar and characteristic FORM, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

tum, or secundum placitum, and thus explains them in his comment—SECUNDUM PLACITUM vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur: nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res à naturâ est, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

Upon the Matter, or common Subject of Language.

Ch. II. **T**HE TAH or MATTER OF LANGUAGE comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this TAH or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is *that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect* (a).

As

(a) This appears to be Priscian's Meaning when he says of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*suum sensibile auriam, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the cause of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and

As the Causes of this Percussion are Ch. II.
various, so from hence Sound derives the
Variety of its Species.

FARTHER, as all these Causes are either
Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand
Species of Sounds are likewise *Animal* or
Inanimate.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound Inanimate*; nor even for that of Animals,
when made by the trampling of their Feet,
the fluttering of their Wings, or any other
Cause, which is merely *accidental*. But
that,

and to be as plausible as any—'Ακούειν δὲ, τῷ μεταξὺ^ν
τῷ τε Φωνοῦντος καὶ τῷ ἀκόντος ἀέρος ταλπήσιμέν εφαι-
ρειδῶς, Ήταν χυματουμένη, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπου-
τος, ὡς χυματῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὅδωρ κατὰ κύκλους
ὑπὸ τῷ ἐμβληθέντος λίθῳ—Porro audire, cum is, qui me-
dius inter loquentem, et audiētatem est, aer verberatur or-
biculariter, deinde agitatus auribus infuit, quemadmodum
et cisternæ aqua per orbēs injecto agitatur lapide. Diog.
Laert. VII.

Ch. II. that, *which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a VOICE.*

As Language therefore implies that Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may perceive that *to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice*, is in fact *to know THE MATTER or common Subject of Language.*

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

WHAT these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers

sophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, 'tis certain that the *mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth,* and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now *pure and simple Voice*, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) transmitted to the Mouth. HERE then, by means of certain *different Organs*, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others; it receives the *Form or Character of ARTICULATION.* For ARTICULATION is in fact nothing else, than *that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c.* The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its *primary Qualities*) but it acquires to these Characters

Ch. II. certain others additional, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them (b).

THE

(b) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of *Speech*, but those very different ones likewise of *Mastication* and *Respiration*; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in vain*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Discourse* in *Man*, who is a *Discursive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his *Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. L. III. c. 1. 3. De Anima. L. II. c. 8. §. 23; &c.*

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as 'tis modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the Preference to themselves.

The following Account from *Ammonius* will shew whence the Notions in this Chapter are taken, and what

- THE *simplest* of these new Characters Ch. II.
are those acquired thro' the mere Openings
of

what authority we have to distinguish VOICE from
mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIM-
PLE VOICE.

Kai ΨΟΦΟΣ μέν ἐστι τληγὴ ἀέρος αἰδητὴ ὁκοῦ.
ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, Φόρος ἐξ ἐμψυχε γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ
τῆς συστολῆς τῆς θάρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς πνεύμωνος
ἢ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀπὸ τροσπίπης ἀθρόως τῇ καλλιμένῃ τρα-
χείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώφῃ, ἵτοι τῷ γαργαρεῶν, καὶ
διὰ τῆς τληγῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἥχον αἰδητὸν, κατὰ τινα
ὅρμην τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευστῶν ταλεῖ τοῖς
ρυθμοῖς καλλιμένῳ φρεγάνων συμβαίνει, οἷον σύλλων καὶ
πυρήγων τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὁδόντων, καὶ χειλέων
πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαίων ὄντων,
πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ἢ τάντως συμ-
βαλλομένων.—Estque SONUS, ictus aeris qui auditu sen-
titur: Vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per
thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, ictus sensu
totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut
gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu serum quendam sensibilem
pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis
quæ quia inflant, ideo ἐμπνευστὰ a musicis dicuntur, usq[ue]
venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes,
labiaque ad loquaciam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simpli-
cem non omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr.
p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect.
626. 630.

Ch. II. of the Mouth, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. 'Tis the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several VOWELS; and hence 'tis they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal* (*c*), and *easy to be sounded of themselves alone*.

THERE are other articulate Forms, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by different Contacts of its different parts; such for instance, as by the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with

the

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the Peripatetics) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ οὖν αἰδητὴν ἀκον, which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be—Ἄνηρ ὡπὸ ὄγκης τετληγμένος, *Struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse;* and HUMAN or RATIONAL SOUND they defined—Ἐναρθρός καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένην, *Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty.* Diog. Laert. VII. 55:

(c) ΦΩΝΗ ΕΝΤΑ.

the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, Ch. M.
and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather lead to Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence 'tis, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the *Articulations so produced* are called CONSONANTS, because they found not of themselves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel* (d).

THERE are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise,

'Tis enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of ELEMENTS.

Ch. II. MENT (*e*), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their *smallest Combination* they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration or Discourse*.

AND thus is it that to Principles *apparently so trivial* (*f*), as about twenty plain
ele-

(e) The *Strict Definition* of an ELEMENT is as follows—Ἐστι δὲ σοιχεῖον, εἴ τοι πρώτα γίνεται τὰ γνόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὁ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. An ELEMENT is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon ELEMENTS with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνὴς σοιχεῖα, εἴ τοι σύγχειται ἡ Φωνὴ, καὶ εἰς αὐτήν διαιρεῖται ἔσχατον ἵκεντα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας Φωνὰς ἐπέρας τῷ ἔδει ποτῶν. The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are those things, out of which the VOICE is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.

(f) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they

elementary Sounds, we owe that variety Ch. II.
of articulate Voices, which have been sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

IT

they called THEUTH. By the GREEKS he was worshipped under the Name of HERMES, and represented commonly by a Head alone without other Limbs, standing upon a quadrilateral Basis. The Head itself was that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a Petasus, or Bonnet, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the ΕΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, THE HERMES OF LANGUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the HEAD, because no other was deemed requisite to rational Communication. Words at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as Homer well describes them) Επιτα πλεούτα, Winged Words, were represented in their Velocity by the WINGS of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a HERMES, having the Front of his Basis (the usual place for Inscriptions) adorned with some old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung across, by which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let A YOUTH be seen drawing off this Veil; and A NYMPH, near the Youth, transcribing what She there discovers.

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS

Ch. II. It appears from what has been said,
 that THE MATTER or COMMON SUBJECT
 OF LANGUAGE IS *that Species of Sounds*
called VOICES ARTICULATE.

WHAT

OF MAN (*Naturæ Deus humanae*, as Horace styles him;) THE NYMPH to be ΜΝΗΜΟΣΤΝΗ, or MEMORY; as much as to insinuate that " MAN; for the Preservation of his Dœds and Inventions, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to LETTERS; and that MEMORY, being conscious of her own Insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an Acquisition."

MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of the *Antiquities of Athens*; has adorned this Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a Taste truly Attic and Simple, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.

As to HERMES, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, Figure, &c. Vid. Platon. *Phileb.* T. II. p. 18. Edit. Serrari. *Diod.* Sic. L. F. *Horat.* Od. X. L. 1. *Hesiod.* *Itheog.* V. 937. *cum Comment.* *Joan. Diaconi.* *Thycid.* VI. 27. *et Scholiast. in loc.* *Pighium apud Gronov.* *Thesaur.* T. IX. p. 1164.

For the value and importance of Principles, and the difficulty in attaining them, see *Aristot. de Sophist.* *Elench.* c. 34.

WHAT remains to be examined in the Ch. II.
following Chapter, is Language under its
characteristic and peculiar FORM, that is
to say, Language considered, not as a
Sound, but as a *Meaning*.

Y 4

C H A P.

C H A P. III.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language.

Ch. III. **W**HEN to any articulate Voice there accedes *by compact* a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called A WORD; and many Words, possessing their Significations (as it were) *under the same Compact* (a), unite in constituting a PARTICULAR LANGUAGE.

IT

(a) See before Note (c) p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 1. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from *Ammonius* is remarkable—Καθάπερ οὐ τὸ μὲν κατὰ τόπου κινεῖδαι, Φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὄρχεῖδαι, Θέσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, Φύσει, οὐ δὲ θύρα, Θέσει· οὗτοι καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, Φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων η̄ ρημάτων σημαίνειν, Θέσει—καὶ ἔσικε τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὅργανον οὔσαν τὴν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωστικῶν, η̄ ὄρεχτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν οὐ λαθραπτός παραπλησίας τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώεις.

It appears from hence, that A WORD Ch.III. may be defined *a Voice articulate, and significant by Compact*—and that LANGUAGE may be defined *a System of such Voices, so significant*.

IT is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be

ζώοις τὸ δὲ ὄνομασιν, η̄ ρήμασιν, η̄ τοῖς ἐκ τύτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσαι τρόπος τὴν σημασίαν, (εὐχέτι Φύση νόσιν, ἀλλὰ Θίσει;) Καίστον ἔχειν τρόπος τὰ ἀλογα ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνῳ τῶν Θυητῶν αὐτοκινήτων μετέχει ψυχῆς, καὶ τεχνικῶς ἀνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Φωνῇ η̄ τεχνικὴ ἀντῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δηλεῖται τὰ τοῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλος συντοθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, η̄ ἀνευ μέτρων. In the same manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is something positive; so is the Power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as

Ch.III. be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of
 ↤ PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the
 Words are as the Figures or Images of all
 particulars.

AND yet it may be doubted, how far
 this is true. For if *Pictures* and *Images*
 are all of them *Imitations*, it will follow,
 that whoever has natural faculties to know
 the

irrational animals : but as to the employing of *Nouns*, or
Verbs, or *Sentences* composed out of them, in the explana-
 tion of our *Sentiments* (the things thus employed being
 founded not in *Nature*, but in *Position*) this he seems to
 possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all
 mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which can move itself,
 and operate artificially ; so that even in the Subject of
 Sound his artificial Power shews itself ; as the various
 elegant Compositions both in *Metre*, and without *Metre*,
 abundantly prove. *Ammon. de Interpr.* p. 51. a.

It must be observed, that the operating artificially,
 (*ἐνεργεῖν τεχνικῶς*) of which *Ammonius* here speaks, and
 which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the
 Human Soul, means something very different from the
 mere producing works of elegance and design ; else it could
 never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many
 other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver,
 the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159,
 &c.

the Original, will by help of the same Ch.III. faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its *Greek or Latin Name*.

The Truth is, that every Medium, through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is an **IMITATION**; or else from *Accidents* quite *arbitrary*, and then it is a **SYMBOL** (*b*).

Now,

(*b*) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΤ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὄμοιώμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τῷ πράγματος κατὰ τὸ συντὸν ἀπεικονίζειν βέλεται, οὐ όπερ εἴ τοι ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὸν μεταπλάσαι τὸ γαρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένη τῇ Σωκράτες ὄμοιώμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ Φαλακρόν, οὐ τὸ σιμόν, οὐ τὸ ἔξωφθαλμου ἔχει τῇ Σωκράτες, οὐκέτ' αὐτῷ λέγοιστο εἶναι ὄμοιώμα τὸ δέ γε σύμβολόν, ἢ τοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφότερα γάρ ἐφιλόσοφοι αὐτὸν ὀνομάζει) τὸ δὲ οὖν εἴφ' ἡμῖν ἔχεις ἀτε οὐ ἐκ μάνης ὑφιστάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρους ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τῷ πότε δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλάδεις τὺς πολεμακύτας, δύναται σύμ-

Ch.III. Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their *natural Attributes* are to be found in articulate Voices, and yet thro' such Voices are things of every kind exhibited, it will follow that **Words must of necessity be Symbols**, because it appears that they cannot be *Imitations*.

But here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—“ Why in the common intercourse of men with men have Imitations been neglected, and Symbols “ pre-

σύμβολον θέντι καὶ σάλπιγγος αὐτήχνης, καὶ λαμπάδος ἥψις, καθάπερ φυσίον Εὐριπίδης,

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφεῖθη περισός, ὡς τυρσηικῆς
Σάλπιγγος θήχος, σῆμα Φοινίου μάχης.

Δίναται δέ τις ὑποθέσαι καὶ δόρατος ἀνάτασιν, καὶ βέλος ἄφεσιν, καὶ αλλα μυρία.—A REPRESENTATION or RESEMBLANCE differs from a SYMBOL, in as much as the Resemblance aims as far as possible to represent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary it. Thus a REPRESENTATION intended for Socrates in a Picture, if it have not those circumstances peculiar

" preferred, although Symbols are only Ch.III.
 " known by Habit or Institution, while
 " Imitations are recognized by a kind of
 " natural Intuition?"—To this it may be
 answered, that if the Sentiments of the
 Mind, like the Features of the Face, were
 immediately visible to every beholder, the
 Art of Speech or Discourse would have
 been perfectly superfluous. But now,
 while our Minds lie enveloped and hid,
 and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every
 thing but itself, we are necessarily compell-
 led, when we communicate our Thoughts,

to

cular to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the pro-
 jecting Eyes, cannot properly be called a Representation of
 him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Philosopher
 Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power,
 as depending singly for its existence on our imagina-
 tion. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies
 should engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of
 a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what
 Euripides says,

But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign
 Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.]
 or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the dart-
 ing of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon.
 in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b,

Ch. III. to pass them to each other through a Medium which is corporeal (c). And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols must needs be sensible, and addressed as such to the Senses (d). Now THE SENSES, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by Symbols but by Imitations, as far as things are characterized by Figure

(c) Αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν ἔσαι τῷ σωμάτῳ, πόντον δι' ἀγῶνα τὸν νοητικόν σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. Επεκτὸν δὲ αἴμασι συμέρεται, δίκην νέφις περικαλύπτειν ἀνταῦ τὸ φρεόν, ἐθενθῆσαν τῶν ὄνομάτων, δι' ᾧν ερμαίνεται ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. *Animi nostri a corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum autem corporibus involuti sint, periade ac nebula, ipsorum intelligendi vis obtigitur: quo circa opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter se significarent.* Ammon. in Praedican. p. 18. a.

(d) Quicquid scindi possit in differentias satis numerosas, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentiae illæ sensui perceptibiles sunt) fieri potest vesciculum cogitationum de homine in hominem. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. i.

ture and Colour, our Imitation would be Ch.III.
necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also.
Again, as far as they are characterized by
Sounds, it would for the same reason be
thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like
may be said of all the other Senses, the
Imitation still shifting along with the Ob-
jects imitated. We see then how compli-
cated such Imitation would prove.

If we set LANGUAGE therefore, as a
Symbol, in opposition to *such Imitation*; if
we consider the Simplicity of the one, and
the Multiplicity of the other; if we con-
sider the Ease and Speed, with which
Words are formed (an Ease which knows
no trouble or fatigue; and a* Speed, which
equals the Progress of our very Thoughts)
if we oppose to this the difficulty and
length of Imitations; if we remember
that some Objects are capable of no Imi-
tations at all, but that all Objects univer-
sally may be typified by Symbols; we may
plainly

* *Eraclitæ*—See before p. 325.

Ch.III. plainly perceive an Answer to the Question
 here proposed “ Why, in the common
 “ intercourse of men with men, Imita-
 “ tions have been rejected, and Symbols
 “ preferred.”

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason,
why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things, as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant;* if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—’tis impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while betweeen *the Medium and themselves* there is nothing CONNATURAL (e).

TIS

(e) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.

'Tis true indeed, when *Primitives* were Ch.III. once established, 'twas easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus the Sounds, *Water*, and, *Fire*, being once annexed to those two Elements, 'twas certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, *Watry*, of the last, *Fiery*, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what *natural Connections* the Primitives themselves might not be commuted, 'twill be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others. We may here also see the Reason, why ALL LANGUAGE IS FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species.

THE Question remains if WORDS are Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—

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If

Ch III. If it be answered, *of things*, the Question returns, *of what things?*—If it be answered, *of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us*—to this, 'tis replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a *proper Name*. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

AGAIN, if all *Words* are *proper Names*, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, *Words must be infinite also*. But if infinite, then *incomprehensible*, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which

Mission-

Missionaries (if they may be credited) at- Ch.III.
tribute to the Chinese.

AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names, or (which is the same) the Symbols of Individuals; it will follow, as Individuals are not only infinite, but ever passing, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown now, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be every where different, and every where changing, since such is the Nature of Individuals, which it follows.

AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names, the Symbols of Individuals, it will follow that in Language there can be no General Proposition, because upon the Hypothesis all Terms are particular; nor any Affirmative Proposition, because no one Individual in nature is another. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but Particular Negatives.

Ch.III. tives. But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating *General Affirmative Truths*—If so, then of communicating *Demonstration*—If so, then of communicating *Sciences*, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating *Arts*, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little the better for it either in Speculation or in Practice (*e*). And so much for this Hypothesis; let us now try another.

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of course, they must be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident, if they are not Symbols

(*e*) The whole of *Euclid* (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon *general Terms*, and *general Propositions*, most of which are *affirmative*. So true are those Veres, however barbarous as to their stile,

*Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,
Neve Negativis, recte concludere si vis.*

Symbols of things *without*, they can only Ch.III.
be Symbols of something *within*.

HERE then the Question recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS? —OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several Ideas, which *Particulars* imprint, must needs be as infinite and *mutable*, as they are themselves.

IF then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing else, except of GENERAL IDEAS, because nothing else, except these, remains. —And what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS?—We mean SUCH AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which exist now, but which

Z 3 . . . existed

Ch.III. existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future ; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, *Man, Lion, Cedar.*

—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with proper Names.

IT follows that one Word may be, not homonymously, but truly and essentially common to many Particulars, past present and future ; so that however these Particulars may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Language notwithstanding may be definite and steady. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the Chinese Absurdity *.

AGAIN, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it stands

* See p. 338, 339.

stands for the same general Ideas, may be as Ch.III. intelligible now, as it was then. The like —— may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of ever new and ever changing Objects.

AGAIN, it follows that Language may be expressive of *general Truths*; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind (*f*).

Now if it be true “ that none of these “ things could be asserted of Language, “ were not Words the Symbols of *general Ideas*—and it be further true, that these “ things may be all undeniably asserted “ of Language”—it will follow (and that necessarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF GENERAL IDEAS.

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AND

(*f*) See before Note (*e*).

Ch.III. AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosophers, who reason about *general*, and *abstract* Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of *Particulars*, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other End*. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than *general Ideas*?

To this it may be answered, that *Arts* surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are *general Terms* from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationally explained*. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through *general Terms*

Terms learnt those general Theorems, that Ch.III.
respect the doctrine and practice of Men-
suration?

BUT suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, *there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which 'twas not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible*—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—*That the Objection was just; that 'twas necessary to the Perfection and Completion of LANGUAGE, that it should be expressive of PARTICULARS, as well as of GENERALS.* We must however add, that its *general Terms are by far its most excellent and essential Part, since from these it derives “ that comprehensive Universality, that just proportion of Precision and Permanence, without which it could not possibly be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of Reasoning and Science;*

Ch. III. “ Science;”—that *particular Terms* have their Utility and End, and that therefore care too has been taken for a supply of these.

ONE Method of expressing Particulars, is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the least artificial, because *proper Names* being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of DEFINITIVES or ARTICLES (g), whether we assume the *pronominal*, or those *more strictly* so called, And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite *Art* of Language, which, *without wandering into infinitude*, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say in other words, which, by the small Tribe of *Definitives* properly applied to general Terms,

(g) See before p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

Terms, knows how to employ these last, Ch.III.
tho' in number *finite*, to the accurate ex-
pression of *infinite* Particulars.

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be **MAN**. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular, *as unknown*; I say, **A Man—known**; I say, **THE Man—indefinite**; **ANY Man—definite**; **A CERTAIN Man—present and near**; **THIS Man—present and distant**; **THAT Man—like to some other**; **SUCH A Man—an indefinite Multitude**; **MANY Men—a definite Multitude**; **A THOUSAND Men**;—**the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout**; **EVERY Man—the same ones, taken with distinction**; **EACH Man—taken in order**; **FIRST Man, SECOND Man, &c.—the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively**; **ALL Men—the Negation of this Multitude**; **no Man**. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

THE

Ch.III. THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE
THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL
AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENE-
RAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND
IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR,
ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY,
AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be asked, “ why has Lan-
“ guage this *double Capacity*? ”—May we
not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind
of reciprocal Commerce, or *Intercourse of*
our Ideas? Should it not therefore be
framed, so as to express *the whole* of our
Perception? Now can we call that Per-
ception intire and whole, which implies
either INTELLECTION without *Sensation*,
or SENSATION without *Intellection*? If
not, how should Language explain *the*
whole of our Perception, had it not Words
to express the Objects, proper to each of
the two Faculties?

To

To conclude—As in the preceding Ch.III. Chapter we considered Language with a view to its MATTER, so here we have considered it with a view to its FORM. Its MATTER is recognized, when 'tis considered *as a Voice*; its FORM, as 'tis *significant of our several Ideas*; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning general or universal Ideas.

Ch.IV. **M**UCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, *by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are*; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged *in Sense* from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing

to

to be *real*, but what may be *tasted*, or Ch.IV.
touched. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to these —
matters being of much the same Opinion,
in Philosophy looks no higher, than to
experimental Amusements, deeming nothing
Demonstration, if it be not made *ocular*.
Thus instead of ascending from *Sense* to
Intellect (the natural progress of all true
Learning) he hurries on the contrary into
the midst of *Sense*, where he wanders at
random without any end, and is lost in a
Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence
then the reason why the sublimer parts of
Science, the Studies of *MIND*, *INTELLEC-*
TION, and *INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES*,
are in a manner neglected; and, as if the
Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or
an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by
Experiment, is deemed no better than
mere Hypothesis.

AND yet 'tis somewhat remarkable,
amid the prevalence of such Notions, that
there should still remain two Sciences in
fashion,

Ch.IV. fashion, and these having their Certainty
 of all the least controverted, *which are not*
in the minutest article depending upon Experi-
ment. By these I mean ARITHMETIC,
 and GEOMETRY (*a*). But to come to our
 Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.

MAN'S

(*a*) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves) with which these two SCIENCES so eminently abound, arise originally from PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE; Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of EXPERIMENT, that they are *self-evident* to every one, possessed of common sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue EXPERIMENT; whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther—I hold *all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject* to be founded in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than *the result of many repeated EXPERIMENTS.* But I must add withal, that the man who acts from *Experience alone*, tho' he act ever so well, is but an Empiric or Quack, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. 'Tis then only that we recognize ART, and that the EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds SCIENCE,

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are those Ch.IV.
of the SENSES, in as much as they commence from his earliest Infancy. These Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least indefinite, and more fleeting and transient, than the very Objects, which they exhibit,
because

SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, *WHAT is to be done*, but *WHY tis to be done*; for ART is a composite of Experience and Science, Experience providing it Materials, and Science giving them A FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus necessary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with respect to PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have hinted already, it has not the least to do. For who ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geometry*, or *Arithmetic* being proved *experimentally*? 'Tis indeed by the application of these that *Experiments* are rendered useful; that they are assimilated into Philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble.

A . a

Ch.IV. because they not only depend upon the
 existence of those Objects, but because
 they cannot subsist, without their immediate Presence. Hence therefore it is, that
 there can be no *Sensation of either Past or Future*, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the *Senses*, it never could acquire the least Idea of TIME (b).

But happy for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called IMAGINATION or FANCY, which however as to its *energies* it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in *dignity* and *use*. THIS 'tis which retains the fleeting Forms of things, when Things themselves are gone, and all *Sensation* at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may be

(b) See before p. 105. See also p. 112. Note (f).

be seen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *Sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*; and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *Sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves (c).

As

(c) Besides the distinguishing of *SENSATION* from *IMAGINATION*, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are *M N H M H*, and *A N A M N H Σ I Σ*, *MEMORY*, and *RECOLLECTION*.

When we view some *relict* of sensation reposed within us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object, this is *PHANSY* or *IMAGINATION*.

When we view some such *relict*, and refer it without to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original, this is *MEMORY*.

A a 2

Lastly

Ch.IV. As the Wax would not be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to *retain*, as well as to *receive*; the same holds of the SOUL, with respect to Sense and *Imagination*. SENSE is its *receptive*

Lastly the Road, which leads to Memory through a series of Ideas, however connected whether rationally or casually, this is RECOLLECTION. I have added casually, as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between *Memory* and *Phansy* be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is the Portrait, such Contemplation is analogous to PHANSY. When we view it with reference to the Original, whom it represents, such Contemplation is analogous to MEMORY.

We may go farther. IMAGINATION or PHANSY may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. 'Tis here that *Hope* and *Fear* paint all their pleasant, and all their painful Pictures of *Futurity*. But MEMORY is confined in the strictest manner to the past.

What

ceptive Power; IMAGINATION, its *re-tentive*. Had it Sense without Imagination, 'twould not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impressions may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

THUS then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call SENSE (if we please) *a kind of transient Imagination*; and IMAGINATION on the contrary *a kind of permanent Sense (d)*.

Now

What we have said, may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more, may consult *Aristot. de Anima*, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his *Treatise de Mem. et Reminis.*

(d) Τί τρίνυ εἰς·ν ἡ Φαντασία ὁδε ἀν γνωρίσαιμεν·
δεῖ νοεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰδητά,
ἢ οὐ τύπου (lege τύπου) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράΦημα εἰν τῷ
ῳδώτῳ αἰδητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμά τι τῆς ἵπὸ τῇ αἰδητῇ
γνωμένης κινήσεως, οὐ καὶ μηκέτι τῇ αἰδητῇ παρόντος,
ὑπομένει τῇ καὶ σώζεται, οὐ, ὅσπερ ἱκάνη τις αὐτῷ, οὐ καὶ

A 2 3

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Ch.IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the SOUL in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGINATION first fix the fluency of SENSE, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

AFTER

τῆς μνήμης ἡμῶν σωζόμενον ἀίσιον γίνεται· τὸ τοιότον ἐγκατάλειμμα, ω̄ τὸν τοιότον ὥσπερ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλεῖσθαι. Now what PHANSY or IMAGINATION is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Senforium, being a relict of that motion caused within us by the external object; a relict, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of relict and (as it were) Impression they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION. Alex. Aprod. de Animâ, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.

AFTER this manner, in the admirable Ch.IV.
 Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher.
 Were there no *Things external*, the Senses could not operate; were there no *Sensations*, the *Imagination* could not operate; and were there no *Imagination*, there could be neither Reasoning nor Intellection, such at least as they are found in *Man*, where they have their Intentions and Remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than a mere CAPACITY or POWER. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature more divine, to which "Intension and Remission and mere Capacity are unknown (e)." But not to digress.

"Tis

(e) See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of MAN's Existence is not a little different from that of the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Essence in

Ch.IV. 'Tis then on these permanent Phantasms
 that THE HUMAN MIND first works, and
 by

MOTION. This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but 'tis likewise true in that Life, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without *first move* our faculties, and thence we move *of ourselves* either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

'Tis to this distinction that Aristotle alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνοι κινήσεις ἐστιν ἴνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκίνησίς· καὶ ἄδοντι μᾶλλον ἐν πλειάρχῳ ἐστιν, οὐ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ τῶν ταῦτων γλυκὺν, κατὰ τὸν τοιητὸν, διὰ τοντορίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος ἐμετάβολες φέννηρος, καὶ οὐ Φύσις η δεομένη μεταβολῆς· ἐγὰρ ἀπλῆ, οὐδὲ ἐπιεικῆς. For there is not only an Energy of MOTION, but of IMMOBILITY; and PLEASURE or FELICITY exists rather in REST than in MOTION; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For in

BOOK THE THIRD.

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By an Energy as spontaneous and familiar Ch. IV.
to its Nature, as the seeing of Colours is
familiar to the Eye; it discerns at once
what

in the same manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub fin.

Tis to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that Boethius refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

—Tempus ab Ego

*Ire, jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS das cuncta
moveri.*

From this single principle of IMMOBILITY, may be derived some of the noblest of the Divine Attributes; such as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, IN-CORPOREAL, &c. Vide Aristot. Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. Du-Val. See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of Boethius are quoted at length.

It must be remembred however, that tho' we are not Gods, yet as *rational* Beings we have within us something *Divine*, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, per-

Ch.IV. what in MANY is ONE ; what in things
 DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR
 and the SAME (*f*). By this it comes to
 behold

permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance
 in real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient
 writer says)—Ομοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, the
 becoming like to God, as far as in our power. Τοῖς μὲν
 γὰρ Θεοῖς πᾶς ὁ βίος μακάριος· τοῖς δὲ αἰθρώτοις,
 εἴφ’ ἔσεν ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει.
*For to the Gods (as says another antient) the whole
 of life is one continued happiness; but to Men, 'tis so far
 happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy.*
 See Plat. in Theætet. Arist. Eth. X. 8.

(*f*) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal ACTS of its most excellent Part. 'Tis this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders Objects of Intelligence invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the sensible World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. 'Tis certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but 'tis made up of all these, and other attributes UNITED; not an unknown Constitution of sensible Parts, but a known Constitution of sensible Parts, unless we chuse to extirpate the possibility of natural Knowledge.

WHAT

behold a kind of *superior Objects*; a new Ch.IV.
 Race of Perceptions, more comprehensive
 than

WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or UNION?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. 'Tis the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her subordinate Wholes, much more in that *comprehensive Whole*, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this *unifying Power* more conspicuous, than in the subjects of PURE TRUTH. By virtue of this power the Mind views *One general Idea* in *many Individuals*; *One Proposition* in *many general Ideas*; *One Syllogism* in *many Propositions*; till at length by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and *steady regions of SCIENCE*,

*Quas neque concutunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
 Adspergunt, &c.*

Lucr.

Even

Ch. IV. than those of Sense; a Race of Perceptions, each one of which may be found entire and

Even negative Truths and negative Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so necessary is this UNITING Power to every Species of KNOWLEDGE. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is heard by our Ears, and understood by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as hear the sounds, without knowing the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both hear and understand the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles.* That this is ONE Truth, and not two or many Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION?—The Answer is obvious; 'tis by successive Portions of little and little at a time. When the first Word is present, all the subsequent are absent; when the last Word is present, all the previous are absent; when any of the middle Words are present, then are there some absent, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much is not, (to Sensation at least) as the'

and whole in the separate individuals of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, without ~~any~~
parting

tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the Perception of SENSE, than which we see nothing can be more *dissipated, fleeting, and detached*. —And is that of the MIND, similar? —Admit it, and what follows? —It follows, that one Mind would no more recognize one Truth, by recognizing its Terms *successively and apart*, than many distant Minds would recognize it; were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every TRUTH is ONE; tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no respect true *by parts at a time*, but 'tis true of necessity *at once, and in an instant*. —What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY? —Where even does it reside, or what makes it? —Shall we answer with the Stagirite, Τὸ δὲ ΕΝ ΠΟΙΟΤΝ τῷτο οὐ ΝΟΤΣ ἔχειν; —If this be allowed, it should seem, where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to concur, that Sensation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Sensation was *temporary, divisible and successive*; Intellection, *instantaneous, indivisible, and at once*.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Center that they are ONE. Let us then suppose SENSE, and MIND to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them at the Circumference, Mind at the Center; and

Ch.IV. *parting from the unity and permanence of its own nature.*

AND

and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but **MANY IN ONE**. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book; that Resolution or Analysis, which enables us to investigate the *Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. 'Tis by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itself* the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exist; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as *Optics*, were we necessitated to contemplate *Colour concreted with Figure*, two Attributes, which the Eye can never view, but associated? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any coloured Body.

Those

AND thus we see the *Process by which* Ch.IV.
we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS; for the *Per-*

Those two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no basis to stand on, were it not for this *separative* Power. They are both conversant about QUANTITY; Geometry about CONTINUOUS Quantity, Arithmetic about DISCRETE. EXTENSION is essential to *continuous* Quantity; MONADS, or UNITS, to *Discrete*. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all diversified, we leave nothing but those SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHMETIC. Again, by separating from Body every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be Body no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of Geometry.

By the same *analytical* or *separative* Power, we investigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of which is a *developed Word*, as the same Word is an *involved Definition*.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SCIENCE, COMPOSI-

Ch.IV. Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In these too we perceive the objects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE, which can by no means be, but *of that which is general, and definite, and fixt* (g).

Here

TION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARITIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NEGATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND DIVERSITIES.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.— If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Science as well to compound as to separate, may we not say that those Philosophers took *Half* of Wisdom for the *Whole*, who distinguished it from Wit, as if WISDOM only separated, and WIT only brought together? — Yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

(g) The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING, may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ἀνόμασται, διὰ τὸ ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΙΝ καὶ ὅφει τῶν πραγμάτων ἀγενή τοῖς,

τῆς

Here too even *Individuals*, however of Ch. IV.,
themselves unknowable, become objects of
Knowledge,

τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρες ἀπάγνυσα· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην τερπὶ τὸ καθόλε παῖς ἀμετάπλωται καταγνωτεῖται. SCIENCE (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us (ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) TO SOME STOP and BOUNDARY of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from *Plato*, as may be seen in the following account of it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue Socrates, having first (according to the Heraclitean Philosophy which *Cratylus* favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that *Flow* and *unceasing Mutation*, supposed by *Heraclitus* to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be permanent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds — Σκοπῶμεν δή, εἴ διντῶν αναλαβόντες τρεῶτον μὲν τῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφίβολον ἔστι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαῖνον τι δέ τι ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ πρῶτην ΕΠΙ τοῖς τρεάχμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ δέ τι συμπεριφέρεται. Let us consider then (says he) some of the very Words

Ch.IV. Knowlege, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may *any Particular* be

Words already examined; and in the first place, the Word SCIENCE; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing System of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἐπειδαί and μένειν, as if it kept along with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See *Plato* as before, p. 412.

As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to Scaliger for the following ingenious Etymology. RATIOCINATIO, motus quidam est; SCIENTIA, quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam nostrum. Παρὰ τὸ ΕΠΙΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. Sistitur enim mentis agitatio, et fit species in animo. Sic Latinum SCIENTIA, ὅτι γίνεται ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex ab usu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis participiis idem ad junxerunt. Audiens, ἀκούων ὄν. Sciens, χῶν ὄν. Scal. in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17.

The

Be said to be known, when by asserting it Ch.IV.
to be *a Man*, or *an Animal*, or the like,

we

The English Word, UNDERSTANDING, means not so properly Knowledge, as that Faculty of the Soul, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm Basis, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable Support?

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as fleeting powers of Perception, like Sense, but rather as steady, permanent, and durable COMPREHENSIONS. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain steady, permanent, and durable OBJECTS; since if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING RECEIVED, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a Greek Platonic (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—*Ei ēi γνῶσις ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς αἰδήσεως, οὐκ ἀλλα γνῶσται ἀληθεστέρα τῶν αἰδητῶν.* If there be

B b 2

A

Ch.IV. we refer it to some such *comprehensive*, or
 general Idea.

Now 'tis of these COMPREHENSIVE and PERMANENT IDEAS, THE GENUINE PERCEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS of all Languages, however different, are the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that as the PERCEPTIONS include, so do these their SYMBOLS

A KNOWLEDGE more accurate than SENSATION ; there must be certain OBJECTS of such knowledge MORE TRUE THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following then are Questions worth considering,—*What these Objects are?*—*Where they reside?*—*And how they are to be discovered?*—Not by experimental Philosophy 'tis plain ; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of Mathematics ; for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We can only add, that if they reside in our own MINDS, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not ?) then will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

—————NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

Perf.

SYMBOLS express, not this or that set of Ch.IV. Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were therefore the Inhabitants of *Salisbury* to be transferred to *York*, tho' new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new Language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed, that they would want, would be the *local proper Names*; which Names, as we have said already *, are hardly a part of Language, but must equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

"Tis upon the same principles we may perceive the reason, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the Language of *modern England* is able to describe *antient Rome*;

B b 3 and

* Sup. p. 345, 346.

Ch.IV. and that of *ancient Rome* to describe *modern*
England (*b*). But of these matters we
have spoken before.

§. 2. AND now having viewed *the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas,* let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) whence 'tis that these Ideas originally come. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

LET

(*b*) As far as *Human Nature*, and *the primary Genera* both of *Substance* and *Accident* are *the same* in all places, and have been so thro' all ages; so far *all Languages* share one common *IDENTITY*. As far as *peculiar species of Substance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as *the positive Institutions of religious and civil Polities* are *every where different*; so far each *Language* has its peculiar *DIVERSITY*. To the Causes of *Diversity* here mentioned, may be added *the distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.

LET us suppose any man to look for Ch.IV.
the first time upon *some Work of Art*, as
for example upon a Clock, and having
sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart.
Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea
of what he had seen?—And what is it, *to
retain such Idea?*—'Tis to have A FORM
INTERNAL correspondent to THE EXTER-
NAL; only with this difference, that the
*Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the
External is united with it*, being seen in
the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to
view *many such Machines*, and not simply
to view, but to consider every part of them,
so as to comprehend how these parts all
operate to one End, he might be then
said to possess a kind of INTELLIGIBLE
FORM, by which he would not only un-
derstand, and know the Clocks, which he
had seen *already*, but every Work also of
like Sort, which he might see *bereafter*.—

B b 4

Should

Ch.IV. Should it be ask'd " *which of these Forms*
 — " *is prior, the External and Sensible; or*
 " *the Internal and Intelligible;*" the An-
 swer is obvious, that *the prior is the Sen-
 sible.*

THUS then we see, THERE ARE IN-
 TELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE
 SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.

BUT farther still—If these Machines be
 allowed the Work *not of Chance*, but of
an Artist, they must be the Work of one,
 who knew what he was about. And what
 is it, to work, and know what one is about?
 — 'Tis to have an Idea of what one is
 doing; to possess a FORM INTERNAL, cor-
 respondent to the EXTERNAL, to which ex-
 ternal it serves for an EXEMPLAR or AR-
 CHETYPE.

HERE then we have AN INTELLIGI-
 BLE FORM, WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE
 SENSIBLE FORM; *which, being truly prior*
 as

as well in dignity as in time, can no more Ch.IV.
become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect.

THUS then, with respect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS; one Order, intelligible and previous to these Works; a second Order, sensible and concomitant; and a third again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to work; thro' the second, the Works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; the first may be called THE MAKER'S FORM; the second, that of THE SUBJECT; and the third, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us pass from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect; " a Plain, " for example, spacious and fertile; a " river

Ch.IV. " river winding thro' it ; by the banks
~~~~~ " of that river, men walking and cattle  
" grazing ; the view terminated with  
" distant hills, some craggy, and some  
" covered with wood." Here 'tis plain  
we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL.  
And could any one quit so fair a Sight,  
and retain no traces of what he had be-  
held ?—And what is it, *to retain traces*  
*of what one has beheld?*—'Tis to have cer-  
tain FORMS INTERNAL correspondent to  
the EXTERNAL, and resembling them in  
every thing, *except the being merged in*  
*Matter.* And thus, thro' the same reten-  
tive and collective Powers, the Mind be-  
comes fraught with *Forms natural*, as be-  
fore with *Forms artificial*.—Should it be  
asked, " *which of these natural Forms are*  
" *prior, the External ones view'd by the*  
" *Senses, or the Internal existing in the*  
" *Mind;*" the Answer is obvious, that  
*the prior are the External.*

THUS

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as Ch.IV.  
in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE  
FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE  
SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we see the  
meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil  
est in INTELLECTU, quod non prius fuit in  
SENSU*; an Axiom, which we must own  
to be so far allowable, as it respects the  
*Ideas of a mere Contemplator.*

But to proceed somewhat farther—Are  
*natural* Productions made BY CHANCE, or  
BY DESIGN?—Let us admit *by Design*,  
not to lengthen our inquiry. They are  
certainly\* more exquisite than *any* Works  
of ART, and yet *these* we cannot bring  
ourselves to suppose made by *Chance*.—  
Admit it, and what follows?—*We must of  
necessity admit a MIND also, because DESIGN  
implies MIND, wherever 'tis to be found.*  
—Allowing therefore this, what do we  
mean

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\* *Arist. de Part. Animal. L. I. c. 1.*

Ch.IV. mean by the Term, MIND?—We mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas those Works are fashioned.

THAT such EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you please) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be A MIND, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a Mind do we leave without them? CHANCE surely is as knowing, as MIND WITHOUT IDEAS; or rather, MIND WITHOUT IDEAS is no less blind than CHANCE.

THE Nature of these IDEAS is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natural Substances,

stances, which are but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they are *mental* is plain, as ~~they are~~  
*they are of the Essence of MIND*, and con-  
sequently no Objects to any of the *Senses*,  
nor therefore circumscribed either by *Time*  
or *Place*.

HERE then, on this System, we have  
plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH  
ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FORMS  
SENSIBLE. Here too we see that NATURE  
is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER,  
having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS,  
HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSE-  
QUENT (i).

THAT

(i) Simplicius, in his commentary upon the Predica-  
ments, calls the first Order of these intelligible Forms,  
τὰ ὡρὸ τῆς μεθέξεως, those previous to Participation,  
and at other times, οἱ εἰνημένην κοινότης, the transcendent  
Universality or Sameness; the second Order he calls τὰ  
τὸ μεθέξει, those which exist in Participation, that is,  
those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls  
them οἱ καρατεταγμένη κοινότης, the subordinate Univers-  
ality or Sameness; lastly, of the third Order he says,  
that

**Ch.IV.** THAT the Previous may be justly so  
 called is plain, because they are essentially  
 prior

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that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—ήμεις ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ' εαυτὰ ὑπεσήσαμεν, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves. Simp. in Prædic. p. 17. In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—Μάποτε οὐ τριτὸν ληπίεν τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἔξηγημένον τὸν καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἀιτίου τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν εἴαυτῷ Φύσιν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν τολυειδῆ ἀρόληψιν—δεύτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆς αἰτίας τοῖς διαφόροις ἐιδεσιν ἐδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δέ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέστως ιψις-ἀμενον, ὑπερογκεῖς ὅν—Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its existence in those several Species—that of the third Order, what subsists by abstraction in our own Understandings, being of subsequent sign to the other two. Ibid. p. 21.

To

prior to all things else. The whole visible World exhibits nothing more, than  
so

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To *Simplicius* we shall add the two following Quotations from *Ammonius* and *Nicephorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these Authors are not easily to be procured.

'Εννοείδω τοίνυν δακτύλιος τις ἐκλύπωμα τὸ ξένην, εἰς τύχοι, Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ κηρία τολλὰ ταραχείμενα· ὃ δὲ δακτύλιον σφραγίζεται τοὺς κηρὺς τάντας· οὐτερου δέ τις εἰσελθὼν καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ κηρία, ἐπιτίθεται ὅτι τάντα ἔξι ἐνός εἰσιν ἐκλύπωμάτος, ἐχέτω ταρφ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκλύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. 'Η τοίνυν σφραγίς η ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἶναι· η δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· η δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῇ ἀπομαζαμένῃ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, καὶ οὐτερογενής. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐννοείδω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ἔιδων· ὃ γὰρ Δημιουργὸς, τοιῶν τάντα, ἔχει ταρφὸν τὰ τάντων ταραθείγματα· εἰναὶ, τοιῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔχει τὸ εἰδός ταρφὸν τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; τρόπος ὁ ἀφροδῶν, τάντας τοιεῖ. 'Εις δέ τις ἐνταῖη λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ ταρφὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ ἔιδη, ἀκούεται ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργὸς δημιουργεῖ, η ἔιδως τὰ οὐ π' αὐτῷ δημιουργόυμενα, η οὐκ εἰδῶς. 'Αλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ ἔιδως, οὐκ ἀνδημιουργήσει. Τίς γὰρ, μέλλων ταστεῖν τὸ, ἀγνοεῖ ὁ

Ch.IV. so many passing Pictures of these immutable  
 Archetypes. Nay thro' these it attains even

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μέλλει τοιεῖν; οὐ γάρ, ὡς ἡ Φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμεις  
 παῖς· (ὅθεν καὶ τοιεῖς ἡ Φύσις, οὐκ ἐφιστάνουσα γεωτι-  
 κῶς τῷ γιγνομένῳ) Ἐι δέ τι καθ' ἔξι λογικὴν ποιεῖ,  
 διδέκτε πάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ αὐτῆς. Ἐι τόνυ μὲν  
 χεῖρον, ἡ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, οἶδε τὸ ὑπὸ<sup>τ</sup>  
 αὐτῆς γιγνόμενον εἰς δὲ διδέν οἱ ποιεῖ, αὐτόθι σῆλον, ὡς  
 ἔστιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ ἕιδη. Ἐι δὲ τὸ ἕιδος ἐν τῷ  
 Δημιουργῷ, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ φακίσιλάν τύπος· καὶ λέγεται  
 τῦτο τὸ ἕιδος ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, καὶ χωριστὸν  
 τῆς ὕλης. Ἐι δὲ τὸ ἕιδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθ'  
 ἔκαστον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κηροῖς ἐκίτιπώματα· καὶ  
 λέγεται τὰ τοιάντα ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ἔναις,  
 καὶ ἄχωριστα τῆς ὕλης. Θεασάμενοι δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος  
 ἀνθρώπους, διτι πάντες τὸ αὐτὸν εἶδος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔχοντιν,  
 (ώς ἐπὶ τῷ δερον ἐλθόντος, καὶ θεασαμένων τὰ κηρία)  
 ἀνεμαζάμεθα αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ διαινοίᾳ· καὶ λέγεται τῦτο  
 ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἦγον μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ,  
 καὶ ὑπερογενές. *Intelligatur annulus, qui alicuius, ut-  
 pote Achillis, imaginem insculptam habeat: multæ insuper  
 ceras sint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quis-  
 piām, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione for-  
 matas, annulique impressionem in mente contineat: sigillum  
 annulo insculptum, ANTE MULTA dicetur: in cerulis  
 impressum, in MULTIS: quod vero in illius, qui illo ve-  
 nerat intelligentia remanserit, POST MULTA, et posle-*

a Semblance of Immortality, and con- Ch.IV.  
tinues

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rius genitum dicetur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo: etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum ceteros faciat omnes. At si quis restiterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nesciet, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quâdam rationis experite aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, et si quæ faciat, non advertat:) Si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quocunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ facit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et IN MULTIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspiciimus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videamus, illa effigies in mente nostrâ infidens POST MULTA, et posterius genita dicetur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conspicerat. Ammon. in Porphyr. Introduct. p. 29. b.

Cc

Λέγονται

Ch.IV. times throughout ages to be SPECIALLY

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Λέγονται δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἰδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΑΟΙΣ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οἷς ἐποίειν τι σφραγιστήριον, ἔχων καὶ ἐκλέπτωμα τὸ τυχόν, ἐξ οὐ κηρύκα πολλά μεταλλαγέτια τῷ ἐκλεπτώματι<sup>Θ</sup>, καὶ τις ὑπ' ὄψιν ἀγαγέτων πεντα, μὴ ἀρροκατιδῶν μηδὲ ὅλως τὸ σφραγιστήριον ἐπιρακών δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκλέπτωμα, καὶ ἐπιστήσας ὅπει πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ μετέχοντι ἐκλεπτώματι<sup>Θ</sup>, καὶ τὰ δοκεῖτα πολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἓν, ἔχετω τότε κατὰ διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν Ἀι σφραγιστήριον τύπωμα λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τό δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καταληφθὲν, καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν αἴλως ὑπεραν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. "Ουτως δὲ καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἰδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μέν εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Δημοφραγῷ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητικὸς λόγους· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ οἱ σοσιοποιοὶ λόγοι τῶν ὄντων ἐναπόντιασι τῷ φερετήκασι, καθ' ὃντις λόγοις ὁ ὑπερέστι<sup>Θ</sup> τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ προώρισε καὶ παρῆγαγεν ὑφεστηκέναι δὲ λέγονται τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἰδη ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρον αὐθρώποις τὸ τῷ αὐθρώπῳ εἰδός ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρον ἵπποις τὸ τῷ ἵππῳ εἰδός· ἐν αὐθρώποις δὲ, καὶ ἴτποις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τὸ γένον<sup>Θ</sup> ἐνρίσκεται τῶν ποιητῶν εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ὅμοι καὶ τοῖς ζωοφύτοις τὸ καθελικώτερον γένον<sup>Θ</sup>, τὸ αἰδηπτικὸν, ἐξετάζεται· συναχθέντων δὲ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν,

Δευ-

**CALYPSONE, amid those infinite parti- Ch.IV.  
cular**

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Θεωρεῖται τὸ ἔμψυχον εἰς δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἔμψυχοις ἐθέλεις τις ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, τὸ σῶμα σύμπαν κατόφεται· συνδραμνοῦν δὲ τοῖς ἐιρημένοις τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἔστιν, τὸ πρῶτον γένος Φανεῖται καὶ γενικάταλον· καὶ δύτινο μὲν EN TOIS POALOIΣ ὑφέστηκε τὰ ἔδη καὶ τὰ γένη. Καταλαβὼν δέ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος αὐτῶν θρώπων τὴν αὐτῶν Φύσιν, τὴν αὐθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἕκτατα μέρος ἵππων αὐτὴν τὴν ἵπποτητα, καὶ γάτω τὸν καθόλευ ἀνθρώπουν, καὶ τὸν καθόλευ ἵππουν ἐπινοήσας· καὶ τὸ καθόλευ ζῶν ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγων· καὶ τὸ καθόλευ αἰδηπτικὸν, καὶ τὸ καθόλευ ἔμψυχον, καὶ τὸ καθόλευ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν καθολικωτάτην ἔστιν ἐξ ἐπάντων συλλογισάμενος, ὁ τοιᾶτο εὐτῆς ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῷ διανοίᾳ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐτῶς ὑπέστησεν ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΑΟΙΣ, τατέσι, μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπερογενῶς. *Genera vero et Species dicuntur esse ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum, quamlibet figuram habens, ex quo multæ ceræ ejusdem figuræ sint participes, et in medium aliquis has proferat, nequaquam præviso figillo. Cum autem vidisset eas ceras in quibus figuræ exprimitur, et animadvertisset omnes eandem figuram participare, et quæ videbantur multæ, ratione in unum coegisset, hoc in mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse species ANTE MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quæ vero ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsistit, POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes.*

C 2

In

Ch. IV. cular changes, that befal it every moment (*k*).

MAY

*In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes una et simpliciter præ-existent; secundum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in singulis hominibus hominis Species, et in singulis equis equi Species est. In hominibus æque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempe sensitivum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animatum. Si verò una cum animatis quisquam velit perscrutari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem IN MULTIS subsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam humanam, et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum, et universale animatum, et universale corpus, et maxime universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in suâ mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΑΙΣ, hoc est, POST MULTA, et posterius genita. Niceph. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcin. in Platonic. Philosoph. Introduct. C. IX. X.*

(*k*) THE following elegant Lines of Virgil are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

Ergo

MAY we be allowed then to credit those Ch.IV.  
speculative men, who tell us, “ *tis in*  
“ *these*

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*Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ævi  
Excipiat : (neque enim plus septima ducitur ætas)  
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET—G. IV.*

The same *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind* may be seen in all *perishable* substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' *Individuals perish*, the several *Kinds still remain*. And hence, if we take **TIME**, as denoting the *system of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the *Timæus*, where the Philosopher describes **TIME** to be——μένοντος άιώνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἵσταντος άιώνος εἰκόνα. *Aeternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem.* Plat. V. III. p. 37. Edit. Serran.

We have subjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to serve as a commentary on this description of **TIME**.—*AETERNITAS igitur est, interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporaliū clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPORE, id præsens à præteritis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitæ suæ spatiū pariter possit amplecti; sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit, hesternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vitâ non amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobilī transitorioque*

Ch.IV. *“ these permanent and comprehensive FORMS  
 “ that THE DEITY views at once, without  
 “ looking abroad, all possible productions  
 “ both present, past, and future—that this  
 “ great and stupendous View is but a View  
 “ of himself, where all things lie enveloped  
 “ in their Principles and Exemplars, as be-  
 “ ing*

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*momento. Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles, nec cœperit unquam esse, nec definat, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendetur, nondum tamen tale est, ut eternum esse jure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinitæ licet vitæ spatiū comprehendit, atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vitæ plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet, cui neque futuri quidquam absit, nec præteriti fluxerit, id ÆTERNUM esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est, et sui compos præsens sibi semper assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præsentem. Unde quidam non recte, qui cum audiunt visum Platonii, mundum hunc nec habuisse initium, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-æternum putant. Aliud est enim PER INTERMINABILEM DUCI VITAM, (quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM, quod Divinae Mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque enim*

*Deus*

"*ing essential to the fulness of his universal Ch.IV.*  
 "Intellection?"—If so, 'twill be proper,  
 that we invert the Axiom before men-  
 tioned. We must now say—*Nil est in*  
*SENSU, quod non prius fuit in INTELLEC-*  
*TU.* For tho' the contrary may be true  
 with respect to Knowledge merely *human*,  
 yet never can it be true with respect to

Cc 4

Know-

*Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quanti-  
 tate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNC  
 ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STA-  
 TUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM  
 MOTUS IMITATUR; cumque eum effingere, atque æquare  
 non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex simplicitate  
 præsentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quanti-  
 tam; et, cum totam pariter vitæ sue plenitudinem ne-  
 queat possidere, hoc ipso, quid aliquo modo nunquam esse  
 definit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest,  
 aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans se ad qualemcumque  
 præsentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quæ, quo-  
 niam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRÆSENTIAE QUANDAM  
 GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibuscumque contigerit, id præ-  
 stat, ut ESSE videantur. Quoniam vero manere non po-  
 tut, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum  
 est, ut CONTINUARET VITAM EUNDO, cuius plen-  
 tudinem complecti non valuit PERMANENDO. Itaque,*  
*&c. De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.*

Ch.IV. Knowledge universally, unless we give Precedence to Atoms and LIFELESS BODY, making MIND, among other things, to be struck out by a lucky Concourse.

§. 3. 'Tis far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our later Metaphyficians. But yet 'tis somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above *Precedence*.

For mark the Order of things, according to their account of them. First comes that huge Body, *the sensible World*. Then this and its Attributes beget *sensible Ideas*. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made *Ideas intelligible*, whether *specific* or *general*. Thus, should they admit that MIND was coeval with BODY, yet till BODY gave it Ideas, and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more

more, than a sort of dead Capacity; for Ch.IV.  
INNATE IDEAS it could not possibly have  
any.

AT another time we hear of *Bodies* so exceedingly fine, that their very *Exility* makes them susceptible of *sensation* and *knowledge*; as if they shrunk into *Intellect* by their exquisite subtlety, which rendred them too delicate to be *Bodies* any longer. 'Tis to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as *subtle Æther, animal Spirits, nervous Ducts, Vibrations*, and the like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

BUT the *intellectual Scheme*, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the primary mental Cause. 'Tis bere it looks for the origin of *intelligible Ideas*, even of those, which exist in *human Capacities*. For tho' *sensible Objects* may  
be

Ch.IV. be the destined medium, *to awaken the dormant Energies of Man's Understanding,* yet are those Energies themselves no more contained in *Sense*, than the Explosion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire (I).

IN

(I) The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Commentary of the *Platonic Olympiodorus*, (quoted before p. 371.) upon the *Phædo* of *Plato*; which tho' perhaps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiscence*, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the *Senses* assist in the acquisition of *Science*, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers.

Οὐδέποτε γάρ τὰ χειών καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαῖ οἱ αὐτίαι εἰσὶ τῶν κρειττόνων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυαλίοις ἔχειν τεινέδαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπεῖν τὸν αἰδητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ψεχώς ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐρεθίζεσσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἰς αὐτάμυνσιν τῶν καθόλων·—κατὰ τάυτην δὲ τῶν ἑννοίαν ἔργαται καὶ τὸ ἐπ Τιμαίῳ, ὅτι δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς Φιλοσοφίας ἐπερίσημεθα γένεται, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰδητῶν εἰς αὐτάμυνσιν αἴφικνέμεθα. Those things, which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the Principles or Causes of the more excellent; and tho' we admit the common interpretations, and allow SENSE to be a Principle of SCIENCE, we must however call it a Principle, not as if it was the efficient

IN short ALL MINDS, that are, are SIMILAR and CONGENIAL; and so too are their

*efficient Cause, but as it rouses our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas.—According to the same way of thinking is it said in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RECOLLECTION.*

And in another passage he observes—'Επειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἄγαλμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὅλων ἔχουσα λόγον, ἐριθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἀιδητῶν αὐταιριστικεται ὡν ἔνδον ἔχει λόγων, καὶ τέττας προσεάλλεται. For in as much as the SOUL, by containing the Principles of all Beings, is a sort of OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION or EXEMPLAR; when it is rouzed by objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.

*Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon the same subject in the following manner. Τὸν ψυχὴν Φασὶν οἱ τὰ ἔιδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσαν ἔσγει ἐπισήμων τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀιδητοῖς λόγον, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτὰς ἔχοντας καὶ τελεώτερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν, η ἐν τοῖς ἀιδητοῖς ἔχονται. Τὸ δὲ τελεώτερον τότο καὶ ἀκριβέστερον ων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀιδητῶν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὃγε μὴ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δὲ αὐτὸν μηδαμοῦ ἀλλοθί οὐν αὐτὴν ἔξ αὐτῆς δια-*

*ποεῖσθαι.*

Ch.IV. *their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. Were*  
 it otherwise, there could be no intercourse  
 between

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νοεῖσθαι· οὐ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μηδαμῆ ὅν, τι  
 διανοείδαι· τὰς γὰρ φευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν ψήφῳ μὴ ὄντων  
 ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἀλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων ἔναις συνθέσεις  
 πιάς, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὄρθον γνωμέναις. Λέπτεδαι δὲ ἀφ'  
 ἑτέρας τιὸς Φύσεως πολλῷ ἔτι κρείτιονός τε καὶ τελεώτε-  
 ρεις ἀφίκει τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελεώτερον τέτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς  
 οὐδηποτοῖς λόγῳ. *Those who suppose IDEAL FORMS,*  
*say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of*  
*Science, those Proportions, which exist in sensible objects,*  
*possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than*  
*that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now*  
*this superior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have*  
*from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet*  
*can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its*  
*having existence any where else. For the Soul is not*  
*formed so as to conceive that, which has existence no where,*  
*since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them com-*  
*positions irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but*  
*of various real Beings, one with another. It remains*  
*therefore that this Perfection, which is superior to the*  
*Proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the*  
*Soul from SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH IS BY*  
*MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PER-*  
*FECT.* Pleth. de Aristotel. et Platonic. Philosoph.  
 Diff. Edit. Paris 1541.

The ΛΟΓΟΙ or PROPORTIONS, of which Ge-  
 nissus here speaks, mean not only those relative Pro-  
 portions

between Man and Man, or (what is more important) between Man and God. Ch. IV.

FOR

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portions of *Equality* and *Inequality*, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesqualter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical *Lines*, *Angles*, *Figures*, &c. of all which  $\Delta\gamma\gamma\omega\iota$  or *Proportions*, tho' we possess in the *Mind* the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the *sensible World*.

To these two Authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or INTELLECT, wholly distinct from *Sensation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

*Hac est efficiens magis  
Longè caussa potentior,  
Quam quæ materiæ mode  
Impressas patitur notas.  
Præcedit tamen excitans,  
Ac vires animi movens,  
Vivo in corpore passio.  
Cùm vel lux oculos ferit,  
Vel vox auribus instrepit ;  
Tum MENTIS VIGOR excitus,  
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,  
Ad motus simileis vocans,  
Notis applicat exteris,  
INTRORSUMQUE RECONDITIS  
FORMIS miscet imagines.*

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.

Ch.IV. FOR what is Conversation between Man  
 and Man?—'Tis a mutual intercourse of  
*Speaking* and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker,  
 'tis *to teach*; to the Hearer, 'tis *to learn*.—  
 To the Speaker, 'tis *to descend* from *Ideas*  
 to *Words*; to the Hearer, 'tis *to ascend*  
 from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in  
 this ascent, can arrive at *no Ideas*, then is  
 he said *not to understand*; if he ascend to  
*Ideas* dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is  
 he said *to misunderstand*.—What then is  
 requisite, that he may be said *to understand*?  
 —That he should ascend to certain *Ideas*,  
 treasured up *within himself*, correspondent  
 and similar to those *within the Speaker*.  
 The same may be said of a *Writer* and a  
*Reader*; as when any one reads to day or to  
 morrow, or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid*  
 wrote in *Greece* two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvelous, there should  
 be *so exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they

were only generated from sensible Objects, Ch.IV.  
 infinite in number, ever changing, distant  
 in Time, distant in Place, and no one  
 Particular the same with any other?

AGAIN, do we allow it possible for GOD  
 to signify his *will* to Men; or for MEN to  
 signify their *wants* to GOD?—In both these  
 cases there must be *an Identity of Ideas*, or  
 else nothing is done either one way or the  
 other. Whence then do these COMMON  
 IDENTIC IDEAS come?—Those of *Men*,  
 it seems, come all from *Sensation*. And  
 whence come God's Ideas?—Not surely  
 from *Sensation* too; for this we can hardly  
 venture to affirm, without giving to *Body*  
*that notable Precedence of being prior to the*  
*Intellection of even God himself*.—Let them  
 then be *original*; let them be *connate, and*  
*essential to the divine Mind*.—If this be true,  
 is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas of*  
*corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things*  
*derived from subjects so totally distinct) should*  
 so

Ch.IV. so happily co-incide in the same wonderful  
Identity?

HAD we not better reason thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all MINDS have their Ideas *derived*; or all have them *original*; or *some have them original, and some derived*. If all Minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, *which is itself not Mind*, and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. If all have them *original*, *then are all Minds divine*, an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must *one Mind* (at least) have *original Ideas*, and the rest have them *derived*. Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them? —From MIND, or from BODY?—From MIND, a thing *homogeneous*; or from BODY, a thing *heterogeneous*? From MIND, such as (from the Hypothesis) has *original*

*original Ideas*; or from BODY, which we Ch.IV. cannot discover to have any Ideas at all? (1) —An Examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. 'Tis thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of *the Epicurean Poet*,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum confare,*  
*animamque;*

or trust *the Mantuan Bard*, when he sings  
in divine numbers,

*Igneus est ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO*  
*Seminibus.—*

BUT

(1) ΝΟΤΝ δὲ ΣΩΜΑ γεννᾷ· τῶς γὰρ ἀντὶ ΑΝΟΗΤΑ ΝΟΤΝ γεννήσοι; No BODY produces MIND: for how should THINGS DEVOID OF MIND produce MIND? *Sallust de Diis et Mundo*, c. 8.

D d

Ch.IV. But 'tis now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.

## C H A P.

## C H A P. V.

*Sub-ordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.*

ORIGINAL TRUTH (a), having the Ch. V. most intimate connection with the *Supreme Intelligence*, may be said (as it were) to

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(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Sensation*, have a short method to explain the nature of TRUTH. 'Tis a *factitious* thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as 'tis remembred and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance *the last* of any, being not only subsequent to *sensible Objects*, but even to our *Sensations* of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have not

Ch. V. to shine with unchangeable splendour, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but it self neither admits *Diminution*, nor *Change*, because the Darkness respects only particular Percipients. Among *these* therefore we must look for ignorance and

not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent TRUTH not as the *last*, but the *first* of Beings; who call it *immutable, eternal, omnipresent*; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method *how they perceive Truth*, was to pass for an account of *Truth itself*; as if to describe the road to *London*, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the

and error, and for that *Subordination of Ch. V.*  
*Intelligence*, which is their natural consequence,

We have daily experience in the works of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will suffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to NATURE; and well for mankind is it found

D d 3 to

the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of *natural materials*, but are as much creatures of our own, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If Milton by his URANIA intended to represent TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

— — — — — *Heav'ly born!*  
*Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,*  
*Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,*  
*Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play,*  
*In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd*  
*With thy celestial Song.* — — — — — P. L. VII.

See Proverbs VIII. 22, &c. Jeremiah X. 10.  
 Marc Antonin. IX. 1.

Ch. V. to be true, else never could we attain any  
 natural Knowledge at all. For if the *constitutive Proportions of a Clock* are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to *those seminal Proportions*, which make the essence and character of every *natural Subject*?—Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some *too general*, some *too partial*, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are *erroneous*, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspence and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνηστι πιστῶν, ἀρθρα ταῦτα  
 τῷ φρενῷ.

AND thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of LETTERS, and that

**that of VIRTUE** appear to co-incide, it Ch. V.  
being the business of both to examine our Ideas,  
*and to amend them by the Standard  
of Nature and of Truth (b).*

IN this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how these *peculiar* Ideas become THE GENIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, since the Symbol must of course correspond to its *Archetype* (c);

D d 4 how

- (b) How useful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DISPOSITION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph.* *Mem.* IV. 5, 6. *Arrian. Epi&I.* I. 17. II. 10. *Marc.* *Anton.* III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

(c) ΗΘΟΥΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ἐστι τὸ ἀνθεῷπερ  
ΛΟΓΟΣ. Stob. *Capiuntur Signa haud levia, sed ob-  
servatu digna (quod fortasse quispiam non putarit) de in-  
geniis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipsorum.*  
Bacon de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. Vid. etiam *Quintil.*  
L. XI. p. 675. Edit. Capperon. *Diog.* L. I. p. 58. et  
*Menag.* Com. *Tusc. Disp.* V. 16.

Ch. V. how the *wisest* Nations, having the *most* and *best Ideas*, will consequently have the *best* and *most copious Languages*; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countrys different Arts and Practices, discover by WORDS, to whom they are indebted for THINGS.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. WE BRITONS in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our *multiform Language* may sufficiently shew. Our Terms in *polite Literature* prove, that this came from *Greece*; our Terms in *Music* and *Painting*, that these came from *Italy*; our Phrases in *Cookery* and *War*, that we learnt these from the *French*; and our Phrases in *Navigation*, that we were taught by the *Flemings* and *Low Dutch*. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in *Regularity* and *Analogy*. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the defect,

defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, we Ch. V.  
gain in *Copiousness*, in which last respect ~~many~~  
few Languages will be found superior to  
our own.

LET us pass from ourselves to the REGIONS OF THE EAST. The (*d*) Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On them fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about *the Form of their Government*; (for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception;) 'twas all from the poor motive of, *who should be their MASTER*, whether

(d) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτερον εἶναι τὰ ἥθη οἱ μεν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ τερὶ τὴν Ασίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ευρώπην, ὑπομένειν τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ οἱ δυχεραινούσες. For the Barbarians by being more slaveish in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent. Arist. Polit. III. 4.

**Ch. V. whether a Cyrus or an Artaxerxes, a Meteor or a Mustapha.**

SUCH was their Condition, and what was the consequence?—Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction, for ever in their sight, was that of *Tyrant* and *Slave*; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talk'd of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into the *Great* and *Magnificent* (*e*), they as frequently degenerated

(e) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the Dispensations of divine Providence, &c.

enerated into the *Tumid* and *Bumbast*. *The Ch. V.*  
*Greeks too of Asia* became infected by their  
neighbours, who were often at times not  
only their neighbours, but their masters ;  
and hence that Luxuriance of the *Afstatic*  
*Stile*, unknown to the chaste eloquence  
and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we  
forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of  
them more fully, when we have first consi-  
dered the Nature or Genius of the *Romans*.

AND what sort of People may we pro-  
nounce the *ROMANS*?—A Nation engaged  
in wars and commotions, some foreign,  
some domestic, which for seven hun-  
dred years wholly engrossed their thoughts.  
Hence therefore their *LANGUAGE* be-  
came, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms  
expressive of things *political*, and well  
adapted to the purposes both of *History*  
and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was  
their *Philosophy*? — As a Nation, 'twas  
none, if we may credit their ablest Writers.  
And hence the Unfitness of their Language  
to

Ch. V. to this Subject ; a defect, which even Cicero is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes Philosophy himself, from the number of Terms, which he is obliged to invent (*f*). *Virgil* seems

(*f*) See *Cic. de Fin.* I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4, &c. but in particular *Tusc. Disp.* I. 3. where he says, *PHILOSOPHIA jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen LITERARUM LATINARUM ; quæ illustranda et excitanda nobis est ; ut si, &c.* See also *Tusc. Disp.* IV. 3. and *Acad.* I. 2. where it appears, that 'till **CICERO** applied himself to the writing of *Pbilosphy*, the *Romans* had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of *Amafanius* the *Epicurean*, and others of the same sect. How far the *Romans* were indebted to *Cicero* for Philosophy, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The *Epicurean* Poet **LUCRETIUS**, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have over-looked the *Latin* writers of his own Sect ; deriving all his Philosophy, as well as *Cicero*, from *Grecian* Sources ; and, like him, acknowlegging the difficulty of writing *Philosophy in Latin*, both from the *Poverty* of the Tongue, and from the *Novelty* of the Subject.

*Nec*

seems to have judged the most truly of his Ch. V.  
Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

*Tu*

---

*Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM obscura reperta  
Difficile inlustrare LATINIS versibus esse,  
(Multæ novis rebus præsertim quom sit agendum,) Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ et RERUM NOVITATEM:  
Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas  
Suavis amicitia quemvis perferre laborem  
Suadet.—* Lucr. I. 137.

In the same age, VARRO, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of *Philosophy*; as did the Patriot BRUTUS, a Treatise concerning *Virtue*, much applauded by CICERO; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the Writers above-mentioned came HORACE, some of whose Satires and Epistles may be justly ranked among the most valuable pieces of *Latin Philosophy*, whether we consider the Purity of their Stile, or the great Address, with which they treat the Subject.

After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of *Augustus* to those of *Nero*, came the Satirist PERSIUS, the friend and disciple of the Stoic *Cornutus*; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life, so

Ch. V. *Tu REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, Ro-*  
*mane, memento,*  
*(Haec tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere*  
*morem,*  
*Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.*

FROM

so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single *difficult* writer among the Latin Classics, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also **SENECA**; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble Author of the *Characteristics*, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of **Hadrian** and the **Antonines**, lived **AULUS GELLIUS**, or (as some call him) **AGELLIUS**, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a *Philosopher*, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With *Aulus Gellius* we range **MACROBIUS**, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived under

FROM considering *the Romans*, let us Ch. V.  
pass to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN  
COMMON-

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under *Honarius* and *Theodosius*) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His Works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Somnium Scipionis* of *Cicero* may be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind.

In the same age with *Aulus Gellius*, flourished **APULEIUS** of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a Platonic Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was **MARTIANUS CAPELLA**, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a *Philologist*, than of a *Philosopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank **CHALCIDIUS** the *Platonic*, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowlege of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timaeus of Plato*.

The

Ch. V. COMMONWEALTHS, while they maintained  
their Liberty, were the most heroic Confederacy, that ever existed. They were  
the

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The last *Latin* Philosopher was BOETHIUS, who was descended from some of the noblest of the *Roman* Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greater part in the *Logical* way. But his *Ethic* piece, *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, and which is partly prose, and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbed *Africans* already mentioned. By command of Theoderic king of the Goths, 'twas the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the *Latin Tongue*, and the last remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other *Romans*, who left *Philosophical* Writings; such as MUSONIUS RUFUS, and the two Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS and JULIAN; but as these preferred the use of the *Greek Tongue* to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of *Latin* Writers.

And so much (by way of sketch) for THE LATIN AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.

the politeſt, the bravest, and the wiſeſt of Ch. V.  
men. In the ſhort ſpace of little more  
than a Century, they became ſuch Stateſ-  
men, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Phy-  
ſicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors,  
Architects, and (laſt of all) Philosophers,  
that one can hardly help conſidering THAT  
**GOLDEN PERIOD**, as a Providential Event  
in honour of hu man Nature, to ſhew  
to what perfection the Species might aſ-  
cend (g).

Now

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(g) If we except *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the *Lyric* Poets, we hear of few Grecian Writers before the expedition of *Xerxes*. After that Monarch had been de feated, and the dread of the Persian Power was at an end, the **EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS** (if I may use the expression) broke forth, and ſhone till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom it disappeared, and never roſe again. This is that *Golden Period* spoken of above. I do not mean that Greece had not many writers of great merit ſubsequent to that period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the Great, the Striking, the Sublime (call it as you please) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could aſcend in any after age.

E e

The

Ch. V. Now THE LANGUAGE OF THESE  
GREEKS was truly like themselves, 'twas  
 CON-

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The same kind of fortune befel the People of *Rome*. When the *Punic* wars were ended, and *Carthage* their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as *Horace* informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. 'Twas soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and *Rome*, like *Greece*, had her *Golden Period*, which lasted to the death of *Octavius Caesar*.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one THE SOCRATIC PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then among

conformable to their transcendent and Ch. V.  
universal Genius. Where Matter so ~~had~~  
abounded,

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the Greeks that fatal *Peloponnesian War*, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths ; wasted their strength ; made them jealous of each other ; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the *Romans* ; raised those unhappy contests between the Senate and the *Gracchi* ; between *Sylla* and *Marius* ; between *Pompey* and *Cæsar* ; till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Cassius* at *Philippi*, and the subsequent defeat of *Antony* at *Actium*, the *Romans* became subjects to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.

It must indeed be confessed, that after *Alexander* and *Octavius* had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. *Aristotle* maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the same Monarch lived *Theophrastus*, and the Cynic, *Diogenes*. Then also *Demosthenes* and *Aeschines* spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of *Octavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Eneid*, and with

E e 2

*Horace*,

Ch. V. abounded, Words followed of course, and  
 —— those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas  
 for which they stood. And hence it fol-  
 lowed, there was not a Subject to be  
 found, which could not with propriety be  
 express in Greek.

HERE were Words and Numbers for  
 the Humour of an *Aristophanes*; for the  
 native

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*Horace*, *Varius*, and many other fine Writers, partook  
 of his protection and royal munificence. But then it  
 must be remembred, that these men were bred and educated  
 in the principles of a free Government. 'Twas  
 hence they derived that high and manly spirit, which  
 made them the admiration of after ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by *Alexander* and *Octavius*, soon stopt the growth of any thing farther in  
 the kind. So true is that noble saying of *Longinus*—  
 Θρέψας τε γὰρ ἵναντι τὰ Φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων  
 καὶ ΕΛΕΤΘΕΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐπελπίσαι, καὶ ἀμα διώτεν τὸ  
 πρόθυμον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔριδος, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ  
 πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμίας. 'Tis LIBERTY that is formed to  
 nurse the sentiments of great Genius; to inspire them  
 with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one  
 with another, and the generous emulation of being the first  
 in rank. De Subl. Sect. 44.

native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Me-* Ch. V.  
*nander*; for the amorous Strains of a *Mim-*  
*nemus* or *Sappho*; for the rural Lays of a  
*Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the sublime  
Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The  
same in Prose. Here *Isocrates* was enabled  
to display his Art, in all the accuracy of  
Periods, and the nice counterpoise of  
Diction. Here *Demosthenes* found mate-  
rials for that nervous Composition, that  
manly force of unaffected Eloquence,  
which rushed, like a torrent, too impe-  
tuous to be withheld.

Who were more different in exhi-  
biting their *Philosophy*, than *Xenophon*,  
*Plato*, and his disciple, *Aristotle*? Dif-  
ferent, I say, in their character of *Com-*  
*position*; for as to their *Philosophy itself*,  
'twas in reality *the same*. *Aristotle*,  
strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in  
*Thought*; sparing in *Ornament*; with  
little address to the Passions or Imagi-  
nation; but exhibiting the whole with

E e 3 such

Ch. V. such a pregnant brevity, that in every  
sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed *in Greek?* Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either *Xenophon* or *Plato*, nothing of this *method* and strict *order* appears. The *Formal* and *Didactic* is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, 'tis without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

AND yet though these differ in this manner from the *Stagirite*, how different are they likewise in character from each other?—*Plato*, copious, figurative,

tive, and majestic ; intermixing at times Ch. V.  
the facetious and satiric ; enriching his  
Works with Tales and Fables, and the  
mystic Theology of ancient times. *Xe-*  
*nophon*, the Pattern of perfect simpli-  
city ; every where smooth, harmonious,  
and pure ; declining the figurative, the  
marvelous, and the mystic ; ascending  
but rarely into the Sublime ; nor then  
so much trusting to the colours of Stile,  
as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment  
itself.

THE Language in the mean time, in  
which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit  
so accurately with the Stile of both, that  
when we read either of the two, we can-  
not help thinking, that 'tis he alone, who  
has hit its character, and that it could not  
have appeared so elegant in any other  
manner.

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE,  
from its Propriety and Universality, made  
E e 4 for

Ch. V. for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.

*GRAIIS ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ore  
rotundo*

*Musa loqui.*

"TWERE to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more sordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) 'twere to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of *Grecian Literature*; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the *French* and *English* Press; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where 'tis to be feared, they rarely find

4                       any

any rational pleasure, and more rarely Ch. V.  
still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. 'Tis certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom; that 'tis *Men*, and *not Books* we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the  
common

Ch. V. common helps, have been sufficient of  
 themselves to great and important Ends.  
 But alas !

*Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile—*

IN truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of *natural Capacity*, and of *super-induced Habit*. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess *the best Capacities*, cultivated with *the best Habits*. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of CULTURE and GOOD LEARNING, they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.

AND

AND so much at present as to GENERAL Ch. V.  
IDEAS; how we acquire them; whence  
they are derived; what is their Nature;  
and what their connection with Language.  
So much likewise as to the Subject of this  
Treatise, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

End of the THIRD Book.

A D-



## ADVERTISEMENT.

**T**HE following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.



## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

**P**AG. 95.—TO STOP, &c.] The Quotation from *Proclus* in the Note may be thus rendered  
**—THAT THING IS AT REST, which FOR A TIME  
 PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE,  
 both itself, and its Parts.**

P. 105. In the Note, for γιγνόμενον read γενόμενον, and render the passage thus—*For by this Faculty (namely the Faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.*

P. 106. NOTE (d).] The passage of *Philoponus* here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings *corporeal* and *sensible*, which were said to be *nearly approaching to Non-Entitys*. The Author explains this, among other reasons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔστι γειτνάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρελθόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐφάνεις καὶ ἥπτεῖται ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὡπώ  
 ἐστι· συμπαρασθέεις δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάσια, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολύθηκαί ἐστι· ὁ χρόνος. How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entitys? In the first place, because HERE (where they exist) exists THE PAST and THE FUTURE, and these are NON-ENTITYS; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with TIME, or rather 'tis upon their Motion that TIME is an Attendant.

P. 119—in the Note here subjoined mention is made of the REAL Now, or INSTANT, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a necessary Connection between *Existence* and the Present Instant, because no other Point of Time can properly be said to be, but also between *Existence* and *Life*, because whatever lives, by the same reason necessarily Is. Hence *Sophocles*, speaking of *Time present*, elegantly says of it—

—χρόνῳ τῷ ζώσῃ, καὶ παρόντι νῦν·

THE LIVING, and Now present TIME.

Tract. V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Passage in *Virgil*, of which *Servius* here speaks, is a description of *Turnus's* killing two brothers, *Amatus* and *Diores*; after which the Poet says of him,

—curru abscissa DUORUM  
Suspendit capite—

This, literally translated, is —*he hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off*, whereas the Sense requires, of THE Two persons, that is to say, of *Amatus* and *Diores*. Now this by *Amborum* would have been express properly, as *Amborum* means THE Two; by *Duorum* is express improperly, as it means only Two indefinitely.

P. 259.—The Passage in Note (o) from *Themistius*, may be thus rendered—*Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.*

P.

P. 294. Note (c)—*There are in the number of things many, which have a most known EXISTENCE, but a most unknown ESSENCE; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is Something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn.* Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.

P. 340.—**LANGUAGE—INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING DEMONSTRATION.]** See Three Treatises, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note on the words, *The Source of infinite Truths, &c.*

P. 368.—*In the Note—yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.]*

*Philoponus*, from the Philosophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, seems to have far excelled these *Moderns* in his account of **WISDOM** or **PHILOSOPHY**, and its *Attributes, or essential Characters.*—*Ιδιον γὰρ Φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς τολλοῖς ἔχον διάφοραν δεῖξαι τὴν κοινωνίαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς τολλοῖς ἔχον κοινωνίαν δεῖξαι τίνι διαφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ δυχερὲς τὸ δεῖξαι Φάτνης (*lege Φάτης*) καὶ περιστερᾶς κοινωνίαν, (ταῦτι γὰρ πρᾶπεν). ἀλλ' οὐ (*lege ὅπε*) τὸ διάφορον τύτων ἐιπεῖν. οὐδὲ κυνὸς καὶ ἵππου διάφοραν, ἀλλὰ τί κοντὶ ἔχεσθαι.* IT IS THE PROPER BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; and IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHARACTER, THRO' WHAT 'TIS THEY DIFFER.

is indeed no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove, (for this is evident to every one) but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 379—THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN,  
&c.] The Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these—μᾶλλον δὲ οὐτὶ τὸ εἶνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, οὐτὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς. THE PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN and BEAUTY are more in the Works of NATURE, than they are in those of ART.

P. 379—WE MUST OF NECESSITY ADMIT A MIND, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third book of a manuscript *Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato*, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of IDEAS, as held by antient Philosophers.

Ἐιδὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ιδεῶν ψυχῆς, διὸ οὐκ ἐκεῖνοις ηρεσεῖ, ὥρτέου ὅτι τάντα τάντα  
ὅσα ὄφατα, ὑράνια καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνην, οὐτὶ ἀπὸ ταύτημάτε  
ἔστιν, οὐτὶ κατ’ αἰτίαν ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ταύτημάτε ἀδύνατον  
ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς υπέροις τὰ κρίτιονα, νῦν, καὶ λόγος,  
καὶ αἴτια, καὶ τὰ αἴτια, καὶ ἔτι τὰ αἴτοτελέσματα  
κρείτιω τῶν αρχῶν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ δὲ Φησιν δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης  
δεῖ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ,  
τύτων γὰρ ἔκβασις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὡς εἰ τῇ  
ἀπὸ ταύτημάτε πρεσβύτερον ἀν οὐ τὸ κατ’ αἰτίαν, εἰ καὶ  
ἀπὸ ταύτημάτε τὰ Θειότατα οὖν τῶν Φανερῶν. If  
there-

therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleased them (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunar, are either from CHANCE, or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE; for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the ENDINGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGINNINGS. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL, in as much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS A DEVIATION FROM THEM; so that whatever is the Effect of such essential Cause [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even tho' we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects, [the Heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite Cause of the World in opposition to *Chance*, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be ONE. After which he goes on, as follows.——

——'Ει μὲν ἐν ἀλογου τῷτο ἀτοπού· ἔσαι γάρ τι πάλιν τῷν ὑπέρων τῆς τέτων αἰτίας κρεῖττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγου καὶ γνῶσιν ποιεῖν, ἕσω τῇ Πάντος ὅν, καὶ τῇ "Οὐ μέρος, δὲ ἐν αἴτιας ἀλόγη τοῦτο. 'Ει δὲ λόγου ἔχουν, καὶ ἀντὸ γνῶσκον, οἶδεν ἁυτὸ δίπτε τῷν πάντων αἰτίον ὅν, ή τῷτο αἰγνοῦν, αἰγνοῖσι τὴν ἁυτῆ φύσιν. 'Ει δὲ οἶδεν, δέτι κατ' ἀτίαν ἐστὶ τῇ πάντος αἰτίον, τὸ

ἢ ὡρισμένως εἰδὲς θάτερον, καὶ διάπορος ὅτεν ἐξ αὐτῆς  
καὶ, δίδει ἀρχα καὶ τὸ εἶται αὐτῶν ὡρισμένως· διδει δια τὴν  
τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ πάντα εἴκει τὸ Πᾶν, ὃν εἶται καὶ αὐτόν.  
Καὶ εἰ τέτο; Πότος εἴσι εἰστο ἀρχα βλέπου, καὶ εἰστο γι-  
νώσκου, δίδε τὰ μετ' αὐτῷ. Λόγοις ἀρχα καὶ διδεσιν αὐ-  
τοῖς δίδε τὰς Κοσμικὰς Λόγιας, καὶ τὰ ἔιδη, εἴκει δι τὸ Πᾶν,  
καὶ εἶται εἰν αὐτῷ τὸ Πᾶν, ως εἰν αἰτίῳ, χωρὶς τῆς  
ὑλῆς.—Now if this Cause be void of Rea-  
son, that indeed would be absurd; for then again there  
would be something among those things, which come last  
in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cause. I  
mean by more excellent, something operating according to  
Reason and Knowledge, and yet within that Universe, and  
a Part of that Whole, which is, what it is, from a Cause  
devoid of Reason.

But if, on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNI-  
VERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON AND KNOWL-  
EDGE ITSELF, it of course knows itself to be the Cause of all  
things; else being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant  
of its own nature. But if it know, that from ITS VERY  
ESSENCE IT IS THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE,  
and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definitely,  
knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this rea-  
son definitely the thing of which it is the Cause. IT  
KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, and all  
things out of which the Universe is composed, of all which  
also it is the Cause. But if this be true, 'tis evident that  
BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING  
ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER IT-  
SELF, AND IS SUBSEQUENT. 'Tis therefore, through  
certain REASONS AND FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER  
that

that it knows those mundane Reasons, and Farms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause, distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] 'Tis upon these Principles that Nicomachus in his *Arithmetic*, p. 7. calls the Supreme Being an Artist—ἐν τῇ τῷ τεχνίτῃ Θεῷ διανοίᾳ, in *Dei artificis mente*. Where Philoponus, in his manuscript *Comment*, observes as follows—τεχνίτην Φησὶ τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς τῶν θεών τὰς τριώντας αἰτίας καὶ τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα. He calls GOD an ARTIST, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work, and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—Ἄσπερ δὲ ήμεις, εἰς τὰ τοιωτά σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, τοιῷ μεν τόδε τι, ὅτω καὶ ὁ θημικρύδης, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀποθέλεπων, τὰ τῆδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν ἀλλ' οὐέον, δτι τὰ μὲν τῆδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ ἔισιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ παντέλειοί ἔισιν. As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at those Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those REASONS or Proportions, which exist in GOD, are ARCHETYPAL and ALL-PERFECT.

'Tis according to this Philosophy, that Milton represents God, after he had created this Visible World, contemplating

—*how it shew'd  
In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair,  
ANS'W'RING HIS GREAT IDEA*—

P. Lost VII. 556.

*Proclus proves the Existence of these GENERAL IDEAS or UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Arguments.* — *εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶν αἰτία τῷ παντὶ οὐτῷ τῷ ἔναις ποιῶσα, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ ἔναις ποιεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖ οὐσίας τούτῳ ἐστιν ὡράτως, ὅπερ τὸ ποιεῖμενον δευτέρως καὶ ὁ ἐστιν ὡράτως, δίδωσι τῷ ποιείμενῳ δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ καὶ δίδωσι θερμότητα ἄλλω, καὶ ἐεἴ τε θερμὸν, ηὔ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωὴν, καὶ ἔχει ζωὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἴδοις ἀνὰ ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσα αὐτῷ τῷ ἔναις ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ αἰτίου ἐν τῷ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ ἔναις ποιεῖν τοῦτο ἐστιν ὡράτως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὴ ὁ κόσμος πλήρωμα ἐιδῶν ἐστὶν παντούν, εἰνὶ ἀνὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ταῦτα ὡράτως· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸν αἰτίου καὶ θλίου, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ αὐθρωπὸν ὑπέστησε, καὶ ἵππον, καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἐίδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί, ταῦτα ἄρα ὡράτως ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ τῷ παντὸς, ἄλλος θλίος παρὰ τὸν ἐμφανῆ, καὶ ἄλλος αὐθρωπός, καὶ τῶν ἐιδῶν ὄμοιώς ἔχειτο. ἐστὶν ἄρα τὰ ἐιδη πρὸ τῶν αἰδηπτῶν, καὶ αἰτία αὐτῶν τὰ δημιουργικὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐιρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τῷ κόσμῳ παντὸς αἰτίᾳ προσάρχοντα. If therefore THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE be a Cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing, operate from its own proper Essence, SUCH CAUSE IS PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARILY, and that, which it is primarily, it giveth to its Effect secondarily. 'Tis thus that Fire both giveth Warmth*

to something else, and is itself warm; that the Soul giveth Life, and posseſſeth Life; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, IS THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SECUNDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the plenitude of FORMS of all Sorts, these FORMS MUST ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD, for 'twas the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The FORMS therefore, PREVIOUS to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their ACTIVE and EFFICIENT CAUSES, are to be found PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE.

*Procl. Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.*

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason, as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this antient Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from *Plato* and *Socrates* to *Parmenides*, *Pythagoras*, and *Orpheus* himself.

If the Phrase, *to operate merely by existing*, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes are secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 162, 359.

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That

That we should not therefore think of a *blind unconscious* operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, by uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy, where he forms the Character of these Divine and Creative Ideas.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—*ἀλλ᾽ οὐπερ ἐθέλοιμεν τὴν ἴδιοτηλα ἀντῶν (sc. Ιδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν Φυσικῶν λόγων λάβαμεν τὸ ἀντῷ τῷ εἶναι τοιποτικὸν, ὃν δὴ καὶ ποιεῖσθαι: ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωστικόν, ὃν ποιεῖσθαι, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀντῷ τῷ εἶναι τοιποτικόν, καὶ ταῦτα ἵνωσαντες φύμεν αἰτίας εἶναι, τὰς Ιδέας δημικργικὰς. Θμεατε καὶ τοφεὶς πάντων τῶν κατὰ Φύσιν ἀποτελυμένων.* But if we should abuse so define the peculiar character of IDEAS by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EFFECTING, MEERLY BY EXISTING, all the things that they effect; and from ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF COMPREHENDING all that they effect, although they did not effect them meerly by existing; and then uniting those two, let us say that IDEAS are at once the EFFICIENT and INTELLIGENT CAUSES of all things produced according to Nature. From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, *Thomas Aquinas*, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. *Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificiata ad Artem.*

The

The Verses of *Orpheus* on this subject may be found in the tract *De Mondo*, ascribed to *Aristoteles*, p. 23. *Edit. Sylburg.*

*Zεῦς ἀρσην γένετο, Ζεῦς ρ. τ. λ.*

P. 391—WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED,  
[Ec.]

—ὅσα τέρ πέιται ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δῆ τινα μερισμὸν, τοσαῦτα καὶ ΤΟ ΕΝ ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ τε μερισμῷ κατὰ τὸ τάντη ἀμερές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν, ὡς ἐλάχιστον, καθάπερ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν, ἀλλ' ΕΝ, ΩΣ ΠΑΝΤΑ. *As numerous as is the Multitude of Individuals by Partition, so numerous also is that Principle of Unity by universal Impartibility. For it is not One, as a minimum is one, (according to what Speucippus seemed to say,) but it is One, as being ALL THINGS.* Damascius *τερπὶ Αρχῶν*, MS.

P. 408—THE WISEST NATIONS—THE MOST COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] 'Tis well observed by *Muretus*—*Nulli unquam, qui res ignorant, nomina, quibus eas exprimerent, quaesierunt.* Var. Lect. VI. i.

P. 411—BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSOPHY?] The same *Muretus* has the following passage upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.—*Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores ROMANI, in petendis honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et Græculis esurientibus relinquebant. Ipsi, quod ab avaritia,*

## ADDITIONAL NOTES.

*tia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus si partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Græcum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam vitam a se et profligatam jacere Graciam somniabant.* Var. Lect. VI. 4,

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## F I N I S,

## E R R A T A.

Page 4. for *ἀποιθατ*, read, *ἀποιθίατ*. P. 29. for *Prisc. L. IX.* read, *Prisc. L. XI.* P. 87. for *κατηγόριαν*, read, *κατηγόριαν*. P. 96. for Proposition, read, Preposition. P. 107. Note for (d) read (c). P. 259. Note for *σωλαχū*, read, *σωλαχū*. P. 262. for Mortar, read, Morter.



## A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

*The Reader is desired to take notice, that  
as often as the author quotes V.I. p. &c.  
he refers to Three Treatises published first in  
one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1745, and  
of which a second Edition is now preparing.*

